Ahmed BOUKOUS

ESSAYS ON ISSUES IN MOROCCAN CULTURE

TOWARDS A GLOCALIZED CULTURE

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If my consciousness had been clear enough and the words sufficiently nuanced to express it, I would have liked to tell you that we are here to explore, discover, and share the best that there is in ourselves. Every one of us has got a treasure. Be conscious and generous of your treasure and, at the same time, stay open-minded and attentive to receive the treasure from others, ready to learn and to question oneself. Seek beauty, truth, excellence through welcoming your weakness, your vulnerability and your shadow in such a way as to be equally welcoming those of the others. Occupy happily your seat: there is a seat for everyone; otherwise neither you nor I will have been here. Think that the place that you do not occupy to avoid bothering remains forever vacant, and be happy that everyone fully holds his own around you.

Tagore Rabindranath (1861-1941)
Hindi Composer, writer, painter, and philosopher.
Nobel Prize in Literature winner in 1913.

Prologue

The present book intends to analyze the cultural issues of concern within Moroccan society today. The analysis is conducted within the framework of symbolic domination as it has been elaborated in critical sociology by Bourdieu (2008). The issue of culture in Morocco is generally addressed within the framework of postcolonial thought, an approach that opposes national culture to the culture of the colonial power with respect to cultural and linguistic independence. This frame of thought was first carried out by the political and cultural elites emerging from the National Movement, with a fringe magnifying "the Arab-Muslim heritage" and another one embracing "the progressive Arab culture". These two veins of the same paradigm have dominated cultural thought and creation for at least four decades after independence, to the extent that they have been considered as the only legitimate and credible paradigm conveyed by the intellectual elites and ideological machinery.

This reality has been questioned by a plebeian elite coming from dynamic forces with a rural background who migrated to cities and who benefited from education and training. This elite has taken up the mission of setting up the foundations of a postcolonial thought by adopting an archeology of knowledge based approach allowing the deconstruction of the national movement discourse and highlighting the Amazigh cultural stratum which has been confined into the unthought-of area until recently. The process of deconstruction was at first characterized by a state of theoretical confusion, then by a kind of obsession with identity discourse, and at a later stage by a more serene apprehension of cultural rights. Favorable conditions have been created in the wake of a political openness atmosphere, enhanced by the promulgation of the new constitution and the initiation of the process of its implementation. On its

part, the protest discourse has contributed to the establishment of a salutary counter-power through the modalities of citizen action in social media networks. In spite of the vagaries of the political context where the conservative forces are trying to curb the movement towards modernity, the mechanisms of institutional construction and civil participation are gradually being implemented thus contributing to the enrichment of the national cultural project through thought as well as literary and artistic creation. In more specific terms, the analysis undertaken in this book focuses on the issue of the centrality of culture in the present and future of Morocco. The range of this issue is that of the Moroccan culture paradigm with the multiplicity and diversity of voices expressed therein, those of tradition, modernity, "Arabity", and "Amazighity". The aspects on which the proposed analyzes are based relate to culture "glocalization", and the threats of cultural diversity in the context of globalization; they also concern the cultural range represented by the "interculturalist" utopia advocated by the Westernized elites, the paradoxes of the "patrimonialist" discourse adopted by the traditional elites through embodiment of tradition, and the quest for identity syndrome mobilized by the followers of the past in a changing environment. In order to contribute to a dynamic understanding and to a positive overtaking of these phenomena, more practical questions are posed, namely on the traditional and current literary expressions of "Amazighity", in its relation to the "Moroccan identity" and "citizenship" within a societal project based on "modernity" and "sustainable development". The materials used in the analysis of the selected themes are drawn from the author's work during a period stretching from 1977 to 2018 (See the list of references). Some of these materials are borrowed from surveys; others are taken from empirical investigations on patterns of intangible culture in Morocco today.

Essay 1
Culture, Locality, and Globality

In tribute to
Mahdi Elmandjra (1933–2013)

Statement of the Problem

The phenomenon approach has to be systemic by taking into account the significant parameters at a global level and by interacting dynamically to produce a given situation locally. Thus, it is a combination of political and economic parameters at a global level, producing effects at a local level, which shows how globalization of exchanges between nations leads to the dominance of certain elements of "world culture", essentially “the Western one” coming from elsewhere, particularly in the fields of technology, music, cinema, sports, education, clothing, architecture, transportation, business, cooking, etc. Cultural diversity of the world is shrinking away as a result of the unequal cultural exchange between human communities. In fact, the manifestations of the presence of "Western" culture in peripheral communities through “the intercultural” do only reflect the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of an effective and a wide scale appropriation of “Western culture”, due to the lack of resources and because of endogenous cultural inhibitions. This means that cultural hierarchy remains fundamentally vertical by the domination of the North over the South. Hierarchy is also obvious at the horizontal level, within peripheral communities, because of the socio-economic divisions between classes and social strata.

The Universe as a "global village"

We owe to Marshall McLuhan (1967) the notion of "global village" to refer to the unification of the world as a result of the influence of the media, information and communication technologies. Humanity would therefore live "in the same time, at the same pace, and consequently in the same space", with one and the same culture, "the global culture". However, to judge it with reference to our living reality today, fifty years after the prophesy of our philosopher and sociologist, human communities are still so divided by laws, borders, political systems, economic gaps, religions, cultures and nationalisms. The divisions and partitions are much more apparent than before. Massive divisions started even to become object of theorization attempts with "the clash of civilizations" (See Samuel Huntington, 1997 [1996 USA]). According to the American political analyst, civilizations are differentiated based on objective elements (language, history, religion, customs, and institutions) and on subjective elements of auto-identification. It is the differences and the divergences between identities and cultures that create conflicts and alliances; according to him, the main conflict is the one between "the Western civilization" and "the Islamic civilization", the latter is supposed to incarnate the "extreme evil". In fact, the notion of politics in the service of financial and economic interests, acting as a support to the theory of "the clash of civilizations", has led to the neutralization of certain entities of the "Islamic world" and to permanent threats of interference into all countries classified under "the axis of evil". To overcome this state of affairs, the United Nations Organization created the *Forum of Alliance of Civilizations* in response to the initiatives of Heads of States, namely Zapathero and Sampaio. Its work plan includes specifically antiterrorism cooperation, fight against economic and social inequalities and establishment of a dialogue of cultures. The *Forum* speaks in favor of a culture of peace, dialogue between civilizations, and for a dialogue of cultures and civilizations, particularly a dialogue on interfaith cooperation. The UN is committed to "take the appropriate measures to promote a culture of peace as well as a dialogue at a local, national, and

international level". The immediate objective of the *forum* was to overcome the chaotic state of the world following the invasion of Iraq and its destruction; it actually failed to contain violence which led to the dramatic situations in Iraq, Syria and Libya. One can easily see that the "culturalism" perspective of international relations has led to chaos; and that neither M. McLuhan's "communicative" approach, nor S. Huntington's violence approach, nor the UN's idealistic perspective, have been able to provide a thorough explanation of the dramatic state of the world. The situation is indeed more complex, and less liable to be reduced to this or that exclusive theory.

Culture and "Glocalization"

The fundamental question facing culture in relation to its environment lies in the intricate issue of the interaction between "globalization" and "localization". Does culture have an exclusively local environment or is it inevitably subject to the grip of globalization? Analysts are inclined to consider that the problem is misrepresented when we assume that culture can only be exclusively localized or globalized. In other words, to contrast the local and the global facts in the production and dissemination of cultural expressions by treating them as mutually exclusive factors is to approach culture, its producers, its modes of production and the social uses that one makes of it from an unhistorical perspective. Today, it seems clear that local expressions of culture are governed de facto by the capitalist logic of globalization; they are produced by agents who live, more or less well, from their activities, by using market tools and mechanisms in the production, marketing and commercialization of their products. Moreover, sectors and producers which resist or do not adapt to this scheme have no possibility to resist competition and to continue to exist. So naturally, and in extreme cases, local cultures and their producers and consumers open up to the world by borrowing the techniques, processes and marketing strategies of globalized cultures, and thus adapting them to the realities of the modern world. This is how local communities are invited into globalization through "glocalization". The

term “glocalization” is a combination of “global” and “local”; it is a concept that matches global trends and local realities; it translates the Japanese term *dochakuka* meaning “global localization”, and refers to the adaptation of modern agricultural techniques to local conditions, and it has then been used somehow successfully in the marketing strategy to integrate local markets into the global capitalist system.

According to Roland Robertson (1994), the hybridization of the global and the local transcends the “location”, a place of reproduction of traditional cultural patterns, involving the risk of being frozen in a presumably unchanging and mistakenly secure identity, contrasted with globalization as a sphere of domination of central cultures over peripheral ones and the place of extroversion and loss of identity landmarks. The syncretic exceedance of introversion produced by localization together with extraversion inherent to globalization are likely to be realized in the process of “glocalization”, in the sense of a moderate “globalization”, which adapts itself to local realities, rather than ignoring or laminating them. But we are also aware that promoting the relationship of the local and the global necessitates “thinking globally and acting locally”, while being open to the rest of the world, through communicating via the new information and communication technologies. “Glocalization” is, in this sense, an internalized “globalization” representing an alternative movement that consists of a humanized culture whose components are approved by the users themselves. On a much broader scale, sociologists explain that the emergent reality of social life in the conditions of globalization provides the preconditions for trans-national social spaces, and that this process of glocalization can ultimately lead to a cosmopolitan and transnational society. Globalization could then be considered as an economic form of trans-nationalism, because the social movement described by trans-nationalism leads to a reduction of the importance of borders for all forms of global activity, ranging from political processes to cultural or economic processes. Thus, the borders are losing importance because of the transnational movement, the integration of the global forces in which the people who crossed the borders ultimately interact; it

should be hoped that this process of "Glocalization" can provide a societal impetus for a more cultural open-mindedness of cosmopolitanism.

It is also possible to define cultural glocalization in terms of cultural identity and language (See Ho Kin Tong *et al*., 2011). Homogenization, heterogenization and "glocalization" are three possible ways to take up the challenge of cultural globalization; yet, "glocalization" might also be the most realistic solution because it shows to be a way toward a better quality of life. The process of exporting cultural identities to other countries is cultural globalization, while the adaptation of incoming foreign economic products to local needs is a cultural "glocalization". Language is an indicator in lifestyle area as well as the bearer of aspects of identity related to cultures, institutional systems and spiritual values. Incoming foreign languages and foreign economic products often lead to changes in local culture identities. This is an interactive process, because change affecting any configuration item can bring about change into other configuration items. To be an efficient communicator in this multilingual world, people have to develop multilingual and multicultural skills. For example, the Hong Kong and Singapore experience with the glocalization of Mandarin and with the rapid growth in the number of Mandarin learners and speakers worldwide indicate the potential for Mandarin to develop into an international language after English.

In the context of the globalization of material and exchange of symbolic goods, the risk of culture uniformity and of the massification of their uses is a real one, because the general tendency of States and companies is to move toward the reification of knowledge and know-how to become commodities and exclusively merchant products. We see this well with cinema, music, painting as well as in another different field, namely sport. However, awareness starts to assert itself within a social class concerning the importance of culture in sustainable development, contributing essentially to human fulfillment, intercultural dialogue and culture of peace. However, one should adhere neither to the market oriented vision of object collectors which considers cultural objects as products whose aesthetic dimension is essentially lucrative, nor to the idealistic vision that

overlooks the importance of the commercial dimension and the social uses of cultural objects. On another level, humans have, at all times and based on different modalities, mobilized culture as a symbolic expression of identities, a mobilization which has most often been oriented towards self-defense vis-à-vis a presumed outside world, rightly or wrongly, driven by a feeling of political, economic, cultural hegemonism. As a reaction, the communities that feel threatened can engage in a quest for landmarks. Some of them come to use the notions of "culture" and "civilization» in the aim of opposing human communities to each other. That has been the case of all the empires (Roman, Moslem, Iberian, British, French, American, Soviet, etc.). The excellence of the conqueror's culture and civilization has always served as an excuse for the domination of the conquered peoples. This has led to the imposition of its cultural model and *ipso facto* to the implementation of the process of cultural uniformization. The resistance of the subdued peoples has in turn been nourished by the sense of historical legitimacy granted to its culture; a fact which has given it the strength to fight the imperial system and to threaten it in many parts of the globe.

In the wake of the world conflicts, humanity gained a burst of awareness as to the necessity of managing differences among the nations through peaceful means. It must be admitted that neither the experience of the League of Nations nor that of the Organization of the United Nations has ever been managed to attain this in a sustainable way. In most cases they have been cut to fit the interests of the great powers, some of whom do not hesitate to leave organizations that refuse to yield to their will. This was attested recently with the withdrawal of the U.S.A. from the UNESCO and the Human Rights Council. However, thanks to the efforts made by the international community within the scope of UNESCO, the Universal Declaration for Cultural Diversity (2001) adopted a new cultural strategy based on the acknowledgment and promotion of the diversity of world cultures, while emphasizing that cultural diversity is an integral component of the human identity itself. Cultural diversity is considered in the Declaration as equally necessary for humanity as biodiversity is for

natural ecosystem. This constitutes UNESCO's fundamental contribution "to humanize the globalization". Being consubstantial, cultures specific to human communities cannot serve as a ground for discord. But the equation between "human identity" and "cultural diversity" equally necessitates the recognition of the presence of unity within diversity, without which diversity would be only multiplicity. Diversity exists only on the basis of unity, and the extensive recognition of cultural differences, with all what it entails, is by nature an affirmation of the fundamental unity of the human act; the manifestation of all these differences emanate from one unified background. Diversity entertains a founding relationship with culture; culture is diversity, infinite deployment of distinctions, nuances, and revivals. Culture is the relentless resumption of all that exists to make it both same and different, to understand it and bring it to life. It is by nature diverse. But for this same reason, it gives this diversity a dimension that transcends and envelops it: diversity does not exist by itself; it is even indecipherable in the absence of culture. Diversity is constructed by culture which gives it meaning, shape and depth.

The positive role of "Glocalization» is clearly visible in the contribution of cultural industries to the preservation of cultural diversity worldwide. There would be no cultural diversity without the human being's capacity to practice and express his creativity. Literary, artistic and aesthetic expressions are but one way among others to express ideas, hopes and values of human communities. While reflecting their world view and their identity, cultures contribute to the preservation of diversity whilst being a factor of sustainable development and prosperity for creators and entrepreneurs. Therefore, in a world marked by competition, diversity, being a source of creativity anchored in tradition and open to modernity, is an added value lever in the market of cultural goods. Analysts are unanimous in considering that local and international economies have been "boosted" by the cultural industries since the end of the twentieth century. This phenomenon continues during the 20th century to become a key component in the trade balance of a number of countries.

Integrating Modernity

It's through integrating modernity into tradition that indigenous communities maintain their lifestyles, identities, values and their worldviews. The recognition of local and indigenous knowledge challenges many basic notions of development, environmental conservation, heritage protection, access to information, and education for all. "Indigenous and local knowledge", refer to the know-how, interpretations and systems of sophisticated meanings accumulated and developed by peoples with a long history of interaction with their natural environment. For the great majority of rural and indigenous people, these cognitive systems serve as a basis for decisions taken at a local level related to basic aspects of daily life, economically, socio-culturally and ecologically. These unique knowledge models are outstanding manifestations of universal cultural diversity; and they constitute an integral part of cultural system based on language, use of resources, naming and classification systems, rituals, spirituality and a special worldview. Local and indigenous knowledge is often perceived as an ancient wisdom transmitted through many generations. "Tradition" and "heritage" are then interpreted as synonymous to permanence, immobility and inflexibility. In fact, local knowledge is subject to a perpetual process of re-evaluation, renewal and development. Each generation appropriates the cognitive tools and concepts required to live in a rapidly changing world; and to do so, it adapts its ancestors' knowledge to its own experience and to the perspectives available to it. An indication of the inherent dynamism of local knowledge is the ease with which indigenous peoples adopt modern technologies and adapt them to their needs.

Transmission of "local" or "indigenous knowledge" across generations ensures intergenerational dialogue; it can also enhance community capacities to open up to other communities' know-how, both endogenous and exogenous. In this way, the local communities grant themselves the means to appropriate the principle of "glocalization" efficiently. For example, Amazigh carpet manufacturing makes use of the traditional weaving know-how related to forms and colors, as well as designs rooted

in the collective unconsciousness through enriching the carpet by introducing novel techniques, formats and designs borrowed from global culture. But the "glocalization" can sometimes lead to bad results. For example, the restoration and the rehabilitation of the Kasbahs in South-Eastern Morocco are not always successful, especially when the materials used (cement and reinforced concrete) replace adobe or when the crenellated turrets are badly arranged or contain inappropriate patterns, and anything that disguises and disfigures these world architecture wonders. There are other areas where the opening up to the global culture produces innovative works in the Amazigh culture. This is the case of literature where the traditional genres are enriched by the adoption of new genres such as the novel, the short story, the essay, new innovative writing techniques such as description, exodiegetic and metadiegetic techniques, intertextuality, etc. or even other artistic expressions such as cinema, theater and plastic arts. Naturally, the introduction of these innovations can disrupt the transmission of traditional knowledge or divert younger generations, who may deem them outdated, obsolete or even primitive. This situation may lead to the decay of certain aspects of the local culture and, as a result, head towards cultural extraversion and alienation. It is then up to education systems to assume the undertaking of a creative appropriation of local knowledge and know-how by young generations, while granting them the means to master modern knowledge.

It is obvious that in order to introduce coherence in the connectedness between local knowledge and global knowledge, it is judicious to integrate them into the process of sustainable development adhering to a vision governed by ethics, values and moral principles. In this perspective, the recognition of cultural diversity and the promotion of pluralism will no longer be synonymous of fragmentation and of identity confinement, and that the survival of world cultures diversity depends on their creative capacity to maintain a peaceful coexistence based on mutual respect, dialogue and living together through setting up new rules in the intercommunity exchange economy based on equal exchange and fair trade. These exchanges should be addressed within the context of the globalization effects on cultural diversity.

Essay 2
Globalization and Cultural Diversity

In tribute to

Fatema Mernissi (1940-2015)

Statement of the Problem

Globalization is a historical, universal and irreversible phenomenon. In fact, it has marked the history of human communities at all times, and it is not random that certain periodization patterns in history are based on denominations taken from successive empires corresponding to the Hellenization, Romanization, Arab-islamization, Europeanization, Americanization, and recently the Asiatization of the world. But, more drastically, globalization is a salient character of contemporary history because of the integration of economies and cultures in "the global village" structured by the dominant central system, the Anglo-Saxon liberal system. Globalization, which tends to make the Earth a global market, is the outcome of technological progress and of the increasing integration of the world economies by means of trade and financial flows.

The term "globalization», also referred to sometimes as the French "Mondialisation", bears a significant emotional load, and has certainly some sort of impact on everyone. This is why attitudes towards it are varied. Indeed, some, the pro-globalists, consider this phenomenon as beneficial because it allows for the promotion of global economic development and contributes to the sharing of the culture and modernity values; while others, the anti-globalists, believe that globalization increases inequalities between and within countries, threatens jobs in rich

and poor countries, impedes the progress of poor countries, and undermines sustainable development through exhaustive search for growth and overexploitation of natural resources. In this context, language and culture contact is a common phenomenon which generates culture enrichment and hybridization but also dependence of peripheral languages and cultures and which in turn leads to cultural assimilation of the dominated communities. Hence, globalization is a source of benefits and detriments at the same time; it is up to us to know how to negotiate contact and confluence of cultures, and how to manage the two sides of *Janus*.

Attention, hereinafter, will be focused on the relationship between globalization and culture in the anthropological sense of the term, that is, the set of properties pertaining to a community: material and intangible properties, beliefs, values and behaviors. The issue of the relationship between cultural diversity and globalization is both of timely nature and of common sense. It is timely as it directly calls for reflection on the future of our peripheral communities, and it is of common sense because it is self-evident just like such ordinary phenomena that are subtle and recalcitrant to conceptual thinking.

Globalization, Universality and Irreversibility

Let's start by recalling a simple fact, namely that globalization is an irreversible historical phenomenon which requires not only adapting to it, but also mastering, appropriating, and assimilating it in order to make it contribute positively. It is pointless and illusory to think that it is possible to ignore the impact of globalization on the cultures of communities lacking economic power. Globalization is an objective fact whose negative as well as positive impact has to be assessed within a systemic approach. This is a phenomenon that Moroccan culture has undergone since ancient times in the context of its successive contact with the Phoenician, Roman, Arab-Muslim, Spanish, Portuguese, and French civilizations. Even today, the substratum of these cultures is present, to varying degrees, in

Moroccan culture, and the impact of Western culture is even more outstanding, with the primacy of the Anglo-American culture. In the near future, it will be necessary to positively adhere to the process of "the Asianization of the world" by opening up to Chinese, Indian and Japanese cultures, which have particularly evolved by assimilating the positive contributions of Western culture, while preserving their own underlying foundations.

Openness to globalization is much less a choice; it is rather a historical inevitability. Starting from this premise, the dilemma facing the Moroccan culture can be reduced to the Shakespearean question: "to be or not to be". In fact, the Constitution stipulates that Moroccan culture is and should be. But how can this conviction be translated into political, economic, social, cultural and technological reality. In other words, how can the State, institutions, society and individuals contribute to ensure that Moroccan culture can cope with globalization stakes and meets its challenges? It is certain that the attitude vilifying globalization by reducing it to a means of imposing the imperialist Anglo-Saxon culture that devours the cultures of the dominated communities is an ideological, unrealistic and somewhat irrational attitude. The dilemma is how to assimilate the dominant universal culture, making its active principles the leaven that renews the Moroccan culture's structures and forms.

Globalization and Diversity of "Civilizations"

As we have stated in the previous essay, in the context of cultural diversity, there are two approaches which stand out and shape the patterning of the behavior of individuals and groups, an approach which establishes the connection between cultures in terms of conflict, and that is the theory of the "clash of civilizations" and that of the "alliance of civilizations". The first approach is elaborated by Huntington (1996), the US political strategist, apparently following Braudel (1987) who accurately described the mentalities, the identities and the peculiarities of each civilization in the world, namely Arab-Islamic, Chinese, Mongolian, Indian,

African, European civilizations...). Huntington (Idem.) argues that conflicts henceforth have to be considered not as ideological but rather as cultural:

> *In this new world, the fundamental source of conflict will neither be primarily ideological nor primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.*

According to this theory, public opinions and leaders would be more inclined to support or to cooperate with a country or an organization if they are culturally close to each other. The world will soon end up by being confronted to a *clash of civilizations*, that is to say, to a more or less peaceful competition, to a more or less frozen conflict, such as those of the Cold War, between blocks of civilizations. Huntington defines "civilizations" on the basis of their background religion (Christianity, Islam, Buddhism...), and their corresponding culture. He identifies seven civilization entities and potentially an eighth one: the Western entity (Western Europe and the United States), the Latin-American entity, Islamic entity, the Salvo-Orthodox entity (the region surrounding Russia), the Hindu entity, the Japanese entity, the Confucian entity (Sino-Vietnamese-Korean) and the African entity. It is obvious that this approach serves much more the military strategy than it promotes international concord. The exploitation thereof by W. Bush for belligerent and imperialistic purposes in Iraq and Afghanistan continues to have dramatic repercussions on the situation of the globe. Today, with the "Trump phenomenon", it is the strict economic interest that governs international relations, as can be seen from the rapprochement between the United States on one side and the petroleum monarchies on the other. On the opposite side of the "clash of civilizations" theory, the *Alliance of Civilizations* movement, which was initiated by Spain in 2004 and which was taken over and officialized by the UN, has adopted the principle of an international diplomacy based on a mutual enrichment of civilizations.

Thought, culture and art are sources of creativity, emancipation and levers of political, social and cultural transformation. Let's take a few examples to illustrate the merits of this approach. No reasonable and objective observer can deny the fact that the progress achieved by Humanity throughout its history is the fruit of successive contributions of the great civilizations: Chinese civilization, the Pharaonic civilization, the Greek-Roman civilization, the Arab-Muslim civilization, the European civilization, the American civilization and Asian civilization.

Cultures in the Globalization Context

Cultural phenomena are not immune to globalization; their transformations are generating passionate debates. The term “culture” has two different conceptual meanings. In the broad field of ethnology, culture is an integrated set of norms, representations and behaviors acquired by the human being as a member of a community. Being a sign of identification to a group and of differentiation with respect to other groups; this set is transmitted through traditions which are constantly reformulated according to historical contexts. The second and more restricted characterization advocated by sociologists relates to artistic and symbolic creations, to heritage and cultural productions (books, films, music, plastic arts, etc.). These two designations raise debates with different stakes; the first one concerns the future of the “traditional cultures” and the conditions of cultural identities expression, while the second concerns the cultural industries, which are increasingly concentrated and subject to the effects of the digital revolution.

Two trend movements have marked the symbolic cultural situation at the heart of the unrestrained globalization. On the one hand, globalization sharpens differences and intensifies antagonisms between cultural identities by multiplying exchanges, and on the other hand, in order to limit these antagonisms and preserve the human heritage, there is an emergence of international mechanisms aiming at promoting “cultural diversity”. Globalization alters the nature of local and international

conflicts, and increases particularly religious, ethnic and linguistic tensions. Several fault lines explain these tensions, starting with the North/South relations, which favor the propagation of Western values and erode languages and ancestral memories. Furthermore, one should note the oppositions between the West and the Arab and Muslim World based on various partially exorcised traumas, such as colonization, which has generated contrasting reactions ranging from the rejection of cultural imperialism to the attraction to the Western model. De facto, tensions between religion and laicism have become stronger these last decades. Indeed, if the post-industrial countries give the impression to be "disappointed" (except significantly for the United States), everywhere else, religious values appear to be progressing. Migration flows also generate tensions for migrants and their families, but also when they affect populations undergoing threats or believing they are so with respect to their well-fare, security and cultural identity. Finally, there are several other cultural divisions characterizing the present era: the protection of national cultures is at odds with the movement of creative work and knowledge across country borders; the disappearance of many vernacular dialects is against the dominance of some major vehicular languages; the assertion of a "common humanity" contradicts the valorization of ethnic minorities, creolizations and cultural hybrids. Sometimes, the cultural field itself generates struggles: the issues of the differences grow and become conflicting. But, most often, culture is much less an agent, but it is rather a hostage of economic and political power relations, which invest and make use of it. Individuals and institutions are then predisposed to make use of cultural identities, be they real or imaginary, to make benefits from the rhetoric of "cultural exception", which actually masks protectionist tendencies. The abusive reference of former communist states to "Asian values" to justify their new capitalist line, and the political uses of the satirical cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad in some countries, etc. are cases in point. As it creates new cultural tensions, globalization can at the same time reduce the countries' ability to manage them.

UNESCO Convention (2005), Strengths and Limitations

International institutions are not always capable to compensate for the limitations in the States policies as to the management of contradictions and conflicts. It is for this reason that UNESCO, being faithful to its educational mission, prefers to anticipate and prevent through promoting respect for cultural expressions. International conventions related to culture exist already, but none of them dealt in global terms with the issue of cultural diversity in globalization. This resulted in the impossibility for States to adopt measures constraining the movement of cultural goods and services. In reaction to these concerns, UNESCO has elaborated a new convention aiming at rehabilitating public interference into the cultural sector, *The UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of Cultural Expressions*. This project is extremely motivated by the failure of the proposals on "cultural exception» during the negotiations which led to the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Hence, it was about moving from the defensive strategy of the "exception" to a more positive approach in terms of "diversity".

The text which entered into force in 2005 is centered on "the expressions that result from the creativity of individuals, groups, and communities". It focuses essentially on contents, namely transmitted messages, and not on specific forms or channels. The "protection» and "promotion" of culture are almost always associated with it. This amounts to saying that the approach incorporates openness to other cultures and development of intercultural exchanges. In addition, the text insists on the sovereignty and the States' capacity to act; and above all, it incites them to exercise their prerogatives and to actively engage in favor of diversity. The text does not specify the measures that States should take, which leaves them free choice of the means. It only provides examples of possible actions. We can namely find therein quotas and measures in favor of artists as well as measures to support independent national cultural industries and the informal sector to ensure their access to the means of production, dissemination and distribution. All these measures are based on the "specific status of cultural activities, goods and services", which

excludes them from the regulations of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC).

One of the criticisms leveled to the Convention is its limiting character which does not allow for dealing with cultural rights and their respect. Also, it lacks a political vision concerning the issue of cultural diversity; quite simply, it does not address the issue of measures infringing human rights; furthermore, it refers only to the rights of individuals, excluding any indication of collective rights, despite its reference, on several occasions, to "minorities" and "indigenous peoples". If the text clearly stipulates the rights of States, the obligations of the latter are not mentioned therein. The words used are good indicators: It is said that they have to "strive", "work on", "favor", "encourage", and so on. Such vague wordings intend not to deter the least wealthy States from adhering to a convention imposing constraints that they may not be able to cope with. It is obvious that the search for compromises between States is at the origin of these limitations because the Convention would gain more weight based on wider ratification. Its impact depends on the degree of adherence it will gain; because, if it cannot stand as a legal ground for trade negotiations, it can still serve as a supporting document which can politically mark the boundary between what is negotiable and what is not. In order for it to fulfill such a function, it needs support that is not only quantitatively large but also qualitatively representative. Subsequently, its credibility will depend on its effective implementation, starting with the setting up of bodies designed to ensure its follow up. The first meeting of *The Conference of the Parties* was convened in June 2007 in order to comply with the requirement stipulating that intergovernmental committee members are elected upon entry into force. This is particularly important as this intergovernmental committee is endowed with many responsibilities, such as the establishment of consultation procedures between the parties and the preparation of operational guidelines. But the Convention's main source of credibility lies essentially in the outcome of the use that the States themselves would make of it. Most of the commitments that it

includes do not prescribe specific results and constitute at most obligations of conduct.

The Convention should regulate overt conflicts and deal with the conditions of potential disputes by reinforcing sustainability conditions of vulnerable and dominated communities cultures against powerful communication media, such as television, radio, internet, etc. which de facto diffuse and impose the culture of the super powers. This is how American cinema, sports, and music stars contribute largely to impose their own culture on youth around the globe. Similarly, the Japanese cartoons mark children's consciousness worldwide. In short, the economic power promotes the power of the culture that accompanies it. Thus, cultural models, thought, myths, beliefs, fashion, lifestyle, etc. tend towards homogenization throughout continents, but always from North to South. This cultural homogenization has positive effects as well as negative ones. Indeed, the fact that the ideals of democracy, and values of modernity increasingly transcend borders, is in itself beneficial to the extent that formerly enclaved or enclosed communities are compelled to open up to societies which are more open and more developed. They accordingly discover democracy, human rights, gender equality, cultural and linguistic differences, prosperity and the benefits of economic development. They thus become aware of the achievements made by other societies, as they are inspired by them and identify with them ... they sometimes become more demanding, and more advocate towards the rulers. That is how they force change ... but a change that is agreed upon and in which they are active parties and not a change forced by an imperial will.

The effects of globalization, however, are not automatically perceived in a positive way by all societies. Far from that, we can even say that the effects of globalization can be perverse. Let's take examples in the field of culture. France has adopted an anti-globalization attitude to preserve its culture, which is presumably threatened by Anglo-Saxon culture. It has thus developed the theory of the "cultural exception" to maintain its cultural products, particularly in the areas of cinema and music, by

requiring that quotas be reserved to French production in cinemas, festivals, and in radio and television programs, despite that the French economy is fully in line with liberal economy. There is even a law which requires that the use of French is compulsory in administrations, universities, research and the public domain; that is the Toubon Law of 4 August 1994 on the use of French and the protection of the French linguistic heritage. It aims at a strategic objective, that of ensuring the primacy of the French language in France where it is threatened by the expansion of English, through three measures: language enrichment, the obligation to use French and to defend it as the language of the Republic (Article 2 of the 1958 Constitution). In the same line of the rationale of this "law", the Fillon government is re-launching the debate on "national identity" in France, with seemingly xenophobic insinuations in the country Enlightenment. Indeed, millions of native French people develop feelings of xenophobia, if not racism towards immigrants, namely Maghrebian ones, even when it is obvious that migration is a phenomenon that accompanies globalization and the development of media resources that are normally open to cultural differences.

At the other extreme, in the Netherlands, and as a reaction against a socio-cultural model that it rejects, the Moroccan diaspora, especially the young generation presumed to be dispossessed of its identity, is strongly tempted by the identitarian closure, especially by putting forward religious values. Racism from segments of society, the social exclusion of some exogenous groups as well as the sexual permissiveness in the Dutch society are negatively perceived by Moroccan immigrants. In the absence of cultural and socio-economic means allowing them to integrate better into the hosting society, young people are reverting to traditional religious values and developing a sense of hatred for the symbols of that society. Tragedies such as the murder of Theo Van Gogh by Mohammad B. illustrate this mad search for exclusive identity. One possible explanation for this state of affairs is that the Western world is egoistically selective in its approach to globalization. It is on the one hand for the opening of the Southern countries' markets to the products of Western economy, and for

free access of its citizens to these countries; but on the other hand it keeps its borders close to the Southern people. Europe has begun by employing the labor force of the South in areas of hard labor, under difficult conditions and with wages lower than that of its nationals. Today, migrants' rights are recognized, which *a priori* no longer justifies that freedom can be granted to some and be denied to others, under the pretext of cultural and religious differences.

Globalization and "Popular Culture"

An open vision of the issue of "Popular culture" and the challenges of globalization is significant as it incites for a treatment of the challenges faced by Moroccan culture at a global level. In fact, such a perspective intends to lift it from its seclusion, from its narrow territory to the local and regional geographical space, and to place it at the national and international level. It also widens the social space of "popular culture" by subtracting it from the mercantile sphere which treats it as a reified object in the context of market production. That is, in our view, how we can evaluate this culture, its strengths and its weaknesses, by placing it in the context of the great currents that cross the universal culture and by confronting it to the challenges of cultural conflicts that shake the world. In this perspective, we would like to contribute to the debate on this theme, as a citizen concerned with issues of thought and culture, by suggesting some reflections inspired to us through the notion of "popular culture" in its connections with Amazigh culture and with national culture.

Historicizing the "Popular Culture"

Conceptually, it is necessary to revisit the notion of "Popular culture" by placing it within its historical context and by submitting it to epistemic criticism. Let us start with opting for a general definition of the concept of "culture", and then define what we mean by "popular culture". Culture, as a common base, is the set of modes of thinking and actions shared, to

varying degrees, by members of a community or a social group; culture thus includes a tangible component which comprises architecture, jewelry, carpets, pottery, timber working, etc., and an intangible component which includes literature, singing, dancing, cinema, theater, plastic and graphic arts, etc. It also includes socio-economic modes of organization that express themselves through the so-called "traditional" institutions such as *azerf* (customary law), *lajmât* (community assembly), *agdal* (grassland defense mode), *tawiza* (mutual assistance), *aqqn n-tagant* (forest protection regulation), *azerf n-waman* (customary law regulating water management), etc.; and the competing modes concerning modern institutions, such as political representation, the body of legislation, social organization, economic production, and so on. All these elements form an integral part of "Community culture" or "popular culture", in a broad sense. When examined, this notion shows to be polysemic and marked by epistemic confusion. Indeed, it has been used at least with two distinct meanings, that of "popular culture" and that of "the culture of the people".

Popular Culture, Culture of the Poor, and Culture of the People

The notion of "Popular culture" is used in the sense of culture of the popular classes which are underprivileged economically, socially and culturally (See Hoggart, 1970; Bourdieu, 1979). To some extent, in Morocco, that would be the culture of the poor, the culture of the underdeveloped margin, or the culture of "the Unusable Morocco". The forms it takes are those of the "folklore" vehiculated by "dialects". It is thus opposed to the "scholarly culture" of the elite expressed by the "prestigious languages", and endowed with political, material and symbolic powers. "Popular culture" has thus become a pejorative and depreciatory entity. With respect to the notion of "people's culture", it is used in the particular historical context of the 1970s, marked by the predominance of the ideology of "cultural revolution" in its Maoist version, and vehiculated through the ideology of the French extreme left, especially in the wake of French movement "La Cause du Peuple" and the

Moroccan leftist movement "Let's Serve-the-People". Both movements glorify "the people" by granting them the mission of liberating humanity. The "culture of the people" is conceived of as an expression or reflection of the material and symbolic living conditions of the popular masses in their struggle for dignity and could lead to absolutist drifts.

Historicization of "Popular culture" is certainly a critical enterprise necessary for putting into perspective the symbolic production of the dominated social groups. With a historical hindsight, we can certainly recognize that the two notions of "popular culture" and "culture of the people" have been used by sociologists and anthropologists of culture for ideological purposes that contributed to their epistemic opacity. Indeed, "Popular culture" has sometimes served as a battleground between the proponents of a concept of "culture of the popular masses" and another one which, in the name of cultural relativism, establishes a virtual egalitarianism between the cultures of the world on the one hand, and the cultures of social groups on the other. This conception, which highlights the thematic richness, the complexity of form and content characterizing "Popular culture", proclaims that the latter has nothing to envy to the scholarly, elitist, intellectualist and bourgeois culture of the dominant classes (cf. Khatibi, 1983; Mammeri, 1991; Boukous, 1995). This is, to a certain extent, corroborated by the conception of Bourdieu (1974), which is based on the following syllogism: the people is poor and dominated, therefore, its "Popular culture" is poor and depreciated; conversely, the culture of the dominant economic groups is rich and prestigious. However, with respect to Bourdieu's theory, it is essential to take note of his analyses related to culture, where he shows the coherence and the complexity of the Amazigh culture (Idem, 1972). These analyses depart from the mechanistic view of the approach developed by Bourdieu in *La Distinction* (1979). Ultimately, to evaluate "Popular culture" out of its context, on the basis of the canons of scholarly and elite culture can only lead to the depreciation of the former. On the other hand, to evaluate it on the basis of its own aesthetic features, its own conditions of production is to apprehend it in an objective and historicized way. At the

methodological level, this evaluation entails taking into account the dichotomy of autonomy/heteronomy of "Popular culture", in the relationship holding between the components of the production process of this culture, namely the producers, the conditions of production and the product itself.

"Popular culture" and Amazigh culture

It has sometimes been considered that "Popular culture" includes a component of Amazigh expression and another of a dialectal Arabic expression, assuming that both components are expressed in dialects (oral literature and singing), adopt non-sophisticated production techniques mainly in crafts, are produced by popular agents such as artisans and popular artists, and are displayed on the market as devalued products or folklore. Despite being sustained for some decades (See Boukous, 1977, Mammeri, 1991), this assimilation is no longer convenient today with the new situation, i.e. the promotion and institutional recognition of the Amazigh culture. In fact, Amazigh is now a written language supported by the educational system and audiovisual media. The culture is undergoing unprecedented development by expanding the repertoire of traditional forms through integrating new expression modes (novel, short story, theater, and cinema); ultimately, it is produced and consumed by social groups who are no longer exclusively "common people", especially by the petty and middle bourgeoisies. The social and aesthetic refinement of a component of the Amazigh culture no longer allows for considering it as an exclusive part of "Popular culture".

In fact, the Amazigh culture is undergoing profound changes brought on by its contact with often more powerful, more competitive cultures. These changes are noticeable in the areas of intangible and material cultures. Literature is gradually moving from orality to writing; this passage is undertaken with the loss of a number of aesthetic, functional, linguistic, rhetorical and rhythmic properties. But, there are gains in terms of extension of the repertoire, the enrichment of the genres and

types, the writing techniques and thematic variety. Amazigh arts, namely silver craftsmanship, wood working, rug making, architecture, enjoy international reputation among specialists. The music groups adopt modern instruments, sophisticated rhythms and arrangements, allowing them to be appreciated by the youth and enlarging their audience at national and international level. The challenges to be met by creators and artists are numerous. The most important one lies in the upgrading of the active agents in this sector, in terms of professional management, production quality, artists' incitement and motivation, union organization, social and medical insurance which could offer better working conditions and quality production. This is one of the challenges related to modernity brought about by globalization.

"Popular Culture", Civil Governance and Human Rights

At the political level, equal opportunity between the different constituting parts of the national culture presupposes good governance conditions which would allow for the elaboration and implementation of public policies that promote the "Popular culture". One of the induced effects of globalization is to make us aware of the fact that political culture that is capable of ensuring good governance, civil governance at all levels of the State's structure and social organization is the only possible and feasible option for Morocco as a country aspiring to be efficient and trustworthy within the community of nations (See *Le Maroc possible*, 2006); it is also the only viable option for political organizations that want to adhere to modernity and historical longevity. Thus, the position of political parties concerning "Popular culture", and Amazigh culture should be neither exclusive nor exclusionary. Political allegiances should not be based on nepotism, tribalism or regionalism but rather on nationalism and citizenship. Admittedly, the promotion of Amazigh culture is a matter of "national responsibility, it is not the exclusive property of any party"; but if we want to make this assertion a sound one, it is necessary to achieve the consensus required for its constitutional protection and for the achievement of its institutionalization; that

represents one of the best guarantees against its partisan or identity manipulation, and against its exclusion or marginalization. It also represents one of the best supports for the Amazigh culture to consolidate its position in the market of symbolic goods and, accordingly, to grant it political significance in its competition with the other cultures in terms of representation in society and institutions.

With respect to human rights, it is equally appropriate to depart from the limited understanding which would reduce them to civic, social and economic rights; cultural and linguistic rights are an integral part of human rights. In addition, the acknowledgement of the right of the Amazigh culture to protection, development, valorization and promotion is a necessary condition for the national culture to achieve unity in diversity and to serve the objectives and the major interests of the nation. The improvements attained by the project intending to create the National Council of Languages and Moroccan Culture should be acknowledged in this respect; yet in practical terms, it is necessary to thoroughly integrate the positive values conveyed by Amazigh culture into the national program for the promotion of the culture of human rights in education.

At the social and economic level, the material foundations of the Amazigh culture represented by rural, agrarian and pastoral economy are overwhelmed by the aggressive liberal economy. As a result, the majority of Amazigh speaking regions are isolated in the sterile crescent of poverty and precariousness. As a result, these areas have been drained continuously as a result of rural exodus and migration abroad. The forced urbanization of the Amazigh speakers is generally accompanied by their cultural and linguistic assimilation. In this new economic context imposed by the transformation of Moroccan economy and society in the wake of globalization, the Amazigh culture can barely stand competition with strong, powerful, dominant cultures. Awareness of the importance of the cultural dimension in development among economic developers can create conditions of resilience, resistance and durability of Amazigh culture. Awareness could manifest itself through the support of the

Amazigh language and culture in terms of production in the areas of cinema, theater, television, radio, and by encouraging artists and creators in general. This proposal aims at defending the idea that culture is not an abstraction that is isolated from the economic reality, but is rather a social product that may or may not have value in the market. Promoting Amazigh culture is also the responsibility of citizens who, by adopting either a positive or negative attitude towards this culture, can promote or impede its upgrading, empowerment and development so as to be and remain a contemporary culture that enriches the cultural ecosystem of mankind.

"Popular Culture" and the Technological Gap

At the technological level, any culture cannot reasonably claim sustainability, efficiency, viability without technological backup. In this perspective, Amazigh culture gradually appropriates the technological tools necessary for its development. Thus, the work undertaken by the Royal Institute for Amazigh Culture (IRCAM) in the field of research and development in Information and Communication Technology applied to Amazigh has resulted in the following achievements:

(i) Standardization and coding of the Tifinagh script, a millennial graphic system which gave rise to the Ircam-standard graphics, coded by IRCAM and homologated by the international ISO-Unicode organization. This procedure allows the use of identical coded standards for all users of the Tifinagh alphabet. This graphic system is now used as an option in mobile telephony;

(ii) Developing a variety of character fonts that allow text entry on the computer;

(iii) Setting up of the Tifinagh keyboard; and

(iv) Elaboration of multimedia aids promoting the diffusion, influence, and learning of Amazigh language and culture.

Technology watch is imposed on us by globalization. No culture can be competitive in the market of symbolic goods without fully integrating modern technology. In this field, Amazigh culture is modestly taking its first steps.

Standing between hammer and anvil

The issues dealt with in this Essay concern the notion of "Popular culture", in its connection with globalization challenges. At the epistemic level, we have seen how both anthropological and sociological approaches lead to settled tendencies: the first approach overvalues "Popular culture" as idealized myth while the second leads to reifying it as ordinary products to be consumed. Making reference to the historical context of the two approaches reveals the need for a concrete analysis of the real situation of "popular culture" so as to assess its strengths and weaknesses. In connection with the issue of "Popular culture", we suggest some research paths that are liable to help grasp the course of progress of Amazigh culture in its process of autonomization /heteronomization in relation to "popular culture". This progression shows how the Amazigh culture is engaged in a process of progressive detachment from the realm of "Popular culture", by an upgrading of the status of producers, the forms and contents, techniques, modes of expression, production and reception.

Integrating "Popular culture" and "Amazigh culture" into modernity presupposes political, economic, social and cultural conditions. Some of these conditions should be the outcome of a natural evolution of State and Society within citizenship-based governance on the ground of a social contract; while others would be the result of the impact of globalization effects with its challenges and stakes. Handling of the new symbolic situation then requires a rational and efficient management of the contradictions, paradoxes and constraint dilemmas of globalization and localization data; in short, a consensual management within a joint framework of globalization and localization, i.e. glocalization. Thus, glocalization could be a locomotive of progress, prosperity and mutual

understanding for the international community provided that it is not based on the egoistic considerations of the mercantile reasoning that would make super powers use it according to their exclusive interests. A fair and equitable glocalization should be based on the following principles: the principle of "cultural alterity" that entails the acknowledgment of the heterogeneous and multicultural character of human societies; the rejection of totalitarian and absolutist ideology and the respect of linguistic and cultural identities, without falling into identity drift and its communitarianism corollary. In this perspective, the Amazigh issue should be considered in its multidimensional nature taking into account the multiple stakes involved and the strategies elaborated by sociopolitical actors. Hence the need for all actors, State, policy makers, political scientists, politicians and civil society, to give due interest to the management of cultural and linguistic diversity, bearing in mind it could still represent an area for political and socio-economic issues that go beyond the strict symbolic dimension.

Among the challenges related to the weakening of cultural diversity within the scope of globalization is the question of cultural convergences, of the so-called the "In-between", and more generally of "cross-culturalism" as a utopia that can be attractive for certain social groups.

Essay 3
Cross-culturalism, Reality and Utopia

In tribute to
Abdelkebir Khatibi (1933-2009)

Statement of the Problem

The so-called "Universal culture" is undergoing a tremendous intellectual and political debate with the dawning of the new millennium. This debate has gained momentum in the context of the questioning of the supremacy of the ultraliberal oligarchic political and economic model imposed by the West on the rest of the world. Indeed, this model has generated a cosmic crisis intensified by the practice of monopolized domination by the West and the rejection of this supremacy by large parts of the southern communities. In countries of Arab-Muslim tradition, this rejection is increasingly taking the form of a denial of Western culture and values. Faced with the willingness to lock the symbolic field to foreign influence considered as pernicious, there is emergence of a discourse which preaches *cultural peace* through positive and reciprocal reception of the culture of the other. We qualify as cross-culturalism any discourse that attempts to conceptualize the interaction of languages and cultures and intercultural exchange in the perspective of establishing a shared universal culture.

We would like herein to examine the cross-cultural discourse as it is elaborated in Morocco. We will first draw the history of cross-cultural studies in large size features, and then we will highlight the main theses of this discourse, and finally resituate it within the Moroccan cultural field.

Emergence of Cross-cultural Studies

The concern of knowing other's culture is an old phenomenon which goes back to the time when countries were open to one another; Europe has early in time organized "reconnaissance" missions to foreign countries. They mainly started from the XIV century, when France, England, Germany, Russia, Spain, etc., have sent multidisciplinary teams consisting of geographers, priests, historians, linguists, political scientists, folklorists, etc. to conduct surveys for the purpose of collecting information aimed at knowing better the countries and communities included in the colonial project (See The French Missions of Segonzac, Gentil, Roquevaire Fleet in Morocco at the beginning of the twentieth century). Some southern countries have also sent emissaries to Europe to know about European countries, their culture, their mores, their customs, their institutions, and so on; for example, the Sultan Hassan 1st sent 8 missions to Europe between 1874 and 1888. But in this case, it is not a matter of a cross-cultural approach in the sense of willingness for cultural exchange or for a two-ways view aimed at mutual understanding. In order to shed light on cross-culturalism as a disciplinary field, we will proceed by providing a brief historical background which will allow for highlighting this phenomenon as an academic orientation in the USA, France and Morocco. In the USA, interest in *cross-cultural studies* dates back to the 1970s, the Symposium held in San Francisco in 1975 was the first major assembly organized on this issue. In France, it was only 10 years later that the launching of cross-cultural studies took place at the symposium held at the University of Toulouse-le-Mirail and which led to the publication of the book entitled *L'interculturel en éducation et en sciences humaines*. In Morocco, the introduction of cross-cultural is fairly recent; this is attested by the symposiums devoted to it. For the sake of illustration, let us refer to some of the first university activities devoted to cross-cultural studies. In 1992, *The Group for the Maghreb Studies* and the Department of French at the Faculty of Letters in Rabat organized a conference on the theme of *cultural identity in the Maghreb,* in tribute to Mouloud Mammeri; in 1993, another conference was organized by the same group in collaboration with the Faculty of Letters of Rabat and that

of Kenitra on the theme of *The Cross cultural, the Social Sciences and Language Teaching*. In the same year, a symposium was held by the Faculty of Letters of Rabat on the theme of *The Mutual perception of Moroccans and Germans*; in March 1994, a symposium was jointly organized by the departments of French of the Faculties of Letters of Agadir, Marrakech and Grenoble on the theme of *The cross cultural: the problem and space of creation.* In April 1994, the Spanish Department of the Faculty of Letters of Rabat held a symposium on the theme of *A Two-way perspective adopted by Morocco and the Spanish-speaking countries*; and the Department of English of the Faculty of Letters of Rabat organized another on the theme of *Cultural Studies, Interdisciplinarity, and the University*.

This brief historical overview aims at situating this issue in its context in order to point out that interest for intercultural studies is recent, and to show that in Morocco, it is rather a vocation of the researchers working in the foreign languages departments. The main issues raised in this context can be summarized as follows:

- In the United States, cross-cultural studies are primarily part of educational concerns essentially emanating from sociologists of education. In fact, the interest attributed to *cross-culturalism* emanates from the willingness to take over, at the educational level, the mission of socio-cultural data of *the melting pot* which constitutes the American society. This manifests itself in multilingualism and multiculturalism reflecting the coexistence of different linguistic, ethnic and religious communities in the American territory. The targeted social groups are the speakers of languages other than Standard American English, and who live according to cultural standards that are different from the dominant ones; these are namely the locutors from immigrant communities, from the underprivileged and marginal groups.
- In France, *cross culturalism* is also an educational concern. In fact, teachers, educators, social workers and doctors consider that taking charge of the culture of immigrant communities serves as a means of integrating these communities into the hosting society. Problems of adaptation to the French language and culture have first of all to be

resolved at the level of the school institution through connecting the teaching of languages and minority cultures (local and foreign), which in theory should facilitate the integration of the concerned communities into the social structure.

- In Morocco, the interest attributed to *cross-culturalism* essentially a response to pedagogical and didactic requirements in foreign languages departments, more particularly the need for introducing the study of culture, civilization and trends of thought which constitute the background of the language and literature object of teaching. The underlying assumption of this conception of foreign language teaching is that language is not only a means of communication but also a vehicle for the transmission of culture and a worldview. In other words, one would say that attaining a full command of the linguistic competence in a foreign language is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for an adequate use of that language. This competence has to be enhanced by a good command of the cultural competence of the language. The aim of cross-cultural studies is precisely to help the learner acquire cultural competence, in which the acquisition of a foreign language represents just a single module.

However, cross-cultural is not a matter of foreign languages didactics; it is an issue that challenges anyone attempting to reflect on the interaction of languages and cultures coexisting in the Moroccan market of symbolic goods, primarily, the interaction of national and local languages and cultures with one another, and then their interaction with foreign languages and cultures. The social field segments mostly receptive to the cross-cultural vision are also foreign languages specialists, teachers, researchers, creators, and more generally operators open to the culture of the other, the culture of the foreign.

Cross-culturalism Discourse

How does the modernist *intelligentsia* conceive cultural openness to the other? The issue of *the openness* appealed to the attention of all

intellectuals who are concerned with integrating Moroccan society into the world, especially Laroui and Khatibi. Let us first consider Khatibi's discourse, which stands as a cross-cultural discourse par excellence.

Why should Khatibi's discourse be privileged? In our view, it is because he was the one who has contributed most to the reflection on identity and cultural difference in the Maghreb and the one who has written most on the relation with the Alterity. He practiced the experience of the difference in his contribution to all genres: researcher, novelist, playwright, poet, essayist, and art critic; in sum, all his work was devoted to the issue of cross-culturalism. It is, however, his essays that have most rendered his vision explicit (See Khatibi, 1983; 1987 and 1993). For the purposes of exposition of cross-cultural discourse, we will sketch the main postulates of *the Manifesto of Cultural mixing*, a succinct, but a condensed text published in tribute to Khatibi (See Cheng *et al*., 1990, p. 149-150):

- *Premise 1: Cultural mixing is a structural fact of human history.*
- *Premise 2: Every nation is, in principle, a plurality, a mosaic of cultures, if not a plurality of languages and of founding genealogies, either through text, or through oral narratives, or both at the same time.*
- *Premise 3: This plurality never stands in a relationship of real equality; it is rather in a hierarchical and asymmetrical relationship. According to his principle, the function of the State is to manage -with or without relevance- this asymmetry within which it constitutes a paradoxical principle. It has, thus, to do with relations of hierarchy, asymmetry, and violence at the very core of the interbreeding. .*
- *Premise 4: One of the principles of ethics can be as follows: it is when the other is maintained, respected in his singularity, that I can probably be welcomed by him.*
- *Premise 5: Cultural mixing would be an art of living which incites reflection and which is based on versatile tolerance. This tolerance is somewhat looked at from the outside, by maintaining the right to a look at one's own intolerance and at that of others.*

Within cross-cultural discourse, cultural interbreeding is a philosophy of sociability and sharing, a modernist attitude that integrates different facets of culture, the facets *from within*, that is to say, Amazigh culture and Arab-Muslim culture, and the facets *from outside*, that is to say the contributions of Africa and those of the West. Thus, the plurality of cultural referents constitutes in itself a source of richness, on the condition that, on the one hand, cultural agents base their attitude towards the others on acceptance of their differences, and on the other hand, that civil society as a whole is able to positively manage its plural identity. In the absence of these two conditions, intolerance is likely to prevail; the practice of exclusion would be a source of disharmony and an excuse for violence.

The hypothesis underlying the cross-cultural discourse can be formulated in the language of *universal grammar* (See Chomsky, 1986) in the following terms: *the human species is endowed with a common symbolic competence formed of a set of cultural universals which may vary from one community to another in their form and substance*. Khatibi (1993, p. 17-18) develops this idea in the metaphor of the tree, a metaphor that presents the human culture as a tree in which the roots are diverse and the trunk is unified :

> *We start from the idea that similitude is the initial and final structure of any human community, a structure on which are carved the peculiarities, the characters of each ethnicity, people and civilization. It is like a tree whose roots ramify in accordance with the variety of the branches. But, as history teaches us, the branches would end up by hiding the trunk of the tree. Then, there begins the will to power of one over the other.*
>
> (Khatibi, 1993, p. 17-18)

Starting from this general hypothesis, cross-cultural discourse assumes that Moroccan culture is a tissue with multiple cultural irrigating streams, namely the Amazigh, the Arabic, the Islamic, the Judaic, the African and the Western. The constituency of the Moroccan identity is thus made of different components, so much so that the reduction of the whole to a

single stratum amounts to arbitrariness and to reductionism; it also stands as a manifestation of symbolic violence. In this compound and "composite" set, to use Pascon's term, heritage has the function of representing the collective memory, the sign of *the presence of the dead among the living*. In this respect, it certainly belongs to the past, but it marks the present with its indelible fingerprint, even if much effort is invested to disguise it in folklore products, to reify it as a raw commodity or to suppress it back into the depths of the unconscious. Recognition of heritage is therefore a condition for reconciliation with the basic identity, which presupposes its accommodation by the community, not as an excuse for traditionalism and conservatism, but as a living and dynamic sign capable of blowing breath of life of *the living-dead* into *the dead-living*. On the other hand, adherence of the Moroccan individual to the course of history compels him to be in accordance with the modern time, a time whose driving principle is modern civilization with its sciences and technologies.

Once more, we stumble over the issue of language because openness to modern civilization requires mastering foreign languages, French or English. For Khatibi, it is a passage required by "Francophony" for historical reasons related to the colonial temporality and its substrate. However, "Francophony" does not mean complacency with regard to a fetish language and culture, free from any reservation or unconditional acceptance of an imperial model. *The cross-culturalism attitude* relies allegedly on a methodological principle, the principle of *double criticism:* self-criticism and criticism of the other in their respective misguided ways and delusions. Self-criticism when the subject matter falls within traditionalism and delights in conservative, anachronistic thought and practice, and criticism of the other when it is adorned with the benefits of technical, aesthetic and strategic dominance. The double criticism is thus an infinite questioning of the absolutist claims of the West as well as of the Levant, the Ego and Alter ego. It is also a proposal of a special frame of thought that creates dialogue among dissimilations, asymmetries, and

disharmonies, starting from positive listening to all voices, to all paradigms and all dialogisms which concern all of us.

With the aim of inculcating *cross-culturalism* in the citizen's mind, Khatibi (1993) suggests a strategy for the teaching of languages in the Maghreb based on three criteria: the country's linguistic reality, the geostrategic context and the international status of certain languages. The languages to be taught would thus be Arabic as the official language, Amazigh as a language of heritage culture, English as being the first foreign language in the light of its universality, and finally a second language of choice which can be French, Spanish, German, Italian, etc. The issue of the Amazigh language is considered from the angle of *linguistic peace*, that is to say tolerance of difference, and recognition of the historical dimension of our being, and reconciliation with the anterior past. Let us note that if Khatibi has had the merit of being one of the rare eminent intellectuals to "recognize" "the position" of Amazigh, his position should be enhanced today by taking into account the constitutionalization of Amazigh in 2011, which allows this language to access the status of an official language alongside with Arabic, and the legitimization of its aspiration to a better situation.

Cultural and linguistic diversity is incorporated in cross-cultural discourse as a socio-cultural reality. Instead of denying, repressing or disguising it in a unicist thought, cultural and linguistic diversity is in fact enriching for the symbolic situation, provided that the contradiction between the various contributions is mastered and that the demarcation leads neither to cultural solipsism nor to alienation, which are respectively the fatal outcome of a wild difference and an extroverted identity. The key to this vigilance is, for Khatibi, *the intractable difference*, a notion he defines as follows:

> *The intransigent difference is a renunciation of the metaphysics by way of a double criticism, a double fight, a double death (...): criticism of the two metaphysics, of their confrontation. In fact, it is a matter of choice, a single one is possible: to think of Morocco as it is, as a topographic site between East and West. Morocco as a horizon of*

> *thought is still unspeakable. On the one hand, it should be listened to it resonate in its own tongue (its languages); and on the other hand, only the outwardly being reconsidered, off-centered, subverted, deviated from its dominant determinations, can divert us from the father nostalgia and tear it away from its metaphysical soil or, at least, curve it towards such a pull out.*
>
> Khatibi, 1993, p.135-136.

Cross-culturalism and cross-lingualism, being its medium, are attempts of deconstruction-reconstruction of a structure that we would like it to be homogeneous and coherent based on a deconstruction of distinct cultural and linguistic systems with an ideal objective of building a mixed culture. The process of construction of this cultural hybridization simultaneously implies careful work on oneself, that is, on the components of one's own identity, and a positive attitude towards the other. For Khatibi, the conditions pertaining to the code of ethics are *hospitality, courtesy and sensitivity*.

Cross-culturalism, Myth and Reality

Being particularly disruptive, the temporality of the world today is marked by the intensification of the conflict between identity and difference. Thus, the cross-cultural discourse can be interpreted either as a naive, innocent, discourse, or as a perverse discourse or even as a discourse carrying a utopia, and humanist idealism in the best sense of the word.

Cross-culturalism: a Dysfunctional Discourse

Cross-culturalism, as an expression of cultural relativity and as a willingness for openness to the other, brings into conflict the limited certainties and the pharisaic visions of secular or regular obedience. It refers to its historical outlook, to any thinking of the fences, ethnic purity, genealogical distinction, sanctity of the referent, and divine election. In turn, this discourse is considerably criticized by the fundamentalist, the

interest and the nationalist movements. For fundamentalists (*soloists*), the salvation of the Arab-Muslim community resides in the return to the tradition of the *salaf al-ṣāliḥ*, to the exemplary thought and conduct of the ancients, those who are supposed to be in accordance with the precepts of the Qur'an and Sunna; the most *progressist* among them advocate an opening-up to the West that is yet a selective one, one which consists of borrowing the West's production and management techniques, and technological products, while rejecting its values because they are supposed to be in conflict with the Arab-Muslims values (See Al-Fāsi, 1966). This is the reason why the cross-cultural discourse is considered by this school of theological thought to undermine the perennity of these values in their foundation.

For the fundamentalists, namely *the Muslim Brotherhood*, the cross-cultural discourse is adopted by the rationalists, who are adepts of secularism (*al-qawmiya al-îlmāniya*) and responsible for spreading Western civilization, a civilization qualified as "satanic", (*al-ḥaḍāra al-šaytāniya*). According to this trend, this civilization is characterized by atheism, materialism, and the dissolution of moral standards; it also claims that in terms of language use, the interculturalist elite undermines Arabic, the language qualified as sacred by the divine message, by choosing to use foreign languages in speaking and writing in the Islamic world. Finally, for the *jihadists* and the different radical zealots tendencies, the *cross-culturalist* intellectuals are seen as alienated (*muγtaribûn*), and the good Muslim has to exercise the duty of proselytism (*al-daâwa*) if not the obligation of the use of force (*al-jihād*) toward them. Finally, for the Arab nationalists, apart from the liberal movement inspired by certain scholars of the *Nahḍa* movement, the cross-cultural discourse is a sign of the Western imperialist dominance (French or Anglo-Saxon). The intellectuals who are advocates of this movement are treated as agents of the Western imperialist world because they are a threat to the integrity of the Arab linguistic and cultural heritage. Through the profession of belief in cultural relativism, they would sow doubt on the assumption of the elective character of the Arab Nation (*xayru ummatin uxrijat li al-nās*) and

its eternal message (*al-risāla al-xâlida li-al'umma al-ârabiya*); and finally, by using foreign languages (especially French and English), they would lead to the weakening of the Arabic language, the very foundation of the Arabic identity (See Âflaq, 1959).

We realize, then, that the cross-culturalist discourse is rejected for being a Western runt by *the moderate Salafists* and *the Arab nationalists,* who see in it a danger to the non sensitized citizen to his language and culture; and according to *Integrists*, it is a poison that threatens the foundations and values of the Muslim faith. The most radical rejection emanates from *the jihadists* who attempt to eradicate through violence all the manifestations of Western civilization.

Cross-culturalism: a Marginal Discourse

On another level, one can also question the adequacy of cross-cultural discourse to the socio-cultural reality of Morocco today. Indeed, cross-cultural looks to be an intellectual project limited to the microcosm of the intelligentsia symbolically anchored in Western culture, namely French-language writers, and responding to the expectations of the urban classes, which are, themselves, opened to the West to satisfy their material and/or symbolic interests. While acknowledging the efforts of Khatibi and Laâbi to republish their works in Morocco in order to make them within the reach of the local readership, we would like to ask about, for example, the social background of the French-language Moroccan literature; and how this literature is received, and more generally, what is the impact of the cross-cultural project on the larger social sectors. The answers to these questions will remain pending until *in vivo* field investigations are conducted on these topics. A first element of the answer is provided by the findings of a survey undertaken among high school and university students; these results reveal, on the one hand, that the reading of the French literary works is very limited, and that, on the other hand, the Maghreb literature is of a key interest to only few high school and university students; finally, that authors are less known by their works

than through the media. Hence, the following fundamental question arises: is dialogue among cultures a reality or a myth? The question is worth asking because if openness on and to Alterity is a necessity for the peripheral societies' economic, scientific and cultural development, it should be noted that the central communities borrow only too little from the former communities. Indeed, just as the economic exchange between Morocco and France is unbalanced, the situation is also the same in the linguistic and cultural domains. Many indicators attest this fact. For example, we know the prominent position which the French language and culture enjoy at the level of the middle classes in society, we also know the exorbitant cost of the Arabic French *savage bilingualism* in the area of education in terms of the budget allocated to the functioning of the system and to the learners, as well as in terms of school dropout and failure (See Moâtassime, 1974; CSEFRS Report, 2015). Inversely, we know that almost no interest is granted by the French institutions to the Moroccan culture and that a tiny position is accorded to Arabic and Amazigh languages in the educational institutions in France. Moreover, it is well known that the cost of the presence of the French language and culture in Morocco is backed up by the Moroccan institutions both in the public and private education, which, *a priori*, stands as a paradoxical situation.

In these circumstances, some people consider speaking of *cross-cultural perspectives and dialogue of cultures* as falling into gullibility and naivety. When looking at things lucidly, it should be stated that we are doomed to be open to alterity because the latter occupies a position of dominance thanks to its material and symbolic force. Self-confinement would certainly be a counterproductive strategy; it would inevitably lead to lethargy. But who is the Alter? Can the West be reduced to the French language and culture? The Moroccan elites educated at French schools during the colonial and postcolonial periods are supporters of the French language and culture for historical motives. This is a reason for perpetuating their dependence on this language and culture in a world in which a tendency has been asserted for some decades now; the French

language and culture are themselves dependent on the English language and the Anglo-Saxon culture. This shift in position is perfectly understood by the high privileged social classes which, being convinced that access to modernity are dependent on Anglo-Saxon education, increasingly entrust their children's education to North-American institutions, or to the prestigious English-speaking European schools. We can therefore postulate that cross-cultural has become a pragmatic strategy developed by the dominant classes at the periphery level in order to make the best material and symbolic profits out of bilingualism and biculturalism.

Cross-culturalism: a Humanistic Utopia

Confronted with the dilemma of identity and alterity, of tradition and modernity, we remain perplexed, and challenged by historical development. That is why the prior mission for the present and future human society is to develop and model a cross-cultural society in which individuals and communities are fully aware that they belong to the same humanity, and that they are intrinsically linked to the same destiny, and that all linguistic and cultural differences represent as much richness which should be preserved and enhanced by oneself and by the others. That is to say that cross-cultural is a project that adheres to a humanistic utopia and that can constitute an alternative to confront both the practice of imperial dominance in economic, cultural and military domains and to face the deployment of various fundamentalist movements (regular and secular), ethnic purity and nationalism. To achieve such a project internal and external conditions are required. The major internal condition is the consolidation of the foundations of democracy; the fundamental external condition consists of sharing and respect, through equitable exchange of materials and symbolic products between the North and the South. Can we consider this simply as retarded utopian dream? But what should be expected from a free intellectual other than to conceive innovative paradigms capable of putting obsolete models into crisis and rendering future utopias conceivable.

Essay 4
Cross-culturalism, Meaning and Representation

In tribute to
Mouloud Mammeri (1917-1989)

Statement of the Problem

Following Bourdieu (2008), we assume here that "Cross-culturalism" is a *de facto* biased form of symbolic domination induced by opposition between cultural models representing a symbolic capital whose value is proportional to the power of the communities in global relations, and to the position of the local actors in the social hierarchy. Specifically, the aim of the present essay is to analyze the contact of cultures and its impact on the people, who thus find themselves in a situation of the cultural "In-between". The suggested analysis focuses on the meaning of "the «In-between" and its social representation; it aspires to adhere to the general issue of *cross-cultural* as a means of contact between cultures, and which is certainly a focal question in the field of cultural anthropology in Morocco. We will thus examine the explicit *meaning* of the lexical item *"In-between"* within language in order to define its implicit *meaning* in the framework of the paremiological discourse and we will work out the representation that the population have of this phenomenon through testimonies. In doing so, our goal is to elucidate the modalities of living the intercultural situation.

Linguistic Meaning of "In-between"

In French, the preposition *entre* (from Latin *inter*, "among", "in the middle of") is used as the initial morpheme of a large number of nominal

lexies (between + noun) and verbal lexies (between + verb); it grants them a polysemy which can be reduced to some basic meaning:

(i) In the French language, *L'entre-deux* also spelled as *entre deux* refers to the space or the place that separates two things more or less close to one another, and with which it entertains a relationship of contiguity, for example *"entretaille"* the *spacer*, in engraving, is a light size that slides between larger sizes; *l'entre-rail* "in-between the rails" is the part situated between two rails, etc.

(ii) The exchange of courtesies, *avoir de l'entregent "have good interpersonal skills"*, is to have the art of conducting oneself in society;

(iii) (III) The intermediate state between two extremes, for example: *l'entre-bande* refers to the strip set between each end of a piece of fabric;

(iv) In the register of sports, *l'entre-deux* the «In-between" refers to a period of the game where the ball is in the possession of none of the two players, the throw-in is made by the referee who throws the ball in the air, and it is then up to the player who is the quickest or the most skilled to get it first.

The verbal forms constructed by the prefixation of the morpheme "between" *(entre)* convey the following meanings:

(i) The idea of exchange, and reciprocity; for example: *to look at each other, to destroy each other*;

(ii) The idea of unfinished action that is only half done, such as: *to be ajar, to glimpse, to half-open*, etc.

The lexies to be retained in these definitions are: *separate*, *intermediate*, *exchange*, *a half done action*; they essentially express the sememes of *separation* and *exchange*. Interpreted at the syntagmatic level, these lexies convey the following general meaning: the *"In-between"* is an intermediate spot located between two original extreme sites where relations of

reciprocity and exchange operate and yield a situation that can either be finished or unfinished.

- In the Arabic language (See Ibn Mandhŭr, 1988), there are many forms in which the occurrence of *bayn* is attested:

  (i) *bayna*, a preposition which has the meaning of *between*;

  (ii) *al-bayn*, a noun which means "separation", "distance" (*al-furqatu*), it also expresses its opposite, "rapprochement", "proximity"(*al-waṣlu*); the verbal forms are: *bāna* (perfective) *yabīnu* (imperfective), the substantive noun (*al-maṣdar*) has the masculine form *al-baynu,* and a feminine form *baynūnatun*; *al-bayn* thus belongs to the category of items which are both homonyms and antonyms and which are referred to by the grammarians as *al-aḍḍâd*, the opposites;

  (iii) *al-bayn* also means "clarity" (*al-wuḍūḥ*);

  (iv) bayna *bayn* is an expression which means "between two".

It should thus be noted that in Arabic, the equivalents of the lexis *"In-between"* do not have semantic pejorative or negative connotations.

- In Amazigh, "*between"* is conveyed by the preposition *jar, inger, nger*, *ger*, as in *ngr isaffen* "*between rivers*", *ngr imawn "between doors*". There is no nominal form bearing the semantic value of "*In-between*".

Based on the linguistic meaning of *"In-between"*, we would like to suggest a transposition in the field of cultural anthropology, according to which the notion "In-between" defines a symbolic site C that is intermediate between two extreme originating sites A and B, distinct in their structural and functional properties, a situation that we can schematize as follows:

(A (C) B) (A (C)) (B) (A) (B (C))

The analysis suggested here would adhere to the broader issue of *cross-cultural* as a mode of culture contact, which is certainly a focal question in the field of cultural anthropology in Morocco.

Let us consider two hypotheses concerning the structure and function of *the symbolic "In-between"*.

Hypothesis (1): *the "In-between"* is an autonomous site (C), whose structure and function are distinct from those of the originating sites (A) and (B), which can be represented as follows:



Hypothesis (2): *The "In-between"* represents the intersection of the sites (A) and (B). The site (C), thus represented, can be specified either by the cultural features common to (A) and (B), or by cultural features specific to (A) and others specific to (B), which can be designed as follows:



With respect to the first hypothesis, it should be retained that *the «In-between»* is a site to be created, to be built by a conscious and voluntary effort based on a quest that sets itself apart from the gravity of the original sites. However, the second hypothesis postulates that the cultural features of (C) are reduced either to the cultural traits of a cultural grammar common to (A) and (B), or to the idiosyncratic cultural traits specific to particular cultural grammars.

"In-between" in Discourse

Let us consider the hypothesis relevant to our case, that of the intersection of ((A (C) B), and let us focus on the nature of the interaction of cultural features borrowed from the original sites. Let us then try to answer the following question: in the line of thinking and conduct of the population, is there conflict, cohabitation or harmony between the existing cultural features?

The perception of *the «In-between»* in discourse will enable us to address this question. For this purpose, let us analyze the notion *«In-between»* in the utterance, especially in the paremiological discourse (proverbs, sayings, dictums, and maxims), through a corpus drawn from diversified sources (See the bibliographical references). In order to avoid any arbitrariness in the semantic interpretation, the corpus includes only the sayings and proverbs in which there is an explicit occurrence of the morpheme *«In-between»*. The taxonomic approach of the data in this corpus is carried out on the basis of a limited number of *sememes*, or units of meaning, governed by the same isotropy, or by an element of semantic cohesion of the utterance; the isotropy functions as an instance allowing that any message can be grasped as a holistic entity of meaning (See Greimas, 1970). The sememes which thus emerge are: *discomfort*, *danger*, *duplicity* and *indecisiveness*. Let's consider some illustrations:

(i) The *"In-between"* as a state of physical or moral discomfort:

- *Having the grin of the nut between two stones* (Arabic);
- *Between Hanā and Banā, one would lose his entire beard* (Hebrew);
- *Between the onion and its peel, one draws only a bad odor* (Dialectal Arabic);
- *Between the nail and flesh lie only impurities* (Amazigh, colloquial Arabic);
- *One should not put his finger between the tree and the bark* (classical Arabic).

(ii) The *"In-between"* as expressing a state of danger:

- To stand between Charybdis and Scylia (Greek);
- To be between the devil and the deep blue sea (English);
- To be between the hammer and anvil (Latin origins);
- To stand between two watercourses (Amazigh);
- To stand between two doors (Amazigh);
- Fall between (into) the hands of someone (Amazigh);
- To find oneself, like the hare, between the one who hunts down with a stick and the one who chasses with his slingshot (Arabic);
- The horse kicks out, the mule gives hoof beats, between the two the donkey dies (Turkish);
- To be between wind and the tide (French);
- To be caught in the crossfire (French).

(iii) The "In-between" as a situation of duplicity:

- Between our enemy and ourselves, the one who is right in the middle appears to us closer to our enemy;
- Whoever is between two friends can have only two words (French);
- Between two only the inopportune interferes (Arabic).

(iv) The *"In-between"* as a position of irresolution

- Between two seats one would fall on the ground (French);
- Whoever hesitates between two mosques returns without having prayed (Turkish).

It can easily be depicted from the interpretation of these expressions that the *"In-between"* is dominated by an unpleasant isotopy, the one denoting *malaise.* It is a place of movement, of agonizing indecision, and tight situations; that is indeed how *the "In-between"* is conceived in the paremiological discourse.

If *the "In-between"* places the subject in some sort of *no-man's land*, in the margins of two or more sites or in their deviation, it is not, however, exclusively this cursed place where the subject is submitted to the hazards of the imponderable. There are in fact expressions that convey a more positive view of the *"In-between";* as it is the case in classical Arabic for example:

- *anta bayna kabidī wa xilbī*, which translates literally as "you are between my liver and its membrane". It is said to someone very dear, who is organically part of oneself - the liver being the home of affection in the Arab (and Amazigh) cultures;
- *anta bayna uḏunayya wa ʿātiqī*, which is literally "you are between my ears and my shoulder", and it is said to a person who is part of oneself and to whom one is devoted body and soul. The *"In-between"* can also stand for a haven after multiple vicissitudes, for example: *between two green ones a ripe one, between two mountains there is a valley.*

In another discourse register, namely the religious one, the conception of "*In-between"* is ambivalent. So, in the New Testament, the Amen, Christ wrote to the angel of the church who was at Laodicea (Revelation 3: 16): "I know your deeds: you are neither cold nor hot. I wish you were either one or the other! So, because you are lukewarm - neither hot nor cold - I am about to spit you out of my mouth". The Pascalian vision, a sign of moderation, stands out clearly from the rigor of the Heaven which spits out the lukewarm. (Pascal, *Thought VI*, 353): "I do not admire the excess of a virtue as of valour, except if I see at the same time the excess of the opposite virtue, [...]. We do not display greatness by going to another extreme, but in touching both at once, and filling all the intervening space."

In the orthodox Islamic tradition, the «*In-between*» is synonymous of a *beneficial position,* that is a place of tolerance and equilibrium; as it is illustrated by the following maxims : *al-ḥasanatu bayna al-sayy'atayn*, "a good deed is that which lies between two bad deeds", *xayru al-'umūri*

awsāṭuhā, "the best things are those which lie "In-between" two". This vision contrasts particularly with the idea commonly held in the West because of factual circumstances; moreover, fundamentalism just like extremism is a phenomenon that is also attested in the Muslim, Christian, Jew and Hindu communities.

The meaning of the «*In-between*» is therefore imbued with a semantic connotation that is rather a negative one. There is an agreement, however, that at the levels of language and discourse, especially the paremiological discourse, the predominant conception is generally that of *common sense*, it conveys somehow an ahistorical doxa characterizing *folk wisdom*, which is often marked by socio-cultural prejudices.

Representations of the "In-between"

How about the representations held by real and socially identifiable subjects? In an attempt to answer this question, we conducted interviews with a group of participants living in a multilingual and multicultural situation. For the purposes of this work, we have selected the testimonials that appeared to us the most representative of the different tendencies. The working hypothesis postulated here is that the plurality of languages and cultures produces a hub of thoughts and behaviors about which the subject experiencing this situation strives to strike coherence, either by trying to manage this plurality to the best of his interests, or by pruning what seems to him as disrupting his original identity.

Domestic Exile

> *I am torn between Rabat and homeland (tamazirt); my head is split into two parts. When I am in Rabat, I think of my family, the village, the land, the crops; I remember myself dancing the aḥwash to the rhythm of the threshing of the grain, going hiking in the mountains ... And when I'm in the homeland, I think of my grocery shop, of the city comforts, of customers, of suppliers, and of kids to educate ... I need Rabat to be happy in the homeland.*
>
> A. M., 36 years old, shopkeeper, Rabat.

This respondent lives, so to speak, between two symbolic spaces, the urban space (Rabat) and the birthplace (the homeland, *tamazirt*). The city represents the place where the connections have a transactional nature; the person surveyed constructs a social identity through the medium of socio-economic achievement, professional success and social mobility. The birthplace is conceived as the locus of individuation, the surveyed person deploys his ego on the mode of enjoyment and entertainment. The plight is that he carries with him an unhappy conscience, and he is split between two reference worlds that he cannot handle. To break up with a situation marked by schizothymia (the mind split into two), he aspires to live in a place that is an idealized site characterized by the combination of the euphoric sememes of the homeland and those of the city. How to live in harmony with the modalities of homeland, and soil, while physically living in the city as an individual? This is what may be called *the malaise*, the bad life experienced by neo-city dwellers in societies where rurality is marginalized, occult and stigmatized in its cultural and linguistic expressions.

The Voice of Fundamentalism

> *I reject Western culture because it is a means of alienation. We do not need this culture which is based on the Judo-Christian values because it deprives us from our souls, from our personality, and makes us vulnerable towards the West. May God curse these false Muslims, these hypocrites that mimic Westerners, those who bow down in the direction from which the wind blows. Islam provides us with a model of an ideal society where the value of the individual is evaluated based on his piety and conformity of his conduct to that of the Prophet.*
>
> L. B., 25 years, Teacher.

We have here a testimony of someone who refuses the culture of the other because it is supposed to contain germs of corruption of the original identity, one that is based on Islamic values. The presence of Western culture in the Muslim society is thus perceived as an aggression. It is, therefore, a denial of the situation of the «*In-between*», a situation

associated with position of duplicity and weakness, in which the subjects who lend themselves to it are assimilated to the supporters of the satanic civilization. In a search for the original purity represented by the model life of the Prophet Mohammad; the respondent gets inspiration from a reference universe situated at the time of the Prophet, a time considered as the golden age of Islam, "an era whose later sacralization is being used to make a univocal, a bland, and a past witness of a future utopia," (See Kepel, 1990, p.52).

Between Morocco and France

> *I worked in France for forty years in mines, factories, construction, housework, in everything. In France, if you work you earn money but if you don't, you are ruined. In France, people have rights for: family allowances, retirement, labor unions and democracy. There are racists but you stay home on Saturday and on Sunday you are fine... If you go out you get into trouble. In Morocco, there is my homeland, my children, but there are no jobs, rights and so on....*
>
> B.A., 68 years, old retired emigrant employee.

This piece of discourse is formulated in an interlanguage marked by the interference of structures of the native language of the speaker (Amazigh) in the way he speaks French, namely through phonic and lexical interference. This respondent has spent some forty years in France working in various sectors (mining, factories, construction, housework, etc.). After so many years of experiencing *the "In-between"*, between Morocco and France, he developed a dichotomous representation of these two settings, which we would be tempted to call paradigmatic spaces as they are marked by exclusive specifications. Let's consider each side at a time, the garden side first then the courtyard side. France is the country elected by reason: there is work, money is earned there and workers have rights (family allowances, retirement, labor unions, and democracy). Morocco is the country elected by the heart, (our participant would say by the liver), it is the protecting land of the family, of the cultural heritage; in short it is the landmark (or a millstone?) of the native identity. But France

is also the country of the hard life, where the vicissitudes are awaiting (unemployment, racism, and agony); in Morocco, on the other side of the coin it is the precariousness of living and working conditions.

What does *"In-between"* refer to in this case? Could this be the experience of an intermediary space between the Moroccan and Western worlds, a symbolic space which would combine the benefits of the two worlds? This postulation is doubly problematic because the participant is finally not at ease in none of them. It is a fact that the migrant worker lives in a situation of cultural and linguistic deprivation in Europe. In most cases, he is illiterate and unwilling to invest in an experience that he considers as transitory; and he is unable to assimilate Western culture, except in some of its most immediate manifestations (consumption, customs, work, labor union, etc.). It is also commonly known that the emigrant is no longer exactly the man he was before his stay in Europe. He discovered new places, met other people, attested other values being practiced, and this sum of experiences makes him qualitatively distinct from his folk who, embittered by the lifestyle he leads, by virtue of the goods he has accumulated during his life of toil, would call him with contempt *fakans* or *boufransa* or even *Zmagri*. Thus, the experience of the *Other* places our ex-emigrant at the margin of his native community... still without situating him within Western rationality, to which he is fundamentally foreign by his vision of the world and his conduct. In short, *the "In-between"* in which our respondent lives is a symbolic space marked by alienation and estrangement.

This position, truly not that comfortable, places the respondent in an *"In-between" two* similar to one in which some groups of young black Americans, called the (*"lames")* are situated by their fellow people because they do not want to choose between standard American language and culture and the language and culture of the street, since for them the two symbolic spaces entertain a relation of conjunction rather than that of disjunction (See Labov, 1978).

Praise of the Cross-culturalism

> *The world we are living in forces us to open up to today's universal culture. We definitely have our own culture, our own heritage, but in order to develop ourselves, we need to master foreign languages, to acquire modern science and technology. I do not think that, in doing so, I become alienated to the West; quite the opposite, I am in a position that allows me to activate my critical thinking towards the West and towards my own society.*
>
> A.K., 38 years old, University scholar.

This statement is essentially a discourse on *cross-culturalism* being understood as the intellectual experience of two reference worlds, the Arab-Muslim world and the Western world. The first one is referred to here as *our own culture, our heritage*, which gives the impression to imply that this culture and heritage are marked by the seal of locality and specificity, whereas Western culture is explicitly considered as universal, and as the symbolic expression of the rational nature of the present time. The experience of the *"In-between"* thus becomes a requirement for the openness to Alterity, a condition for having access to universality. Therefore, *the "In-between"* is no more this space which separates or which connects two extremes, the extreme of the origin and the extreme of the Alterity, but an attractive pole whose major attributes can only be those of the Western cultural reference. What about Alienation? Our participant denies this by claiming an *uncompromising identity*, a vigilant and doubly critical one with regard to both the bewilderment of an absolute original identity and the blind dominance of the *Alter* (See Khatibi, 1993). But can *double criticism* escape the historicization of the issue, its adherence to the logosphere of another temporality, that of the dominant pole? It sounds illusory to develop an *"In-between"* made of a state of equilibrium and harmony between two referent cultural groups occupying unequal positions in the global market of symbolic goods, for it can be asserted, without resorting to mechanistic economics, that the terms of symbolic exchange follow those of the exchange of material goods between the South and the North.

Experiencing Alterity

We relate here a human experience involving an American anthropologist and a Moroccan peasant:

> *That Ben Mohammad was able to establish this kind of dialogue with me in a peer-to-peer manner was a very remarkable thing in itself ... Through a mutual confrontation, we were able to establish intimacy relationship and reaffirm through this even our fundamental Alterity. What inherently separated us was our past. I could understand Ben Mohammad only when he could, himself, understand me, that is to say, partially ... Our Alterity was not of an ineffable essence, but rather the sum of different historical experiences. We belonged to networks of different meanings, but now these networks were at least partially embedded. However, dialogue was possible only when we recognize our differences, when we stay loyal – or even critical - towards the symbols that our respective traditions had left us. By doing so, we initiated a process of change.*
>
> (Rabinow, 1988, p.144)

We are here far from the despising attitude adopted by certain ethnologists towards their object of study. Rabinow adopts an attitude of acceptance of Alterity with its differences and without any disdain. The American anthropologist reports elsewhere on an experiment he conducted in the Moroccan Middle Atlas, precisely his participation in a night of intense trance because of the joyous effects that it had on him. The feeling he had when he was looking and was listening to the players of trance accompanied by Moroccan peasants had for him as much aesthetic and cathartic value as the one he had experienced in a music concert by the black American jazz musician John Coltrane. What is interesting in this experience of *the "In-between"* is the empathetic disposition of Rabinow which allows him to access the *human essence* stripped of its ornament. In the statement reproduced above, we have another dimension of the *"In-between"*, the intellectual dimension. It relates his encounter with Ben Mohammed, one of the characters he mostly appreciated during his journey in Ayt Yussi. The question at issue for Rabinow here is to

conceptualize his relation to the *Alter*, and to evaluate the distance that separates him from his interlocutor. In fact, it is interesting to note that the character who marked him most is specifically the one who maintains his difference and who assumes it in serenity.

Rabinow (1988, p.61) also experienced cultural and musical discovery at a trance session in the Moroccan Middle Atlas, an experience whose pathos was obvious:

> *What perhaps surprised me most during this session (trance in the Middle Atlas), was the naturalness in everything. And both at the moment and the souvenir that I have kept of it, this night had on me the same cathartic effect and the same profoundly relaxing impact that I had felt when I listened to a musical recital by John Coltrane. In this case and in the other, they were consummate artists working in a given cultural setting to develop a cultural form that allows them to explore the realms of psychic and emotional disorder.*

Dysphoric Representation of Alterity

In a different but equally instructive context, it is interesting to stop at the experience of Rachid Taha, Algerian, "disoriented oriental rocker", as he likes to call himself. This is an experience shared almost by the Maghreb migrants in the West. He is divided between his cultural origins, those of an environment lacking freedom, and the Western society, that is both attractive and repulsive. In an interview with Rotana Channel, he stated that:

> *After the album "1, 2, 3 Soleil", the French people forgot the Raï which is now classified as an ethnic and community music (....). But before denouncing the others, we have to denounce ourselves (...) I hate communitarianism. The Raï is a phenomenon of fashion in France. No tribute has been paid to the Arab artist as a universal creator (...).*

In another interview with the Mosaïque Channel, he is even more direct:

> *The French do not like us, they hate us; the Arabs do not get on TV... If you want to emigrate, do not go to France... In all cases, everywhere in Europe, the extreme right is rising. The only Arabs that the media in Europe talk about are terrorists and football players (...) and the only Arab they talk about is couscous (...) I'm sad. I'm pessimistic (...) The West is shitting on our face.*

Jewish Figures of Cross-culturalism

The Jewish community occupies a particular position in the Moroccan social organization. Its millennial presence has crossed the periods of history of the country during which it has preserved its religious identity while at the same time being profoundly marked by the Arab-Amazigh profane culture and by marking it, in its turn, by its fingerprint, mainly at the level of economic practices (first in craftsmanship production and in trade, and later on in the liberal professions) and in socio-cultural practices (singing, cooking, jewelry, sewing, etc.). Today, and for a variety of reasons developed *infra*, this community is still present and has been reduced to a few hundred individuals residing in big cities, mainly in Casablanca. It is spread in the diaspora, which still maintains only religious and affective relations with Morocco. In order to understand the symbolic function of the "ferryman" undertaken by the Jew in the Moroccan society, we will listen to testimonies that relate the privileged relations between Moroccans of Muslim faith and those of Hebraic confession, relations which do not conceal the tensions and the exactions undergone by the latter ones at given moments of present and past history of the country.

The Jew merchant had an important function in the local economy. Trust and mutual acquaintance ensuing from him are the source of the acceptance of "the hawker" by the village community. Any other stranger to this community would not be allowed to enter to the center of the village and access to trade with women; trust represents the basic value of transactional relationships. In pre-colonial and colonial times, the Caïds were aware of the role of the Jewish families, which is the reason why they

protected them. On the other side, the Jews have passed on their know-how in trade and craft; the hawker could use dialectal Arabic and/or Amazigh to communicate with people.

Moshe the Hawker

> *I can still remember the visits of Moshe the hawker to our village. In my native village, he used to sell a set of products to villagers, especially women, cosmetic products; jewelry and clothes. There had always been a peddler selling products from village to village. In some localities, there was the Jewish pathway, (abrid n udayn), that of the Ayt Baâmrane passed through the souk of Mesti on Wednesday, the souk of Almu on Monday, the souk of El Khemis on Thursday, the souk of Hadd Bifourna on Sunday. The pathway is protected by the Amghar, it is forbidden for Muslims.*
>
> (A. A., 75 years old, a peasant).

In the traditional distribution system, the village community produced and lived on agricultural and pastoral resources of subsistence economy, generating little surplus but enough to provide cash for the purchase of basic necessity products. The role of a hawker is provided by the Jew who used to move to the consumer, in the weekly souks or even in villages. The Jewish merchants established themselves at the souk where they made or repaired slippers, frames, packsaddles, halters; They also sold tea and sugar, and they bought "argan" oil, olive oil, almonds, beeswax, skins, leather, wool, wheat and any other products that they resold. They also worked as craftsmen: saddler, shoemaker, potter... The Jewish craftsmen worked on fabric, leather (harnesses, packsaddles, saddles, handbags). Tiznit was and is still a major center for silver work in Souss where there were several Jewish sites mainly in Ifrane of the Anti-Atlas, Illigh, Ammeln, Aqqa, Sidi Ifni, Inezgane, Essaouira ... In some other areas there were also predominantly Jewish villages: Tahala, Taẓrwalt (Tafraout Commune), Bouguidir and Oughrib (Sidi Ifni District), Agʷejgal (Ayt Baâmrane Commune), etc. In other Amazighophone areas in Morocco, there were centers with larger Jewish communities in the Atlas, such as in Debdou, Sefrou, and Tahla; in Ksar Souk in the Tafilalet, Tinghir; and in the Rif at

Mestassa and Taghzout. Obviously, even larger communities settled in the cities, especially the traditional ones with population of Andalusian origin, such as Fes, Tetwan, Rabat, Sale, Mogador, etc. Today, there are no more Jews in these counties, but some of them are still visited by the Jews from the diaspora who come to honor the ascendants out of religious duty.

Mesûda or the Delights of the Skhina

> *Mesûda was a Jewish mother living in Agadir City with her family and other Jewish families, and Moslem ones within the same neighborhood. She was in a close relationship of friendship with my own mother. They used to exchange cooked dishes, which allowed me to taste the Skhina (dafina) with unleavened bread, yeast-free bread, during the feast of Pesach (Jewish Easter). In return, Mesûda enjoyed eating Amazigh cuisine, especially bread with "amlu" and mint tea. We shared together the culture of gifts and counter-gifts, which is the foundation of good neighborly relations, the culture of sharing food (tiṭṭi n utchi), sharing of salt (tiṭṭi n tisent). This is how I appreciated Jewish difference through food. My palate is in a sense in mourning since the departure of Mesûda and her family. Luckily, we have cookbooks to palliate the vicissitudes of the history.*
>
> (A. B., 70 years old).

The Jewish cuisine is rich and diverse across cities and regions. It includes the official menus for religious ceremonies, large preparations, *kemia* or aperitifs, salads and entrees, grilled dishes, soups, fish, vegetables and ordinary dishes, poultry, couscous, *dafina*, bread, cakes and desserts, jams, beverages and herbal tea. This cuisine, which also uses spices and herbs, is today known throughout the world (See M. Kakou, 2017).

Sentimental Imprint, Rebecca or the Impossible Love

> *Rebecca, ô Rebecca, splendid was the day when you came to the high school with your father. At your sight the recreation yard was in turmoil. We stopped our squabbles and our infantile games to admire you. You radiated with your sublime beauty our sad evenings at the boarding school. We all fell in love with you. It was up to whoever could approach you, talk to you, and*

accompany you on a weekend outing; and it was Âziz who won your favors; a teenage love, a fantasy frustration. At the next school year, we didn't see you again. Your father, in his capacity of a Ḥazzan, could not conceive of such a relation. Âziz lost his entire mind and dropped out of school. He let his hair grow, and with a rough beard, his eyes wondered in the narrow streets of the Medina looking for you, Rebecca, Rebecca, my love where are you? He never saw you again. You probably had to be delighted by your people who forced you to live under other skies. I believe that somewhere, we are still a few to carry this wound in our ego. The impossible love between a Jewish girl and a Muslim boy, between a Muslim girl and a Jewish boy is an inconceivable tragedy for ingenuous beings.

(M. A., 72 years old)

Love relation between two beings belonging to different confessions, in this case the love of a Muslim boy and a Jewish girl, was experienced as a social tragedy for both, and as an impossible union between their respective families, with a few notable exceptions. This is the crystallization point of *the "In-between"*, the manifestation place of the exclusive identity.

Political Imprint, Abraham and Simon, the Instigators of Political Awakening

The end of the 1960s, when I was a student in Rabat, I discovered Abraham in a political cell. I owe him, and to a few others, my first awakening to politics as an action (which is different from politics as an issue). Historical materialism and dialectical materialism, the vanguard role of the proletariat, the theory of antagonism, the organic intellectual, and the place of the Palestinian revolution in the liberation of the Arab world ... In short, the political culture of that time. There were plenty of new ideals which triggered the enthusiasm of a novice who was socially predisposed to engage, though modestly, in the change of an unjust system ...with a youthful ardor, repression, and a shattered dream ... There was a shift in the paradigm after meeting Simon at the University; I moved from the culture of violence (verbal, discursive) to the culture of political negotiation (politics as an issue this time). We were more concerned with analysis than with action and more in action-research than in activism. Within such a hostile environment, Simon emanated, who is an emblematic figure for me. He was a veteran of

political action as well as a scholar with a subtle knowledge of Judeo-Arab history and culture, and a fervent activist of cultural diversity. His experience, his constructive support and his plain talk also gave me great help. At least for me, my friend and colleague Simon, you had been a real, sincere and committed support. Gratefulness and peace be on your soul.

(A.A., 71 years old).

Moroccan Jews played the role of "ferrymen" in the political life of the country, especially in the discovery of the Marxist ideology, in the training and supervision of young activists. Again, that was thanks to the social and cultural position of a community open to the world, with its changes and its upheavals... It was an *"In-between"* community par excellence.

Academic Imprint, Fernand the Initiator, and Bill "the Master"

In the academic year of 1967-68 at the Faculty of Letters in Rabat, I was glad to have had Fernand, a French Jew of Algerian origin, as a professor of linguistics. He was then preparing a thesis on the Berber dialect of Ayt Seghrouchen. Having noticed my interest in my mother tongue, he invited me to his house for working sessions. It was to him that I owe my initial training in Amazigh linguistics.

And it was thanks to his encouragement that I managed to get a doctoral scholarship at the Sorbonne University. For many decades, Fernand has been a facilitator who allowed many graduate groups of Amazigh speaking students to do research in linguistics, at a time when that was considered taboo, if not forbidden.

Later on, I met William, or Bill as his friends would call him. The master of international sociolinguistics initiated me to the relationship holding between society and language through the analysis of black Americans casual speech. What was the relevance of that? He was the first scholar to have shown that school failure of children from Afro-American families was due, not to a genetic deficit but rather to being judged and evaluated based on linguistic and cultural standards that were not those of their environment. In my view, Bill found the key to make science rigorous and socially useful and committed. That was what incited me to do a post-doctoral program in his laboratory. I also had the privilege of being his guest, with his companion Gillian, and I appreciated both the scientist and

the citizen in him. He is for me an example that I have tried to follow modestly.

(A. B., 65 years old).

Fernand and Bill, both Jewish academic scholars, nourished the intelligence of their students, each in his own way; the first is French of Algerian origin and the second is American from New York and from East-European origin. They are two brilliant scholars with two human experiences of the *"In-between"* that have enduringly marked the author of this book.

It is to be noted that the people given as examples are all Israelites, Moroccan citizens except for Fernand and William. I humbly admit that every one of them has nourished my heart and fertilized my mind, each in his own way and according to his area of interest. It is clear that the contribution of the Jewish component has played an important role for more than two millennia now in the evolution of our society at the economic, social, political and cultural levels. The Jewish community was composed of innocent and uprooted victims carried away by the whirls of planetary challenges, and of lively intelligent brains captivated by new horizons of thought and action. Their representatives, those who are still with us, have the merit of reminding us of the duty of remembrance.

Cross-culturalism: Continuity and Discontinuity

These different testimonies, which express fairly differentiated representations of the *"In-between"*, denote an ambivalent character of this notion. In terms of cross-cultural anthropology, one would say that the *"In-between"* has two contrastive meanings, illustrated by the positions of the subjects whose testimonies are summoned above. It can signify a situation of discomfort in which the subject occupies a position that is being structured and which is separating or located between two other extreme and preliminarily structured positions. It would be a position marked by the search for a psychological, social and cultural balance, a search that can be euphoric if the two departure sites constitute a *culture*

continuum, organized in transiting platforms allowing moving from one cultural sphere to another without detrimental shock. However, the search for equilibrium can be dysphoric if the sites constitute a discontinuous form of discrete cultural segments, having distinctive and contrastive features and imposing a perilous approach on the subject that can lead to diverse kinds of dysfunctions.

The *"In-between"* may also mean a mental attitude and a friendly cultural posture, an intermediary space between two sites maintaining relations of contiguity and cultural exchange according to the principle of reciprocity. We can reasonably postulate that this *"In-between"* is possible only in the case of a *cultural proximity*, where the two sites belong to the same *symbolic logosphere* based on a religious, linguistic, historical, territorial identity... and on common interest. In fact, it looks like that when the intersection of sites includes bundles of cultural features organized into meaning generating syntagms for two or more communities, or for individualities in an empathic relation, the intermediate site, the *"In-between"* in this case, produces conditions for the eventuality of occurrence of innovative paradigms. The *«In-between»* would then be an opportunity for humans to escape the *infuriating machine* of the absolutes. One of the modalities of the absolute lies in the fanatic search for identity in a world of entropy and in structural change.

Essay 5
Identity and Socio-cultural Change

In tribute to
Simon Levy (1934-2011)

Statement of the Problem

The issue of change in Moroccan society is related to the general issue of the equivocal relation holding between "traditions" and "modernity". A serene approach to this question has to take into account a dual reality, namely that of the inevitable evolution of any society in general, and that of the impact of the Western cultural model on traditional societies in particular. This means that no society is static and that the impact obviously induces an evolution of peripheral societies marked by the appropriation of beneficial elements allowing the improvement of life material conditions and by the imposition of other disruptive elements at the level of culture and values. This dual reality contributes to the creation of a dual situation in which society is divided into two fragments. The first one consists of a poor strata, living in precarious conditions in rural and urban areas, and the second one is composed of a synarchy taking advantage of the generated wealth, turning around an autocratic power and consisting of a wheeler-dealer neo-bourgeoisie and an administrative and military plutocracy. The disparities between the two segments in fact create two "societies" which are distinct with respect to their resources and their way of life. In terms of the value system, the peculiarity of this state of affairs is that the social outcasts live within the spirit of traditional culture and that the wealthy adapt this culture to modernity; this pushes some to qualify such a tendency as being a typical sign of schizophrenia.

For at least a decade, the debate on the issue of cultures is no longer a taboo subject. This debate started with the movement represented by the magazine *Souffles* during the 1960s and 1970s, and by the organization of the first congregation of the Summer University of Agadir in August 1980. It was first initiated by different cultural associations, and then it came out to the public sphere (See *Lamalif*, 1981; *Anwāl*, 1986; *Al-Balāgh*, 1986; *Al-Masâr*, 1986; *The Agadir Charter*, 1991; Āfāq 1992; *Tamunt*, 1995; *The Fiftieth Anniversary Report*, 2005; *Timmuzgha for Democracy*, 2011; etc.) At the academic level, a certain amount of research has been conducted in the area of Moroccan culture in its Amazigh, Arabic and Jewish varieties. The debate is not always marked by serenity between the supporters of the "Arabism", "Amazighism" and "Francophilia", which reveals deep issues. It is also significant that it is taking place here and now. In fact, at the domestic level, primordial issues are being discussed: State, Parliament, liberalism, university, culture, etc. It appears therefore legitimate and comprehensible to think about the fate of marginalized cultures and identities in the social projects being elaborated here and there. In addition, the willingness to reconstruct individual and collective identities at the global scale results from transformations and upheavals induced by material and symbolic production relations that are established vertically between the center and the periphery, and horizontally at the inter/intra-peripheral levels by the interplay of various imperialisms and sub-imperialisms. In this general atmosphere, the quest for identity oscillates between the pole of "identity construction" and that of "identification", that is, between the affirmation of an "intractable" difference vis-à-vis the Alter and the search for integration in a supra-entity where particularities are transcended.

A Changing Society

Moroccan society is undergoing considerable change. It is no longer the traditional rural society described in the monographs of the Colonial era. The monetization of the economy modifies personal relations qualitatively; the demographic pressure favors the disintegration of the

traditional order, migration introduces new cultural models, and the penetration of the State government imposes new hierarchies. The "demographic revolution" itself has introduced profound changes by promoting urbanization and disintegrating the traditional family model. The passage to the peripheral capitalist society is not yet complete, so much so that there are synchronic elements indicating different historical stages, some of which are obsolete in theory and others are in the state of genesis. These diverse and sometimes contradictory elements are intertwined and coexist in the social dynamics. This fact leads sociologists to describe Moroccan society as being "composite" (See Pascon, 1971). The constituency of this society is manifested in the concomitance of distinct socioeconomic systems maintaining either exclusionary relations, when it comes to modes of production in absolute contradiction; or inclusion relations, when the institutions of the most powerful mode recover those of the dominated mode; or finally contiguity relations in the case where the "traditional" culture continues to operate in limited sectors. The sum of these factors modifies the organizational model of this society and brings it closer to that of other peripheral capitalist societies. The transition from the first type of society to the second is effected through a complex and often painful process, because of what has precisely been stated by Bourdieu (1958, 107):

> *The pre-capitalist economy is integral with a real life, philosophical existence, interpersonal relationships, work and leisure, and a definite awareness of temporality. It is therefore understood that adaptation to the capitalist system does not presume a simple transformation of the traditionalist way of life, but a radical change in logic, a transmutation of the values which assign to existence its meaning and value.*

Being involved in this process, the Amazigh individual is thus bound to bear these contradictions by making, within his mind, the sums and the differences of the various models which appeal to him, so much so that:

> *Each one (...) is forced to attain within himself the balance and compatibility of all these competing societies, of all these features of society which appears*

to him every day in thousand faces with each having its logic, its references, its vocabulary, sometimes even its own language.

P. Pascon, 1971, p. 22.

Traditionally, religion, tribe and family constituted frames of belonging and socialization where the individual drew his landmarks from sociability and got hold of the referential scheme of the cultural patterns. Religion constituted a reference frame for social codes, rules of conduct and values, and provided a basis for a whole system of laws that delineated the boundaries of a given cultural space. We will indicate, following Bourqia (2010), that societies, such as the Moroccan one and in fact those of most Arab-Muslim countries, have inherited after their independence a reservoir of traditional values which interfere in the relations of individuals and groups with the State and the community. Religion, customs, tradition, and customary rights represent the reserve of moral values that govern the appraisal of the individual, social relations and relationships to the community. The sources of the traditional ethical order are religion, beliefs and social practices. Moral values are inseparable from the religious order in society; religion delineates the moral framework and dictates the values to be followed in relation to oneself, to others and to the community. Religion, customs, traditions, and customary rights are thus the main sources of values which govern the appraisal of the individual, social relations and relationships to the community.

Family is the first institution where values are transmitted and reproduced. The traditional family organization and its extended family model are maintained and governed by a principle of a marked hierarchy and by the principle of authority. There is no doubt that there were discrepancies between rural and urban areas in terms of modes and standards of living. Nonetheless, the principles regulating relations between parents and children, between children and women, and between seniors and juniors, are almost the same in both milieus, namely those of authority. The values that underlie family organization are those of obedience to the parents authority strengthened by the value of the

parental blessing (*rrḍa*) governing the relations of filiation. It is the duty of every offspring to avoid the banishment (*ssaxṭ*) of the parents, an antipode of parental blessing; this becomes a form of satisfaction felt by parents when their authority is obeyed and sustained. The attitude towards parents is settled, children are either blessed or damned. Banishment of children is in fact rare, it occurs in case of serious conflict between the parents and the children, as in cases of violence against parents, refusal of the spouse chosen by the parents, non-assistance to parents in difficulty, expulsion of parents from the subsidiary house, sale of family patrimony, etc. The banished child is supposed to be cursed by God, family and society. The blessing of parents is thus a moral value that every individual aspires from his parents; he internalizes it so that it conditions his relationship with parents and prevents him from falling into banishment. If both parents can share and give blessing to their children, authority is nonetheless generally the father's responsibility; even when excessive, it is justified, legitimized, and accepted by the value system. The authority of the father is replaced by that of the instructor in the "quranic" school (*msid / timzguida*) or in the modern school. The relation of the teacher to the student obeys the same principle as that regulating the father/child relationship, namely the principle of the authority/obedience dichotomy. This authority of the father extends to the authority of the husband over the wife, justified by the notion of obedience (*ṭṭaâ*) and perceived as a positive value which should be an attribute of every self-respecting wife. The principle of authority is the guideline that regulates the hierarchical relations; that is how the value of obedience extends to the ratio orienting hierarchy relations not only between father and children, but between the elderly and the younger, between the master and the disciples/students, the holders of authority and subordinates and, beyond that, between governors and governed.

Parents' blessing is elevated in value by religion, beliefs and collective representations, a value that ensures family cohesion over time. Thus, the children's duty to assist their elderly parents is an implication of the search for parental blessing that accompanies the individual throughout

his lifetime. The fact of having an offspring and the efforts involved to raise them represent both an emotional and a material investment that places children in debt situation towards their parents. Other values are also equally important: "parental blessing" (*rrḍa*), "chastity" (*ḥšuma*), "honor" (*lâaṛaḍa, al'iṛḍ*), "contentment" (*lqanaâa*), "trust" (laman, ttiqa), "promise" (*awal, lkelma*), "propriety" (*ṣṣwab*), "dignity" (*udm, lužeh*), etc., are part of this traditional repertoire of values that are the basis of social relations and the basis of the cohesion of the group and of society in general.

Social change is also manifested at the economic level. Technical progress in agriculture and the requirements of industrial production have resulted in a great wave of urbanization, and the initiation of new ways of life. Society is undergoing a considerable demographic growth, accentuating these phenomena. The formation of an urban proletariat disrupts the archaic social structure; we witness a prodigious shift of social relations to the individualization and a reconfiguration of sociability relations. So, family has shifted from the parental model to the matrimonial model, and that's the sign of the birth of the nuclear family, reduced to the spouses and their children in the middle and upper classes. Marriage, previously considered an institution, is becoming more and more a private affair based on consent between two individuals who choose one another freely. In matrimonial relations, it is primarily a matter of interpersonal relationship; what matters is neither the lineage nor the house with its traditions to be transmitted, but rather the other, with view open onto the future. The rural exodus has divided the extended family, has broken the attachment to land and has diversified the professional activities; the son does no more directly inherit the occupation of the father. Urbanization will thus enable the empowerment of the spouses and the constitution of new affective relationships. It is no longer a matter of getting married so as to preserve an inheritance, to take back the family home, to transmit a tradition, in short to get married for a benefit and for the interest of the family. Henceforth, marriage is a free act of reciprocal recognition of two individuals, which no more involves

all family ancestry as was the case before. Love marriage is progressively replacing arranged marriage. In short, the individual is more a master of his own emotional life and manages to free himself from his family to build a new autonomous home. The spouses, probably for the first time in history, cease to be a matter of kinship, lineage or tradition, to become a love union.

It is thus clear that the traditional value system is undergoing structural evolution induced by transformations due to the disintegration of traditional economy, to the domination of the capitalist mode of production, to wage relations, to the demographic revolution, to the urbanization which has reduced family dimension and to any factor which facilitates the intromission of modernity related values. What follows from this is a renewal of the traditional cultural expressions, be they of the material culture, or of the intangible culture. The socio-economic changes taking place in Moroccan society have significant effects on different cultural expressions.

A Challenging Diversity

Cultural diversity in Morocco is a historical reality paradoxically ignored and not assumed. During many decades, the dominant ideological discourse has reduced the national cultural identity to the Arab-Muslim dimension by relegating the Amazigh, Sub-Saharan, Jewish and even cultural expressions of the Darija [Moroccan Arabic] to their entrenchments. It was only with the enactment of the July 2011 Constitution that the plurality and diversity of cultural components were recognized. Article five of the Constitution thus sets up the configuration *of the linguistic landscape:*

> *Arabic is the official language of the State. The State works for its protection and development, as well as the promotion of its use. Likewise, Amazigh constitutes an official language of the State, being common patrimony of all Moroccans with no exception. An organic law defines the process of implementation of the official character of this language, as well as the modalities of its integration into teaching and into the priority domains of*

> *public life, so that it may be permitted in time to fulfil its function as an official language. The State works for the preservation of Ḥassania, as an integral component of Moroccan cultural unity, as well as the protection of the spoken varieties and of the cultural expressions in use in Morocco. Likewise, it ensures the coherence of linguistic policy and national culture and the learning and mastery of foreign languages of greatest use in the world, as tools of communication, of integration and of interaction with the community of knowledge, and to be open to different cultures and to contemporary civilizations. A National Council for Languages and Moroccan Culture is created, charged most notably with the protection and the development of the Arabic and Amazigh languages and of the diverse Moroccan cultural expressions, which constitute an authentic patrimony and a source of contemporary inspiration. It brings together the institutions concerned in these domains. An organic law shall determine its attributions, composition and the modalities of its functioning.*
>
> Kingdom of Morocco Constitution, 2011, Article 5.

By virtue of these provisions, Moroccan culture is conceived of as an integral and indivisible entity; it incorporates Arabic, Amazigh, Jewish and Sub-Saharan expressions. The political meaning of this assertion is that these various expressions constitute a common cultural foundation shared by the various components of the nation. Thus, if languages are diverse, culture is one entity; it is the exclusive property of no segment of society; it cannot therefore be claimed for political, ethnic, partisan, regional or confessional purposes. Culture unity is in a way the pledge of national unity.

Arab Culture, Constancy and Variability

In the field of cultural production, the issue of modernity has emerged among an elite open to modernity, with the influence of the Orthodox world from the Balkans and Russia, which permitted openness to European enlightenment through an ecclesiastical network linking Arabs, Russians, Rumanians, Greeks, Armenians, etc. The first Arabic printing house was established in the Middle East by the Melkite prelate Aleppine Atanisyus Dabbas in 1706, which enhanced modern education through

missionaries, translations and the press. The Jewish community of Iraq has also played an important role in this movement through the press and writings in Arabic and Judeo-Arabic. These beginnings favored the movement of the *Nahḍa* (the Arab Renaissance) extending from the XVIII century to the first half of the twentieth century resulting from contact with Europe in the context of the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the conquest of Egypt by Napoleon Bonaparte (1798). The *Nahḍa* was a transversal phenomenon that affected political, scientific, technical, cultural, literary and religious domains. The first Arab intellectual to have had contact with the West was Rifâat Al-Tahṭāwi, who travelled to Paris in 1826 as part of a mission sent by Mehmet Ali, Pasha of Egypt. Awareness to modernity has taken three directions: cultural "renaissance", religious reformism and political awareness. The hot issues which agitated the elites were related to the position of religion in politics, the conception of power and social and economic development. European missions (French and British in particular) have introduced science, technology, enlightenment and modern education in Egypt, Syria and Lebanon. The elites of the Middle East were trained first in schools and then in European universities; on their return home, they brought modern culture and tried to apply it to the archaic structures of their countries. In the XIX century, Mehmet Ali's Egypt played a considerable role in this movement by forming, with the contribution of France and England, important scientific and intellectual elite that spreads ideas of progress and modern science and technology. Later on, and in the context of conquering colonization, boasted and followed by scientific missions and research institutions (the French institutes in Cairo, Damascus, Beirut, etc.), the feeling of backwardness of "the Arab nation" got worse with the French and British colonization of the Middle East in the beginning of the twentieth century. It therefore appears that the emergence of the *Nahḍa* is not reduced to the dual relationship between the Middle East and Western Europe; the context of its emergence is in fact a global one.

At the cultural level, the emergence of modern literature (See André Miquel, 1993) has been influenced by a variety of contributing sources,

notably the French, English, Spanish, Russian, and other literatures, via the schools of ecclesiastical network, the scientific and cultural missions and the role played by the Syro-Lebanese diaspora in Latin America and Europe. The Arab cultural movement consists of leading intellectuals and creators who laid the foundations of the Arab literary renaissance; these were namely Rifâat al-Tahṭāwi (1801-1873), Âli Mubārak (1823-1893), Mohammed al-Muwaihili (1868-1930), Faraḥ Anṭun (1874-1922), Georges Zaydan (1861-1934), Taha Ḫussein (1889-1973), Musā Salāma (1887-1958), and the poets Al-Bārũdi (1838-1904), Aḥmad Shawqi (1868-1932), Xalil Muṭrān (1871-1949). These figures had a considerable influence on the writers and thinkers of the Maghreb.

After having provided an account of the richness of the production of Arab thought and literature, it seems to us worthwhile to address the following question: In the third millennium, how can the experience of the *Nahḍa* movement be assessed? Briefly, let us say that the contact with European culture in general was experienced in the mode of trauma generated by the French and English peril on the independence of the "Arab-Muslim world", a threat represented by the military force and by the financial, economic, technical and political superiority. The reaction was mitigated: the backwardness of the Arab world was due to the Ottoman Empire domination, under which the countries emancipated with the help of France and England, to ultimately fall under the control of these last powers. Collateral developments contributed to the emergence of a free movement that produces economic, intellectual and cultural elite that produced thought and creation without actually succeeding in establishing a political system that redistributes wealth equitably among social strata. The military systems, imbued with the ideas of an authoritarian socialism at the service of the oligarchy, put an end to the liberal experience and opened the way to the Islamist adventure that feeds on the frustrations of the popular masses. Thus, it is clear that the current cultural situation is far from being as rich as the one marked by Ṭaha Hussein, Naguib Mahfūẓ, Moḥammad Âbdulwahāb, Oum Kalṯūm, Farid Al-Aṭrach, Asmahān, Yūsuf Chahine, Chaykh Imām and Aḥmad Fu'ad Najem,

Adonis, Niẓār Qabbāni, Mahmūd Darwīch, etc. The present situation is marked by the "restriction" of individual liberties, freedom of opinion and creation by the salafist frame of mind and autocratic regimes. Steps backwards to traditionalism and conservatism have been going on for a decade, despite some pockets of resistance in the area of cultural creation.

In Morocco, within the scope of Western pressures, the early signs of the realization of the historical backwardness of the Muslim world can be identified during the reign of Mulay Abderrahman (1778-1859), when the Sultans started to send emissaries charged with conducting observations in the countries visited within the context of their diplomatic missions (As-Saffar, Al-Hassan Ben Mohammed Al-Rhassal (1902, London), Al-Hajoui Al-Thaâlibi (1919, Paris). The point included in the mission order of these diplomats was to observe the progress made by the countries referred to as *Bilâd Al-kufr* in the technical and military fields. In times of crisis, the question posed by the sultans was to know whether to give in to the European pressures and open up the country to foreign finance and trade, or if necessary to safeguard the integrity of the *Ceridian Empire*. If the Moroccan elites were unanimous in admitting the benefits of modernity, namely railways, the Toulon shipping fleet, theater, the press, libraries, the treasury, tax services, publishing houses, modern schools and eating habits, they were divided on the question of the country's openness vs. closure to the European influence. In simple terms, the conservatives, especially the *Ûlama*, were in favor of closure for the sake of safeguarding the country's Islamic faith, while the "modernists" were for openness for the sake of political and economic development of the Moroccan nation.

Under French and Spanish rules, Morocco was seduced by the ideals of the *Nahḍa* and turned to the elites of the Middle East countries to reinforce the Arab-Islamist convictions, while the latter went to the universities and institutes in France, Spain and England to get modern enlightenment and technology. Al-Ḫajoui is considered to be the best representative of the modernist movement at the beginning of the 20th century; according to him, the questions addressed by the *Nahḍa* cannot find adequate answers neither in the blind imitation of the West nor in a vision that is directed

exclusively towards the past. He pleads for congruence between tradition and modernity, a tradition borrowing from modernity the elements necessary for its reform and renewal, and modernity whose basic values do not jeopardize tradition. This pragmatic perspective is looked upon with suspicion by the nationalists who see in it an invitation to accept European colonization through the acceptance of the ideal carried by the discourse of the French "civilizing mission" in North Africa. As a result of his resolutely "pro-modernist" positions, Al-Ḫajoui was fought by the traditionalists; and at his death the *Ûlama* refused to perform the ritual prayers at the mosque and prohibited his burial in a cemetery in Fes. The believers were instructed not to go to the said cemetery, which was left deserted until the exhumation of the deceased's body. This represents an illustration of an outrageous opposition by the conservatives to modernity and an assimilation of the Moroccan modernists to the unbelievers and collaborators with colonialism.

In its reformist version, *Salafism* is presented as a middle way in the patrimonial discourse. Moroccan *Salafism,* locally represented by Abū Shuâayb Ad-Dukkālī, Mulāy Al-Ârabi Al-Âlawi, Mokhtar As-Sūsī and Âllāl Al-Fāsī, got its inspiration from Jamāl Al-Dine Al-Afghānî and Mohammed Âbduh. This discourse adheres to the Sunni tradition, a tradition that was intended to be freed from the dregs of scholasticism which resulted in the paralysis in the efforts of the *Ijtihād* and has led to the stagnation and to the crisis of the Arab-Muslim culture. It advocates a re-reading/re-interpretation of the Qur'an and the Sunna in the light of the evolution undertaken by modern civilization in the West, arguing for the fact that Islam is not at odds with scientific progress, and that therefore Muslim communities have to adopt its positive achievements, while rejecting the aspects that may negatively affect the essence of their religion or those that may lead to the *distortion* of Muslims.

In Âllāl Al-Fāsī's frame of thought, Salafism receives the inflexion of an activist political doctrine. Indeed, in *Al-Naqd Al-ḏḏātī* (1966), Al-Fāsī lays down as a foundation of his societal project the return to the precepts of the Qur'an and the Sunna, and calls for the use of reason to reform

Moroccan society in the areas of thought, economy, politics and the renovation of linguistic and cultural heritage (*al-turāṯ*). Let us focus our attention particularly on the propositions related to this heritage (for an assessment of Al-Fāsī's political project, See H. Benaddi, 1993). The discourse on heritage produced by Âllāl Al-Fāsī aims at *defending authenticity*; and it thus falls within the apologetic genre. In his passage, *difāân âni al-aṣāla,* (Undated), he argues that the fundamental component of heritage is classical Arabic *(al-fuṣḥā)*, the sacred language of the Qur'ān and the link that unites the Muslim community. But this language, which once was the language used as a vehicle for Arab-Islamic science at a time when the West was lingering in the *darkness of ignorance*, has become "a bastardized language through the predominance of the non-Arab items (Mongolian, Persian and Turkish), it then became a language of disused rhetoric". With the awakening of the Arab community, it became imperative to undertake a *resurrection* and a *linguistic revolution* as prerequisites for the *Arab-Islamic renaissance*. To do this, it is necessary to get rid of the cultural and linguistic domination of the colonizer by the means of *full Arabization* of education, administration and public life. For him, to maintain the use of the foreign language is to participate in the enslavement of the nation by alienating its identity and personality. The use of the Arabic language is perceived as a means of cultural liberation.

Recovery of the cultural heritage is also an essential condition to "the rebirth of the Arab-Islamic culture and to the restoration of its authenticity". According to Âllāl Al-Fāsī, heritage is the reflection of the past and present history of the Arab-Islamic communities; it includes the achievements of eras of greatness but also the residues of the decadence of their history. The fundamental source of this heritage is Islam, which must therefore be firmly anchored in it, based exclusively on the prescriptions of the Qur'an and Sunna. Compliance with Islam's precepts has been the basis of its influence throughout the world and of the success of the Muslim community, first with the Prophet, and then under the rule of the enlightened Caliphs. However, the distortion of the Sunna has led to the decadence of the Muslim community which began with the Umayyads and

has continued ever since. The return to the Golden Age of the Arab-Muslim civilization is contingent on the condition of sorting out what is true, pure and precious in the Sunna heritage from what is false, corrupt and vile in its fallacious interpretations and deviant liturgical practices. It is therefore necessary to reject the heresies, schisms and charlatanism infiltrated during the period of decadence. In the field of literature, it is recommended to preserve qualitative Arabic production, be it from the pre-Islamic period or from the current time; likewise, it is necessary to adopt all the new aesthetic forms of prose and arts, provided they are of good quality. *Popular heritage* should also attract attention because it is the expression and the symbol of popular creation in which the mass (*al-'âmma*) has used a language and an artistic style of its own, provided that it does not substitute folklore for the communal culture, vulgar culture for the genuine heritage, and charlatanism for permanent civilization, as these stand as the guarantors of our cultural and civilizational identity. The following excerpt thus summarizes Âllāl Al-Fāsī's cultural project:

> *The realization of the need to liberate oneself from foreign domination leads us to liberate ourselves first from the instrument of this domination, that is the foreign language, by proceeding to the resurrection of the Arabic language, which is the crucible and the vehicle of our heritage; this heritage that we should be able to sort out based on inspiration from our glorious past so as to transcend our decadent present and prepare a radiant future.*
>
> Âllāl Al-Fāsī (1952, p.16).

After having exposed the foundations of our scholar's ideas, let us move to its evaluation. The *Salafist* doctrine has been confronted with the question of modernity (*'al-ḥadāṯa*) through contemporaneity (*'al-muâāṣara*), and the contradiction to be resolved is conveyed in the following question: how to modernize Moroccan culture and society while still remaining faithful to the Quranic dogma and the teachings of the Sunna? The *Salafist* response to this question consists in proclaiming the intangibility of the Qur'an and Sunna with respect to *the creed*, in realizing the re-appropriation of Classical Arabic language, the refining of the cultural patrimony and the modernization of social, economic and

political structures drawing inspiration from the West. The *Salafist* discourse constituted a powerful paradigm in Moroccan culture during the colonial period and in the aftermath of the country's independence, insofar as it presented itself as a radical alternative to the *colonialist discourse* and as a reliable alternative to both *the unadulterated traditionalist discourse* and to the *elite rationalist discourse* suspected of compromising with the West. Nowadays, there are many attempts to critically evaluate this discourse; the most frequent criticisms consist in questioning the validity of the *Salafist project* as a whole by situating it in its historical context, namely the period of the renaissance (*Al-nahḍa*) and that of colonization. *Salafism* in Al-Fāsī's perspective is interpreted as the expression of the ideology of the national bourgeoisie, which was able to direct the consternation of the Moroccan society created by *colonial trauma*. At this stage of Moroccan history, this bourgeoisie was the most qualified class to assume this task given its *material capital*; it was then a predominantly mercantile bourgeoisie. This was possible thanks to this bourgeoisie's *symbolic capital,* as it was the only component of the Moroccan society to have produced an elite capable of conceptualizing a social project and organizing itself in order to politically lead the national movement. The rural elites, who were still attached to the values and institutions of pre-colonial Morocco, had no credible competitive alternative. In the field of culture, the traditional urban bourgeoisie had based its discourse on the *Salafist* theses whose strategy lies in the transformation of religious discourse into a political doctrine with the aim of mobilizing the masses to the idea of the return to the foundations of Islam and to the refined Arab-Islamic culture, while adapting its basic principles to modern life. On the linguistic level, Urbanization is supposed to be the gateway to the recovery of the lost identity; it also has functioned as a key to the re-appropriation of symbolic power by the traditional urban elites after being marginalized during the colonial period.

Although carrying an innovative project in the context of the *patrimonial discourse*, *Salafism* has been trying to articulate the Arab-Islamic

cultural model in the course of modern history. In fact, the evolution undergone by the overall structures of the State and society after independence have revealed the failure of the *Salafist* discourse. This failure is undoubtedly due to several factors, the main ones are the following:

- The failure to maintain coherence in the *Salafist* philosophy which pretends to establish a compromise between tradition and modernity, or between authenticity and contemporaneity, in considering it easy to discern wheat from the chaff in both the Arab and Muslim heritage and in Western culture (cf. Molino, 1986);
- The impossibility of adapting technology to theology, according to Khatibi's conception (1993), by dissociating Western technology from the cultural values it carries and by integrating modernity into obsolete socio-economic structures;
- Lack of realism in the *Salafist* discourse which believes it can evade the look of the Other in the reconstruction of collective identity in a world fully integrated strategically, economically and culturally; and
- The ambiguity of the *Salafist* discourse with respect to the Arab-Islamic heritage being updated and with regard to the current culture being rooted in tradition.

On the one hand, the question that arises here is to know which heritage to revitalize, the one which advocates the *ijtihād* or the one that advocates misoneism? Revitalizing the exclusive Arab heritage or the Arab-Islamic heritage as a whole? On the other hand, what criteria of selection should be established with a view to retaining or rejecting this or that constituent of Western culture? Admittedly, the *Salafist* project constituted an important paradigm in the Moroccan cultural field at a given period of history; it has attempted to reconcile *tradition* and *modernity* in a world irredeemably dominated by ideas of *progress* and *development*. Yet, *patrimonial culture* invoked by *Salafism* is a traditional culture which still turns its back to rationality and innovation, and it lacks

the means to resolutely contribute to modern culture. It would therefore be stated that the failure of *Salafism* is due to the ambivalence of the answers it provides to the fundamental questions at issue in the contemporary world and the impossibility to strike reconciliation between tradition and modernity.

In our opinion, Adonis is the intellectual who best represents modernity in the Arab culture. He is considered to be an influential figure in the cultural and literary scene in the contemporary Arab world; he is not only a great poet but also an intellectual who thinks about and conceptualizes the issues of Arab culture. We consider that his contribution is essential in the debate on cultural issues in the Arab world. The book *Al-ṯābit wa al-mutaḥawwil*, published in 1973, has revolutionized modernist Arab thought and criticism. He is still an up-to-date scholar in the sense that his work evoked and still evokes an intense literary and intellectual debate between the proponents of modernity and those who are for tradition and conservatism. This controversial work constitutes one of the important foundations in the history of literary criticism and contemporary Arabic thought. It is undeniably an event book that has been reedited many times, which shows not only the popularity of the book, but also the impact of the author's analyses on the Arab cultural elite. The first part of the book presents, on the one hand, the Arab culture "constant", and on the other hand, the tendencies it has attempted to dismiss, and the introduction of other paradigms which he calls "the variable" in this same culture. In the section of the book titled "The Sources", Adonis argues that the early Muslims used to think and to act on the basis of their belief that Islamic religion is the foundation and the measure of the vision of the invisible and of human life, establishing an organic link between religion and life organization, between religion and language, and between poetry and thought. Thus, the Islamic political culture was practically embodied in the institution of the Caliphate, that is, in the ruling system or in the State. It follows then that the accuracy of a political or intellectual position is in accordance with that of religion. The second part deals with the "rooting of the origins". It can be said that

the peculiarity of Arab culture between the middle of the second century and the end of the third century of Hegira is the struggle between “reason” and “transmission”, between “renewal” and “tradition”, between “Islamism” and “Arabism”, and between “traditional” religious orientations and “rational empirical «orientations. The author has dwelled, in his book, on the radical reversal of the traditional paradigm incarnated in the contribution of the Sufi movement. Hence, the book clarifies the antagonism in the Arab culture between the “constant” and the “variable” paradigms, in all its forms, its levels and its dimensions, and during the period referred to. The author has also dwelled considerably on the concept of “modernity” as it has been established by the Arab poets of that time. The third part deals with the “shock of modernity and the authority of the religious heritage” by analyzing the problems of “modernity» in the Arab thought. To do so, the author examines, on the one side, the case of four scholars considered as “patrimonial” while illustrating “the limits of reason”, namely Judge Abdul-Jabber (Muâtazilite), Imâm al-Ghazᾱlī, Al-Fᾱrᾱbī and Ibn Taymiyah, and on the other side, the case of four scholars belonging to “the renaissance” and representing the current of, “the regained thought”, namely Muḥammad Ibn Âbd Al-Wahhâb, Moḥammad Âbduh, Rashīd Riḍᾱ, and Al-Kawᾱkibī. For him, the clash between the representatives of the two schools illustrates the antagonism between the paradigm of the “constant” and that of the “variable”. The final part of the work analyzes “the shock of modernity and the authority of the poetic heritage” in Arabic poetry. The specific questions raised were related to modernity in poetry, the problems raised by this “shock ” with respect to language, poetry, religion and culture in general, the approach of this issue through criticism during the Abbasid era and during the Renaissance period and in the ways in which poets presented it in both periods. Finally, the author wonders whether poetic aesthetics is equivalent to aesthetics of the “constant” or to those of the “variable”. Thus, Adonis’ ideas and creation still represents a major contribution of the Arab intellectual who advocates the ideals of modernity. Today, with the chaos of the post “Arab Spring” and the

radical Islamist wave, Adonis thought and his disciples seem to end up being disconcerted, bewildered, and somehow symbolically orphaned.

Amazigh Culture Revival

Historically, the Amazigh cultural and intellectual scene has produced an elite imbued with the scholarly culture of Arab tradition since the earliest centuries of the intromission of Islam and Arabic into North Africa; this elite followed the path of its predecessors of the time of the Roman Empire who had tried to master and reproduce the dominant language and culture. A few scattered and marginal attempts have tried to make Amazigh language and culture known, but they did not succeeded in sustainably laying the foundations of an autonomous thought and culture (See the Berghwata Episode, the vestiges of writings of Ibn Tumert in Amazigh, and those of Aznag and Ḥammu Taleb). We had to wait until the second half of the twentieth century to see an emerging embryonic elite that initiated a process of Amazigh promotion, making use of borrowed methods of literary, linguistic, historical and anthropological research of literary and artistic creation, and of civil society advocacy calling for institutional recognition of the Amazigh language and culture.

Oral literature in Amazigh language has been maintained but has achieved an insignificant evolution. It is marked by the characteristics of orality in terms of both expression and content; "marvelous" fairy tales, fables and legends that interested folklorists in search for medieval archetypes and comparatists in search for archaic patterns and primitive narrative structures which give the impression to have lost vitality. It can appropriately be stated that in the city as well as in rural areas, where other forms of narrative have penetrated through the channels of the radio, television and books, this literature is falling into disuse, as is the case in Kabyle (See Boukous, 1977; Chemmakh, 2010). Poetry is more resistant to change because it adapts better to the details of modern life (Galand-Pernet, 1965). The patterns of urban culture and monetary economy have been incorporated into a traditional aesthetic mold, a

template marked by the elasticity of texture and metrical constraints (H. Jouad, 1983).

For a decade, creative authors educated at school and university have chosen to embark on the experience of literary creation in their mother tongue by perusing the path of writing. Their production differs from traditional creation both in formal processes and in substance. Poetry, which generally draws inspiration with respect to its themes from the rural world, departs from the traditional poetry by social criticism. The new poetry is also characterized by new themes, inspired by the "committed" thematic of modern literature, i.e. freedom, Palestine, and so on. The experience of prose writers is less advanced than that of poets; however, the emergence of a "neo-literature" which prospects new genres, such as short story, novel, essay and drama, should also be noted. This trend would be of historical significance if it were to assert itself by producing a valuable written literature which would place it on the pedestal occupied by world literatures, which would not fail to constitute a major asset for the Amazigh culture in the process of symbolic struggle with other cultural expressions. We will deal with this issue in a specific Essay.

Singing has undergone new development. The era of troubadour poet singers strikes as being over; *ṛṛways*, *imdyazen* and *shioukh* are more and more settling in the cities where there is a social demand and studios for recording. However, traditional singers have paved the way for the bands formed of young talents who settled in the cities, especially in Casablanca, Agadir, Al-Houceima, Nador, Khenifra, Errachidia, etc. (This is the case of the bands of Ousman, Izenzaren, Oudaden, Saghro Band, Numidia, Ithran, etc.); in this new context, certain bands are influenced by the experience of Arab-speaking bands such as Nas Al-Ghiwane, Jil Jilala, Lamchaheb, Fnayer, etc. These bands have the particularity of combining tradition with modernity in both instruments and repertoire; they only have fine ties with rural culture. It is also important to emphasize the presence of a resolutely modern song which has opted for the "fusion" with the styles of Gnawa, flamenco, or jazz, etc. Modern Riffian songs are an interesting

phenomenon in that they are marked by the experience of the diaspora influenced by Western music, which represents a new way towards adapting the Amazigh song to the taste of modern time. Amazigh culture is also enriched by other unprecedented expressions such as cinema, theater and plastic arts (See Boukous, dir., 2017). These expressions are in their beginnings; they demonstrate the willingness of creators to open up to the world's cultural expressions in order to anchor Amazigh culture in modernity and to offer young generations the cultural means to "promote their loyalty «to their basic cultural identity.

In conclusion, the cultural field of Amazigh expression is undoubtedly rich with a substantial literary, cultural and artistic corpus, but it does not offer a systemic frame of thought with paradigms that could shape a vision capable of situating Amazigh culture within globalization. It should be aspired that the intellectual elite will be able to find this way in the context of the coming structural changes despite multiple hindrances. Among the important challenges confronting Amazigh culture and its producers, there is the training of promoters and producers who have to find their "niche" in the world of creative industries, through promotion via marketing, organization into corporations, integration into public policies, and institutional support, etc. Research, creation and advocacy have laid the foundations for a modern-type identity consciousness that has led to making Amazigh a subject of politics and an object of knowledge. But, it has to be noted that the Amazigh cultural scene has so far not produced a thinker like Adonis in the Arab culture. This explains why the approach to the Amazigh culture remains essentially descriptive and ideological, and does not yet reach the level of analysis of the production conditions of cultural expressions, their aesthetic foundations and the articulation of the patterns of the Amazigh literature in the *topoï* of the universal literature.

Moroccan Jewish Culture Decay

Following Simon Levy, we can say that the Moroccan identity of the Moroccan Jews, along with their Jewish identity, is admittedly expressed in their customs, ways of life, religious rites, occupations practiced, Judeo-

Arabic, Judeo-Amazigh and Judeo-Spanish languages, and also in the values of tolerance and the generally successful coexistence inherited from the good neighborly relations in the Moroccan and medieval Andalusia societies. The Jewish dimension of Moroccan culture is barely studied, with the exception of a few historical studies. Tribute has nevertheless to be paid to the work of researchers such as Haim Zafrani (1983), Joseph Chetrit (2002) and Simon Levy (2013), and to writers, like Edmond Amran El-Maleh, who have contributed, each one from his own perspective, to save an important component of Moroccan culture from oblivion.

Morocco is a Muslim State, both de facto and based on its Constitution; yet, the fundamental law states that: "Islam is the religion of the State which guarantees to all the freedom of religious practice" (art. 6); it also guarantees the equality of all Moroccans before the law. Practice confirms the concreteness of these principles by making Moroccan Jews fully-fledged citizens while granting them with a space for Jewish specificity. Members of a religious minority, Jews are governed by the Law of Moses in terms of personal status. Liturgy, religious songs and Moroccan traditions are part of the deep Jewish identity; the traditions are the reflection of a culture which is millenary, scholarly and popular, religious and profane, and that has been developed in a Moroccan, Arab-Andalusian, Amazigh and Spanish environment. The Jews from southern areas of Morocco as well as the descendants of the refugees from Spain have influenced each other, melted locally, and then their variations have shaded off in the crucible of big cities, through many population movements.

The situation was different in the beginning of the last century when there was a distinction between Arabic speaking, Amazigh speaking, (High Atlas) and Spanish speaking communities (Tetouan, Tangier, Azilah, Larache, El-Ksar, Chaouen). But according to Simon Levy (idem), it was mostly about family and community language. Otherwise, Moroccan Arabic was the common language of relations, trade, and interaction with the Muslim population and between Jewish communities. With the establishment of the Israelite Universal Alliance schools, French has

gradually been superimposed as a language of work, culture, and conversation, in an unequal way depending on the social environment and generation, yet without excluding the Judeo-Arabic. It is in this language that the rabbis use their sermons, and in which the letters addressed by the rabbinate to the faithful of the synagogues are written. Poets like Yaâqob Moshe and Shalom Abensour or David Hassine (XVIIth; XVIIIth centuries) left a sacred valuable repertoire, mainly in Hebrew, while in the XIXth century, Rafael Moshe Elbaz, from Sefru, produced a high quality *malḥūn* of a religious inspiration. The profane poetry is expressed in dialectal Arabic, especially in the *qṣidat*. In the twentieth century, these pieces were printed on loose sheets of paper and dealt with the current events pertaining to social and political life, the joys and sorrows and, of course, love. It is publically well known that Jewish artists have always played a role in the musical scene. Andalusian music and its modes are still the main bases of the liturgical and synagogic music, while the music of Granada, the *malḥūn*, the *qsida*, are cultivated by great artists; in the twentieth, century R. David Buzaglo and Nissim Anaqqab were known in the sacred music; in the profane music, Samy EI-Maghrebi, Zohra El-Fassia and Salim Hilali have marked their époque. The popular literature in spoken Arabic is a Judeo-Moroccan specialty; be it oral, written or printed in Hebrew characters; this production covers the tale, the song, the hagiographic tale, the moral advice, in addition to certain chronicles and some translations of religious or historical works. If the so-called "scholarly" culture of poets, mystics and Judeo-Moroccan jurists is naturally indebted to the civilization in which it has evolved, the traditions and popular productions are a direct expression of an ancient common life where the Jewish variants are distinguished by a touch, a nuance of adaptation to the worship and ritual requirements; the ritual itself is the outcome of the local environment. However, French acculturation is such that the most influential literary and scientific productions were written in French, including the novels by Blanche Benda an and Edmond Âmran El-Maleḥ, the essays by Isaac Abbou, the works of Haïm Zafrani, Simon Levy, Chetrit and other academic scholars.

Isn't the Jewish dimension of the Moroccan identity today just a relic whose cultural and linguistic expressions tend to decay? No doubt, if one admits as a fact that these expressions are no more living, they are no longer produced by a wider community integrated in Israeli culture or in Western languages and cultures among the diaspora. The inherited legacy is revisited only occasionally despite being extremely rich. The Judeo-Arabic songs, failing to be experienced in real life and to be living, is celebrated in the mode of nostalgia by a section of the Jewish community of Moroccan origin. The religious ritual as well is no more celebrated except on the occasion of religious feasts like "Immune", "Hill", "Kippur", "Hanukah", etc. Amazigh and Arabic names are no longer given to children; Judeo-Berber is almost extinguished, the Judeo-Arabic is still maintained by the "old" generations, the nursery rhymes and proverbs are still performed only by a few "dilettantes", the same is true for the customs and beliefs of bygone days, and the same can be said for traditional customs. The cuisine is still appreciated, especially the "*dafina*" (See Kakou, 2017). Having been abandoned by younger generations, Moroccan Jewish culture is cut off from its invigorating roots and is thus doomed to extinction.

"Living-Together" Utopia

In a global context highly marked by phenomena such as the obsolescence of "out-dated" cultural forms or the evolution of certain other forms in resilient situations, it sounds as if there is no alternative other than to work for a shared culture through education, media and civil society action. Thus, by extending a network of women and men of good will throughout the world, it is possible to create "islets" of resistance to xenophobia, hatred, and alienation. Therefore, international relations and relations between peoples can be improved by a "bottom-up" approach, moving upward to the top, from the citizen to the community, the State, and to the world ... Multilateral and bilateral relations policies have shown their inefficiency enough to not continue to believe in them. The culture of respect, fair exchange, sharing, conviviality, and living together would

then have some chance to prevail over the culture of lucre, profit, and violence. After religious humanism, liberal humanism, communist humanism, philosophical humanism, one-way inter-culturalism, it is time for us to consider an alternative humanism, a new horizon of reflection and action, which places Man and Nature in its very essence. This is to say that "living-together" should not be a simple "mouthwash", "a polysemic notion" and "a catch-all concept", as Rachida Azdouz stated in her book on "living together" (2018). "Living together" is implied in the philosophy conveyed in article 2 of the Unesco Declaration on the Protection of Cultural Diversity (2001), which reads as follows:

> *In our increasingly diverse societies, it is essential to ensure harmonious interaction among people and groups with plural, varied and dynamic cultural identities as well as their willingness to live together. Policies for the inclusion and participation of all citizens are guarantees of social cohesion, the vitality of civil society and peace. Thus defined, cultural pluralism gives policy expression to the reality of cultural diversity. Indissociable from a democratic framework, cultural pluralism is conducive to cultural exchange and to the flourishing of creative capacities that sustain public life.*

The Moroccan citizen claims his ontological, cultural and linguistic diversity. He believes in and recognizes the fundamental role of religion (Islam) in his education, his way of life, his perception of the world; he is also tolerant and respectful towards other monotheist religions; in this respect he is inclined to interreligious and intercultural dialogue. He is open to the world and not inward-looking, curious about ongoing societal transformations and transitions. He is, and will be even more in the future, attached to the values of justice, equity and solidarity, that is, to the effective implementation of his civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.

Moroccan culture future constitutes a central issue of the paradox whose terms are objective and subjective facts. The facts pertaining to the sphere of the objective facts are related to the nature of the relations of material and symbolic production established in the global social organization and that are generated in the wake of the state policy in

terms of culture; as to the subjective facts, they are fundamentally related to individual and collective consciousness. Thus, if the diversity of expressions of this culture is left to the implacable and blind logic of an ultraliberal system, the threat will be great. If, on the other hand, a societal project based on conviviality and respect for difference is established, a historical opportunity will be offered for the construction of a truly national, inclusive, harmonious and plural cultural identity. The constitutional provisions provide a framework appropriate to the success of such an option ... provided they are marked with the effectiveness seal. This effectiveness is also conditioned by the symbolic competition between the different paradigms that organize the cultural scene.

Essay 6
Diversity, Tradition and Modernity

In tribute to
Germaine Tillion (1907-2008)

Statement of the Problem

The field of culture in Morocco is marked both by its diversity and its stratification. Intangible culture occupies a special position in this domain in so far that the weight of tradition and the impact of modernity interact within it prominently. Thus, this culture is underlying a whole range of concomitant mechanisms for maintaining its form and substance and a process of change that introduces aesthetic patterns and canons drawn from the cultural expressions of other communities.

Morocco belongs to the African continent in geographical terms, to the Maghreb from the standpoint of culture and to the Muslim world from a religious dimension. In particular, the geographical situation makes of the country a land of encounter. Being located in the western extremity of Africa and the Arab-Muslim world, pointing its head toward Europe, and bordered by the immensity of the Atlantic Ocean, Morocco has been labeled by Arab geographers as *al-Maghreb al-aqṣā*, that is to say the farthest sunset point. Geography has endowed Morocco with a remarkable configuration by granting it with natural defenses represented by the chains of the Atlas and openness onto the Sahara desert. This configuration has conditioned its history in the sense that its population intermingled and has given birth to a people whose components vary in their geographical origins, language, culture and religion.

The Moroccan landscape is characterized by a diversity that is expressed through the plurality of languages, forms and themes. This plurality is the fruit of the Moroccan history, the organization of society, and the interaction of the different sources which irrigate its identity. From an anthropological perspective, the Moroccan cultural field is marked by a fundamental plurality that is reflected through the culture of the segments that make up the national community, namely the Amazigh, the Sub-Saharan African, the Jewish, the Arab, and the Andalusian segments, without overlooking the impact of the Western culture. From a sociological perspective, Moroccan culture is divided into two categories: the *scholarly culture* produced by elites that can be of an urban or rural origin, and the *culture of the people* produced and experienced by the rural communities and by craftsmen groupings in the urban suburbs. Moroccan culture is thus based on the contributions whose multiplicity is a source of richness and vitality.

Language Diversity

The languages used in Morocco are Amazigh (Berber), the indigenous language of the country with its different varieties, standard Arabic and Moroccan Arabic. These national languages coexist with foreign languages, especially French. It is in Morocco that the largest Amazigh community in the world is concentrated. The Amazigh speaking groups are roughly located in the areas stretching from the Saharan desert to the Taza corridor, and in the western and eastern parts of the Rif. The major dialect areas are Tachelhit, Tamazight and Tarifit. The Arabic language includes standard Arabic and spoken dialects. Standard Arabic is the official language of the country and is also the first language of education, media and administration. As for dialectal Arabic, it includes the spoken variety of traditional cities, the variety of the Atlantic plains, the Jebli variety, the variety of the Eastern region, and the Hassani variety spoken in the Saharan regions (See Boukous, 2018).

The languages which coexist in Morocco are characterized by their distinct sociolinguistic attributes. The varieties in use are grouped into two distinct paradigms. The first one includes languages with prestigious and valued sociolinguistic functions, and this is the case of Standard Arabic, French, and less importantly Spanish. The second one consists of languages whose functions are common and socially depreciated; this is the case of Dialectal Arabic and Amazigh. Standard Arabic enjoys a *de jure* status in the sense that it is recognized as an official language by the Constitution; it is therefore used as the only legal language of public institutions. Amazigh and dialectal Arabic are mother tongues. The domains of use as well as the functions of the languages reveal that non-mother languages (standard Arabic, French, Spanish) are used fundamentally in the formal and official fields (education, radio, television, scholarly culture, and diverse institutions), in addition, their use can be in written and/or spoken form. On the other hand, the mother tongues (Amazigh, Dialectal Arabic) are used in informal or semi-formal communicational situations; the use in orality is almost exclusive, and their situations of use are family, street and also work, namely manual work. It is important here to point out some ongoing changes characterizing language use in Morocco. One of the most significant changes is the emergence of another variety of Arabic, named the *Middle Arabic*, which roughly borrows its phonological and morphological systems from urban dialectal Arabic, and its lexicon from Standard Arabic. Educated speakers and elites in general use Middle Arabic instead of Standard Arabic in oral communication in situations qualified as being formal or semi-formal such as on the radio and television or in official speeches and conferences. Another recent phenomenon is the use of Amazigh in writing, particularly in publishing and the press. There are in fact a number of literary works written in Amazigh, most of which are poetry collections. Periodicals, fully or partially written in Amazigh, should also be included here. The oral repertoire of this language is also enriched by its use in the theatre and audiovisual production (recently in video films), and in certain formal situations such as conferences and NGO meetings dealing with the Amazigh language and culture. Amazigh is also

used in political speeches and meetings of local communal councils in the Amazigh speaking regions.

Cultural Diversity

Contemporary Morocco exhibits a polyphonic cultural profile. In fact, Moroccan culture tends to be a national culture composed of constituents each of which having a distinctive site, form and substance of its own. It includes the classical dichotomy: *scholarly culture* and *popular culture*. The scholarly culture embraces, in addition to the traditionalist aspects of theocentric culture conveyed by the religious sciences and the secular culture consisting of poetry and prose, a culture of a secular nature comprising the literature written in Arabic and the literature written in French, both being widely open to modernity with respect to form and substance. With regard to the *casual culture,* that of the rural and urban masses, and despite undergoing a process of *reification* which makes it a raw commodity, it witnesses an obvious boom, especially the music component thereof. Two major socio-cultural phenomena constitute the background of the reconfiguration of the cultural landscape of contemporary Morocco. The first phenomenon is the displacement of the monopolization of symbolic production; this is manifested by the fact that the site of the State's political sphere is no longer the dominant center of cultural production. The second phenomenon has to do with the recomposition of the sphere of religious discourse production, which indicates the transformation of the fellowship movement of the Zawiya into a civil society movement be it pietistic or zealot Islamist.

Scholarly Literature

Scholarly literature is produced by the elites for the elites. It includes the literature written in Arabic and in French, and incidentally the one written in Amazigh. The symbolic production sites are themselves diverse. The evolution that Moroccan society has undergone since the 1970s led to the emergence of new social movements whose cultural production takes

place outside the range of the logosphere of political power. Accordingly, autonomous sites of symbolic production appeared thanks to education which allowed the emergence of modern fashion elites, and to progress made in edition which has permitted the popularization of new forms of culture. The major centers are universities and associations, including the *Union of the Writers of Morocco* representing the area of Arabic Literature and the *Alliance of the Writers in Amazigh* for the Amazigh literature.

The Moroccan literature written in Arabic has developed since the independence of the country thanks to the emergence of an elite initially educated in the Middle East on the eve and at the dawn of independence. The literary production is composed of poem collections (See Sabbagh, Tabbāl, Mejjāṭi, etc.), novels (See Zefzāf, Rabîâ, Choukri, Berrāda, Chāoui, etc.), and short story (See Bennāni, Bakkāli, Bouâllou, Khoury, etc.). The themes are generally marked by the current events. The young generation is increasingly attracted by the aesthetic treatment of the political and social problems related to the evolution of Moroccan society. With respect to form, it was first characterized by the use of the literary canvas common in the traditional Arabic literature and then, with the contact with the universal literature, the authors have embarked into poetic search.

The Moroccan literature written in French language emerged after the Second World War. The first Moroccan work dates back to 1949, it is entitled *Le Chapelet d'ambre*, by Ahmed Sefrioui, followed in 1954 by *La Boîte à merveilles* by the same author and *Le Passé simple* by Driss Chraïbi. With regard to Chraïbi, it can be stated that his fundamental preoccupation - from *Passé simple* to *L'homme du livre,* his last novel – consists in reflecting on the issues of civilization and history, the tyranny of the father in Arab-Muslim society, and the domination of man over woman, etc. This literature reinvented itself with the experience of the literary movement around the magazine *Souffles* from 1966 with Abdellatif Laâbi, Mostafa Nissaboury, Muḥammad Khair-Eddine, Tahar Benjelloun, Abdelkebir Khatibi (See A. Tenkoul, 1985; S. Babana-Hampton, 2008). For this movement, literary production is a fighting weapon against the retrograde

structures that can emanate from both Western and Arab cultures. The literary creation continues with Edmond Amran El Maleh, Zakia Daoud, Mahi Binebine, Abdellah Taiâ, Mohamed Nedali, Fouad Laroui, and it has been renewed with the generation of Leila Slimani, Youssef Elalami, Abdallah Baïda, Réda Dalil, Issan Eddine Tber, and many others. The adopted writing draws inspiration from techniques borrowed from various literary currents.

The Popular Literature

Despite starting to lose vitality, oral tradition remains the collective memory of the rural communities. It is the repository that collects and records, in the ancestral word transmitted by generations of men and women, the experiences accumulated throughout the history of Morocco by the communities not making use of writing and by those where writing remains essentially the privilege of clerks. Indeed, the proverb says: *verbal Volant, script manant* [spoken words fly away, written words remain]; which can yet be nuanced by saying that if writing remains because it is transcribed, fixed and archived, the spoken word is also kept alive in the memory of women and men due to its dynamism and its variety. Let us recall in this respect that speech precedes writing in human civilization and that the former is also more widely used. In fact, throughout the world, the number of communities with oral tradition and those with non-written languages are much greater than communities with a scriptural tradition. Oral tradition is also the main source of history for communities without a writing tradition; the oral materials (folktales, legends, myths, genealogies, testimonies, etc.) are documents transmitted from generation to generation; they contain information that the historian uses applying the historical method to reconstruct the past of these communities. oral tradition responds to a need for transmitting the past experience; the problem facing the communities with oral tradition is to preserve the memory of their historical experience by bringing to the present what is actually from the past. The documents provided by oral tradition can also be used in archeological or sociolinguistic studies (See J. Drouin, 1974; A.

Boukous, 1977). Oral tradition thus serves the function of a social memory to communities who use speech rather than, or in the absence of, writing to solve their communication problems.

The Moroccan oral tradition, once vivacious, has expressed *vox populi* [the voice of the people] by making use of vernacular languages, namely Amazigh and dialectal Arabic. It is transmitted to younger generations through the voice of the old people, through the mouths of women during evening parties and men in their free time. In turn, the younger generations enrich, develop and transmit to their descendants the symbolic legacy of the ancestors. Oral tradition is an aspect of the culture of the people that has its genres and aesthetics; it has poetic and prose genres.

Poetry is undoubtedly the most important genre based on its value as a prestigious genre and on its audience from all social classes. The poetic forms of oral tradition are diverse, they can be sung or not, accompanied or not by music. It can be stated that there are basically two types of poetry: the one related to rural life whose composers are amateurs, and the poetry generally composed outside the homeland territory by professional poet-singers. The poets are labeled differently depending on cultural areas, the genre of their poetic creation, the nature of the accompanying instruments, and the place of representation, etc. In the Amazigh tradition, poetry that is not sung is generally chanted or droned following special rhythms. This is referred to as *tanḍḍamt* in the Southwest region, as *tamdyazt* in the tradition of central Morocco, and *izri* in the Rifian tradition. The themes can originate from religious literature or secular literature, or from both, because the poet often addresses themes of different inspirations in the same poem. The chanted poem is referred to as *amarg* in the Souss region, as *izli* in the Middle Atlas and *aghennij* in the Rif region. The amateur poet is named *anḍḍam*, *amarir* or *amdyaz*, depending on the region. He participates in collective dances known as *aḫwaš* in the Tachelhit area, and *aḫidus* in central Morocco. As for the professional poet-singer, he is called *ṛṛays* or *ššikh* (feminine *taṛṛayst*, *ššikha*), and he performs in public and private ceremonies.

The most well-known *anḍḍam* poet is Sidi Ḫammu Ṭaleb, who would have lived as *Sufi Faqih* in the 17th century. Nowadays, he is still considered the chief of the *Shluḥ* poet-singers, *Bab n umarg*. His counterpart would be Sidi Âbderraḥman EI-Mejdub in the dialectal Arabic tradition. His poetry is rich in themes related to the cultural experience of his community, namely to religious, social and moral values. Poetry basically includes four genres: izli, *tamawayt*, *tayffart* and *tamidulit*. The *izli* is a short poem whose structure is relatively fixed, and that is generally used in verbal jousting. T*amawayt* is a poem which accompanies the amateur poet in his hiking paths across the mountains, its structure is not always governed by poetic constraints. T*ayffart* is a long poem that has a thematic unit; the themes can be related to religion, current events, an epic subject or a story. Finally, *tamidulit* is a genre of poem chanted during ceremonies, its structure hardly evolves; it is almost rigid and thus offers only little space for creation.

The poet played an important role in the fight against the colonial power. The collective memory has thus retained the names of outstanding poets, such as that of *Jaunty* in Souss, and that of the poetess *Taggard*, who was the heart of the movement of resistance in the Middle Atlas during the 1920s, and of whom oral tradition has preserved some of the most notorious *timawayin* (singular *tamawayt*). Although oral poetry is most of the time improvised, it is governed by metric rules generally observed by the poet. Versification is based on prosodic patterns that characterize each poetic genre. The composition rests on various elements including assonances, syllables, stress, sometimes the rhyme and more often rhythm.

Prose includes genres such as the folktale, the legend, the proverb, the saying, the riddle, and so on. The folktale, itself, is varied. There is the *fairytale*, which tells stories where the real mingles with the imaginary; the *hagiographical folktale* that recounts the lives and miracles of the saints, the *animal folktale* adopting the style of fables in the Western tradition, and the *pleasant folktale* in which characters are being staged in comical situations. The storyteller can be the grandmother who pampers her grandchildren

during evening family vigils, the old man who entertains the children on the threshing floor, the adult who mentors his peers backing onto the mosque wall, the young man who instructs his friends, the professional storyteller who captivates the onlookers in souks or in public squares of old cities, etc.

Oral tradition is the product of the creative imagination of the rural communities; it is also a historical product of these communities. The hero of the folktale is a male or female character who is in a situation of material, emotional or symbolic need. To compensate for this need, the hero goes into exile, encountering on his way a series of pitfalls and facing many ordeals. His success or failure depends on the fulfillment of his being and the happiness of his family. His triumph over adversity makes up for the maiden shortfall and restores the social order within the group. The hero generally receives the help of a magical assistant, which can be the ring of the *djinns* command, the *fez* (*Sheshia*) that turns one invisible, the slippers that eliminate fatigue, the stick that makes one fly in the air or the bird that lays golden eggs. The *fairytale* has several functions. It is a fiction that allows the listener to dream, to wander with his imagination, and perhaps to transcend the vicissitudes of everyday life to the imaginary world. The rural man, subject to the hazards of nature, finds an imaginary world in the tale; the child, poor or rich, miserable or happy projects his deprivations and desires in a world of fiction. The tale is also a source of instruction and socialization for the child, a means through which oral tradition inculcates morality, knowledge and know-how that the community transmits. The tale can also be instructive when, for example, it relates the model life of the thaumaturge saints. In addition, the story has the function of entertaining, educating and making people laugh. The most popular hero of the comic tales is the famous *Jeha*.

Proverb and saying are genres which are as popular as the tale. The knowledge and the appropriate use of these genres are a sign of genuine command of the Community cultural competence because they express in a concise form a variety of experiences that tradition has accumulated throughout the history of the community. The entire quality of the

proverb is expressed in its form and aesthetics. In terms of its content, it is significant only within a given cultural system. This explains the frustration felt when reading a translated proverb; it in fact loses both its flavor and its meaning. The proverb is used in a situation of communication where the user no longer acts as a speaker but as a negotiator of a doxa and common dominant values. The listener's parade can thus only be a counter proverb.

Oral tradition also includes a popular theater form similar to the *halqa*. The main figure is *baqshish*, who travels through the rural souks and the mussems and goes to public plazas of the cities where there are large communities of rural origin, namely *Jamaâ EI-Fna,* the famous plaza in Marrakech. The theater of the *halqa* displays the basic forms of drama. In a few sketches, *Baqshish* demonstrates the art of "setting" a simple action with protagonists having definite characteristics; he creates comic effects in the replicas of characters and the conflicting situations in which they are involved. This theater is rooted in popular life with its tensions, disillusions and hopes. *Baqshish* is an integral part of the culture of this milieu; he observes its contradictions and transmits them into the language of comedy theatre. The audience recognize themselves implicitly in the scenes presented and they laugh at them. Based on this aspect, the theater of *Baqshish* has the function of socio-psychological catharsis.

Traditional Arts

With respect to art, the traditional plastic art is essentially of rural inspiration. It is based on principles different from those of urban art. It is an art that is utilitarian, symbolic, abstract and collective. In fact, it is an art integrated into a utilitarian object such as carpets, mats, amphoras, jewelry, and clothes, etc. It can also be integrated into a building such as a door, a wall panel, a ceiling, etc. In this, it is an artcraft in which the aesthetic concerns are presenting the production; every object has a symbolic function, whether it has a spiritual dimension such as the amulet, or a material dimension such as the oil lamp or the bellows. The

artist craftsman does not use rich matter to the detriment of the poor one, poor material is often compensated by rich forms; a rough fabric or clay is treated with as much application as silk or walnut wood.

Rural art symbolism draws its inspiration from the universal essence, especially the symbols of the *Center of the Globe*, the *Great Goddess,* the *Life-giving Woman*, *Water*, *Union*, and so on. This art has an abstract, non-figurative character; it uses elementary geometrical forms such as the straight line, the broken line, the triangle, the square, the circle and the rhombus. The color range is naturally inherent therein, i.e., the colors used are extracted mainly from plants and minerals. Finally, artistic production is a work that draws its source from the collective subconscious; as a result, the artist craftsman is profoundly connected to his community, and he arranges, in his own way, community if not universal shapes and symbols. Until recently, rural art has rarely been subject to the commonplace aesthetics produced in the Center, a site governed by political or socio-economic power; it has developed its own aesthetics, but without being impermeable to the influences of Mediterranean and Islamic aesthetics. Nowadays, things are quite different with the total dependence of rural society and the consequent decline of its aesthetics. Indeed, the disintegration of the material and symbolic basic structures of rural society due to the monetary economy and its values, to the integration of the society into the Moroccan social organization and its dependence both on the center of this social organization and on the dominant center at the Global scale have led to major changes in the symbolic production of rural communities. This situation is accompanied by the imposition of a new aesthetic model with commercial motivation in which a clear distinction is established between the artistic object and the utilitarian object. The artistic object is considered there as an original creation that is hoarded and exposed; and the artist is viewed as an exceptional and often marginal being; as to the utilitarian artistic object, it is annihilated when confronted to the serial products of industry, which thus become the *artistic objects of the poor*.

Rural art is threatened by a commercial conception of culture which is irreversibly imposed everywhere. It makes use of imagination and the behaviors in rural society through the availability of purely functional serial objects, which dramatically compete with the products of craft's art. This is particularly prejudicial to the durability of the cultural heritage so much so that the regression of rural art goes along with the decline of the aesthetic and symbolic dimension of the artistic activity of the rural community. This dimension, being preserved since the Neolithic era despite the various invasions, is about to succumb to market production. The rural society is, in fact, swamped by monetary economy products which create new needs and impose imperious cultural models. It is therefore necessary to become aware of the amount of challenges induced by the transformations that the society undergoes and the need to safeguard and to promote the treasures of the rural art, especially as these treasures are threatened by the outrageous practice of illegal traffic.

Modern Arts

Plastic arts constitute an innovation in Morocco in so far as they were introduced as a result of contact with the West at the beginning of the last century. Since then, artistic activity has been a facet of the aesthetic creation that has accompanied the social and cultural transformations undergone by Moroccan society. The plastic creation draws its resources from an artistic heritage with a millenary historical depth and with outstanding vitality. In this respect, it reflects the image of Moroccan society, marked by a great diversity of artistic expressions represented mainly by the Amazigh tradition, which is particularly manifested in the patterns on carpets, jewelry and architecture, the African contribution, Arab-Muslim culture, and by European orientalism contributions.

Easel painting represents the first step in the emergence of plastic creation, as a system of representation in its modern conception and function. It is related to the political, economic and cultural settlement of the French and Spanish protectorate. The journey undertaken by

Delacroix to Morocco in 1832 is decisive in that it contributed to the development of pictorial Orientalism. Being in contact with daylight, natural landscape and Moroccan culture, Delacroix became the precursor and renovator of an aesthetic design that will mark modern painting. Morocco was also a favorite land of great painters such as Matisse, Klee and Kandinsky. Modern Moroccan painting was born out of the influence of these master artists. Accordingly, the works by Louardighi, Ayt Youssef, Châibia, and Fatima Hassan, are entirely marked by a breath in which the intuitive imagination overflows into a faerie of shapes and colors. After the Second World War, a fertile artistic vein hatched in the Schools of Fine Arts of Tetuan and Casablanca. But it is with the advent of independence of the country in 1956 that a genuine Moroccan plastic arts school was born. The pioneers were Cherkaoui and Gharbaoui. They were followed by Aherdane, Glaoui, Meryem Meziane, Belkahia, Chebâa and Melehi and even younger ones such as Mahi Binebine. Moroccan painting is crossed by a movement favoring portrayal and another one which grants primacy to abstraction. The figurative movement sets artistic creation within the frame of Moroccan heritage that is rich in the diversity of its expressions; and stands as a trend that attempts particularly to abolish the distinction between the artist and the craftsman by focusing its work on the creation of stylized objects inspired by tradition and Arabic calligraphy. The abstract movement draws on the informal style of painting by making use of geometric abstraction. The significance of the Moroccan plastic arts experience lies in its adherence to the interaction between the specific and the universal by synthesizing the traditional forms of the intuitive and spontaneous creation of self-taught painters with the modern aesthetic research of academic painters.

Plurality, as a Value Chain

The Moroccan intangible cultural heritage is rich and varied. It includes the languages used in the country, the literary and artistic expressions they convey. It is rooted in the knowledge of the community by means of the verbal sign and the aesthetic symbol. Its function is to ensure the

cultural integration of the individual inside the community. It also includes the values of the community producing and transmitting it, as well as the universal values characterizing the human species in general, irrespective of race, language and living conditions specific to each human community. It is in this way that this heritage is a means of rootedness in the culture of the country at the same time as it constitutes a breeding ground that draws on the contributions of world cultures.

The diversity that characterizes the Moroccan cultural and linguistic landscape is a source of wealth that is expressed in the plurality of the languages and the historical origins of populations, languages and through the various manifestations of their cultures, particularly in literature, arts, carpet, food, and architecture ... The historical experience of the Moroccan people prompts thinking and experiencing this diversity not as an impediment to the establishment of the nation state but rather as an asset which contributes to the harmonious development of the different linguistic and cultural components of the Moroccan community. Faced with such diversity, the cultural elite managed to conceptualize different visions, some of which are anchored in Patrimonialism and the others in modernism, which gives the cultural sphere a configuration crossed by several paradigms. The message of Tillion, anthropologist and human rights activist, is the conviction that modernity is not a privilege of Western societies. This assertion is attested in the deplorable condition of women which is common in both the north and south of the Mediterranean; even worse, it represents “the common evil that strikes both the oppressor, his victim, and the civilization that carries it.” (*Idem*, 1966).

Essay 7
Cultural Field Paradigms

In tribute to
M. Abed Al-Jābrī (1935-2010)

Statement of the Problem

The present essay exposes the general configuration of what may be referred to as the "cultural discourse field" in Morocco, specifically the different paradigms which stand as a discourse aiming at theorizing symbolic practices, or at least to generate, frame and legitimize them. The relevant issues to address this problem relate to the origin of the symbolic field in Morocco and the modalities of expression of the discourses that structure this field. The scope of this essay is of a theoretical dimension. Its definite object is limited to the dialectical presentation of discourses that tend to structure the cultural field and animate it in a dynamic synchronism.

Structuring and Restructuring the Paradigm

Moroccan social pre-colonial organization was characterized by a cultural polarization whose terms are the pole of the culture known as "scholarly", "classical" or "elite", and the pole of the culture known as "common", "folkloric", or else "popular" (See Mammeri, 1991). An analysis which deals with phenomena at a surface level would show that the connections between these two poles are not conflicting in the sense that each one of them has its own structural organization, social background and functions. In general terms, the first pole represents the culture of the State and its elites, which are generally urban elites limited to "imperial

cities" (Fes, particularly); its substance is related to the Arab-Muslim culture, its mode of expression is writing, and its code is "classical" Arabic language. The second pole is fundamentally based on a rural social background and secondarily on anuran one (specifically the association of craftsmen); orality represents its almost exclusive mode of expression, and the code is either Amazigh or dialectal Arabic or *Darija*.

The *modus vivendi* which has been established between "Traditional culture" and "Modern culture" is probably dependent on the ebb-and-flow of social forces which underlie each one of the two cultural models. When the central government authority is powerful, the scope of influence of its culture stretches out to dominate not only inside its traditional fiefdom, the city, but also in controlled peripheral areas; while, during the periods of Makhzen authority retreat, it is the culture of margins which tends to expand. The connection between the two cultures is evident and reflects the nature of relations between the Makhzen authority and tribal autonomy. Some people speak of an opposition between the State and the Siba; "the scholarly" culture would be fundamentally the culture of the Makhzen center (See Chabbi, 1995) and the "common" culture that of the unsubdued periphery. Then colonization came and changed qualitatively the facts of the problem, bringing with it a model of society that is conquering and aggressive and which soon put into crisis the structures of Moroccan society as a whole. Thus, due to contact with Europe, Morocco has undergone major transformations following the gradual destruction of the country's economic, political, social as well as cultural structures (See the contrastive readings of Miège, 1963; Adam, 1968; Rivet, 1999). At the level of culture, which is of particular interest to us here, the first victim is "scholarly" culture, and along with it "classical" Arabic; they both have fallen into lethargy since the fifteenth century, struck by powerlessness and sterility. They are cornered in their last entrenchments: religious education and the *shariâ*. Everywhere else, the French language and culture are holding a position of institutional dominance, while exerting an influence limited to the colonial social class and the local social class educated "à la française". The symbolic power of the "scholarly" culture of

the Arab-Muslim tradition was seriously undermined and its holders were reduced to the status of downgraded in the area of "the usable Morocco". Elsewhere, "popular" culture, "Amazigh dialects" and "Arabic dialects" were apparently ignored or in certain cases considered with limited interest. They are sometimes looked down upon because they were supposed to convey manifestations of irrationality and primitiveness, and at other times they benefit from a certain scientific interest from folklorists and dialectologists, to whom we owe the first works on dialectology, the first collections of oral literature, and the first descriptions of customs. After independence, this legacy would be looked at as being poisonous in the sense that it is suspected, if not rejected, as an avatar of colonization. In general, it can be said that "popular" culture has resisted to colonial aggression better than «scholarly" culture. This is undoubtedly true for several reasons. The main ones of these are the colonial system monopolization of the State structures, which were the support of "scholarly" culture; the eviction of "scholarly" culture and "classical" Arabic from the dominant symbolic production field; and subsequently, the confinement of "scholarly" culture and "classical" Arabic to the fields of liturgy and judicature.

In the aftermath of independence, the social forces which constituted the national movement, and which are essentially of reformist obedience, attempted to rearrange the cultural and linguistic chessboard by restoring to "scholarly" culture and to "classical" Arabic their former times pre-eminence. The process of re-appropriating cultural and linguistic supremacy through "arabization" of education and justice sectors has been proved to be slow and difficult, and the new challenges are serious. The postcolonial symbolic situation no longer has the relatively balanced bipolar advantage of pre-colonial Moroccan society, a new linguistic and cultural configuration has surged; it is multipolar and much more contentious than the initial configuration. These components are "mother" languages and cultures, "classical» and "modern" Arabic language and culture, and foreign languages and cultures, especially those of French expression. In broad terms, the transformations undergone by

Moroccan society at all levels, and particularly at the cultural level, have given rise to contradictions whose conflicting nature is evident in a number of discourse paradigms; these paradigms can be reduced to two major discourses each of which including variants, namely the "patrimonial" discourse and the "modernist" discourse.

Arabity Patrimonial Discourse

The material and symbolic domination that the colonial power exerted over Moroccan society, in spite of some "indigenous" vague hopes, has had the effect of destroying part of the foundations of traditional culture by imposing a model of a powerful society whose functioning led to the marginalization of the traditional elite by creating a "modern" local elite via the French school. Therefore, in the education sector, the creation of certain educational institutions such as the "Franco-Moroccan» high schools: Moulay Idriss in Fes, Moulay Sliman in Meknes, Moulay Youssef in Rabat, Mohammad V in Casablanca, Mohammad V in Marrakech, the "Franco-Berber «high school of Azrou, etc., contributed in the training of elites who played an important role in the national movement and in the post-independence period (See Laroui, 1974, on the social and cultural origins of Moroccan nationalism). Following the Arabization of education, these institutions have been taken over, since the 1960s, by the French educational institutions such as the high schools of Lyautey in Casablanca, Descartes in Rabat, Regnault in Tangier, Victor Hugo in Marrakesh, Paul Valery in Meknes, etc. These high schools have contributed to the education of modern elite from the middle and upper classes that has provided the important economic, political and cultural leadership, and thus ensuring elite reproduction (See Vermeren, 2010).

In the social imagination, the strength of the new culture lies in having a technical nature and especially in promoting social mobility through education. But the logic of the colonial system imposes a selective distribution of social benefits at the expense of the "indigenous people". Thus, social promotion restrictions frustrate the ambitions of the

Moroccan bourgeoisie, the dispossession of the so-called Moroccan "usable" lands exacerbates the resentment of the wealthy peasantry, and the exploitation of the emerging working class generated for the most lucid of them embryonic politico-unionist awareness.

These frustrations are expressed more or less clearly in the patrimonial discourses that proclaim a quest for an authenticity that should be restored by means of resourcing in the foundations of the Arab-Muslim culture by renovating it according to the "reformist" discourse, with the return to "radical Islam" according to the "traditionalist" discourse, and by celebrating the Amazigh identity according to the Amazigh discourse.

The Reformist Option

The disarray of the Moroccan society created by the colonial trauma was carried by the Moroccan bourgeoisie, who was, at this phase of the Moroccan history, the class that was most qualified to assume this task thanks to its material capital. It was mostly a merchant based bourgeoisie with a symbolic capital; it was the only segment of the Moroccan society to have an educated elite, able to organize and take over the political leadership of the national movement.

With respect to culture, the elite originating from the urban traditional bourgeoisie bases its discourse on reformist theses whose objective consisted in "the transformation of metaphysics into a political doctrine" by adopting a "social pedagogy" (See Khatibi, 1977). This bourgeoisie aims at the mobilization of the masses on the basis of the return to the foundations of Islam and at the golden age of the Arab-Muslim culture by purifying it from both the residues of decadent scholasticism and the distortion of the modernists alienated by the West, while adapting the "positive" aspects of modern (Western) society such as technology and the parliamentary system (See. Al-Fâsī, 1962). The reformist cultural project thus rejects the Western societal model in general and its cultural mode in particular, by advocating the return to "sources" and to "authenticity".

Arabization is the main measure of restitution of the lost identity; it also has the function of being the key which should allow for the reappropriation of symbolic power by the traditional urban elites in the wake of independence.

The evolution undergone by the large structures of the State and by society after independence has revealed the failure of the reformist discourse. This failure is undoubtedly due to many reasons, the main ones being the failure of the "concordism" of the reformist philosophy which claims to establish reconciliation between "tradition" and "modernity", between "authenticity" and "contemporaneity", while assuming that it is easy to sort out the chaff from the grain both in the Arab-Muslim heritage and in Western culture (See Morino, 1986). A second reason relates to the impossibility to "adapt technology to theology" by dissociating Western technology from the cultural values it carries and by integrating modernity into obsolete socio-economic structures (See Khatibi, 1977). The third reason relates to the ambiguity of the reformist patrimonial movement with respect to the heritage to be upgraded, and to the present-day culture to be re-entrenched in tradition (See Prémare, 1986). To these considerations, it is necessary to add the reformist discourse lack of realism in claiming the ability to evade the gaze of the Alterity in the reconstruction of the collective identity.

The "traditionalist" Option

The failure of the reformist discourse in terms of socioeconomic efficiency, alongside with the crisis of the discourse which claims adherence to rationalism, has provoked a cultural vacuum that is particularly dramatic, in the sense that the masses of young school students, who have been excluded from social advancement, no longer find a credible reference system that is accessible to them. In addition, because of "structural" problems, the disadvantaged school has turned into an educational institution with an in-crisis social function. As a result, education, which used to be the "center of gravity" of culture, has turned

to be a major institution of downgrading, mainly because of the saturation of the job market, the inefficiency of the acquired skills and the inadequacy of the provided culture with the social needs. The renewal of Islamic spirituality is a phenomenon with an obvious historical dimension (See Kably, 1989).

In such a context, which exhibits aspects of the "cultural chaos", the discourse with an illocutionary force in the popular milieu is one that preaches radical rejection of Western culture as well as the "corrupt" Arab culture, and proposes as an alternative the return to the "pure" Islamic culture and the refusal of "compromising behavior" with the proponents of rationalism, laicism, liberal democracy, feminism, Marxism, etc. The claimed Islamic culture has thus become the point of convergence of two "plebeian reserves", that of the illiterate masses, whose cultural references are reduced to traditional values and that of the marginalized product of the "arabized" school and educational systems. This discourse is exclusively of a theocentric essence; it renews contact with the foundations of "scholarly" culture and with the "mystical motives" of Popular culture as a bearer of hope, as stated by Gallissot (*1986, p.52):*

> *When there is no future in a country, religion is back to offer the last substitute of social utopia; it can still nourish hope within the desperate, especially that it does not need justification, is it not, in itself, its own legitimacy ?*

Traditionalist discourse is a metaphysical discourse that treats culture as a theological knowledge related to the Absolute and to Creed; it is therefore inarguable and irrefutable in its essence. Consequently, classical Arabic language regains its sacredness as the language chosen by God for the revelation of the Qur'an, and Tradition becomes the norm of individual and collective conduct. As a result, Western culture is rejected because it is supposed to be Judeo-Christian and a bearer of evil. "Popular" cultures alongside with the languages that vehiculated it are object of suspicion because they are supposed to express pagan beliefs, encourage superstition, and they accordingly question the divine Unity. The rationalist criticism pointed out many contradictions in the traditionalist

discourse, and some consider it a largely infra theoretical discourse. This is why one would question its socio-cultural credibility, the credibility which will be assessed depending on the capacity of this discourse to elucidate major issues at a global and local level and to provide «alternative" solutions and not a utopia.

Amazighity Discourse Emergence

The discourse on specificity equally proposes itself as an offer for cultural diversity management. It is based on the idea of the singularity of the primary culture, with an Amazigh ethnic background, and on its immutability despite the circumstances more or less favorable to its development during the cultural history of the country. It is history that is marked by the symbolic dominance of the "scholarly" culture in pre-colonial Morocco, the subjection of the Moroccan cultural construct to the French culture under the colonial regime, the retraction of the latter during the struggle for national liberation, and its reproduction and maintenance by the dominant classes after independence.

The quest for Amazigh identity is not only an intellectual preoccupation; it is largely an existential concern. Obviously, this quest is not shared by the whole Amazigh community. In fact, this community is subject to an imperious secular linguistic and cultural assimilation process due to the centripetal action of the central power and to the contact with the Arab tribes. Nowadays, this process is reinforced by the economic and cultural dependence of the Amazigh-speaking peripheral regions on cities, with respect to the capitalist mode of production, and to the dominant cultural and linguistic models. Assimilation is taking place slowly in the countryside and at an accelerated pace in the city, due to the massive rural exodus from the Amazigh-speaking areas. There are largely two major tendencies characterizing Amazigh community, a tendency towards the inhibition of the primary cultural identity and another one which is at ease within.

The first tendency is represented by the individuals and groups who want to appropriate the dominant cultural and linguistic models. They go through the different stages of the process of acculturation in the urban environment. This process can be briefly described as follows: the first generation of migrants experiences additional biculturalism where urban culture, whose tool is Moroccan Arabic and substance is "popular culture" of Arabic expression, is consumed only sporadically and superficially, through contamination so to speak, to the extent that the Amazigh speaker does not participate in this culture that he receives passively due to the interplay of social mechanisms. The second generation, and due to its greater integration into the urban structure, experiences a situation of complementary biculturalism. In this phase, the people involved practice the Amazigh cultural and linguistic model as well as the urban cultural model(s) in an unequal manner. This biculturalism is experienced in a dichotomous way in so far as Amazigh culture belongs to "the interior space". It is integrated and experienced in the private sphere and within the Amazigh group, while the urban culture(s) fall(s) under the "exterior space", that of the social relations with a transactional character. The third generation is totally integrated in the urban socio-cultural sphere and is implicated in a network of "extramural" relations where the Amazigh specificity, based on ethnicity or localism, is neutralized to the benefit of "nationality" and of "universality". The primary culture-personality is thus repressed, consciously or not; it is interpreted as a substratum bearing signs of regression, or at least as a hindrance to socio-cultural mobility.

The other socio-cultural tendency that manifests itself in the urban milieu relates to resistance to the process of cultural and linguistic assimilation. Awareness of the importance of the cultural dimension in constructing the individual and collective identity leads to the development of strategies of resistance to cultural and linguistic alienation. These strategies take many forms including cultural production such as written literature, songs, and arts, linguistic and literary research, and associative cultural action. The question that arises

spontaneously is whether the endocentric activities can slow down the process of erosion that Amazigh culture is undergoing, despite being deprived of the logistic means that are proportionate to the objectives assigned to them, and relying primarily on a subjective and voluntarist willingness to preserve the primary language-culture, and thus to preserve the pluralistic nature of Moroccan culture.

The quest for Amazigh identity is part of a universal issue. In fact, the issue of identity arises theoretically, here as elsewhere, in the same terms: it is reduced to the opposition whose two poles are "Ego-centered identification" and "Alter-based identification". The first pole relates to the Ego (collective or individual), that leads to the voluntary search for distinction, autonomy and singularity; the second pole is that of the Alter, and it looks for breaking the boundaries of particularity and to dissolve specificity with a view of integrating larger entities, in this case the Moroccan, Maghrebian, Arab, Muslim, African entities, etc.

This goes in line with what we stated elsewhere:

> *The hesitations that we perceive in individual and collective behaviors are reduced to this double polarity: solipsism and alienation; solipsism refers to the deadlock resulting from the exacerbation of the feeling of difference, while alienation represents the crucible in which centrifugal forces massify, standardize, and assimilate differences in an imperious process of phagocytosis. Of course, both tendencies are based on conscious and unconscious motivations and, on both sides, rationalizations are not lacking.*
>
> Boukous (1985: 51)

Amazigh culture legitimization is based on some central theses in the apologetic discourse: its permanence, which organizes the collective unconscious and constitutes the base of the country's "core cultural personality"; and consequently establishes its legitimacy; its specification as a "popular culture", which grants it with a plebeian aureole in the populist discourse; and its vitality, which results, on the one hand, from the fact that it embraces the maternal universe and, on the other hand,

from the fact that it covers the scope of private life, transactional communion and dominant power.

The criticism leveled to the “specificist” discourse considers it to be a variant of the metaphysical discourse, in so far as it stands as an irrevocable absolute social object whose historical awareness reconsiders the process of mutation, a mutation which is illustrated by the ongoing socialization process at both cultural and linguistic levels, and under the imperious effect of the destruction of the traditional rural economy, the emigration of the active forces, and the ensuing urbanization. Culture is in fact crossed by “Arabic”, “Islamic", and by “Western” backgrounds as they are interacting, heavily impacted by Arab and Islamic culture in Morocco, and by Western European cultures that host Amazigh migrants; let us not forget that many millions of Amazigh speaking Moroccans are in a diaspora situation. Given its objective and subjective status, Amazigh culture is one of the challenges of the social and cultural transformation of the twenty-first century Morocco. This explains that the survival strategies in favor of endogenous development, first on the margins of institutions and bodies, and then in an institutional framework, are indeed deployed at the levels of research, cultural creation, linguistic normalization and cultural action. The State’s new policy is the outcome of negotiations between the State and the Amazigh civil society; it has initiated measures liable to lead to the promotion of Amazigh language and culture within the framework of the implementation of the constitution provisions. This is the role of the Royal Institute for Amazigh Culture since its creation in 2001. It should be noted that today the question of cultural and linguistic identity is being overtaken by political, social and economic demands emanating from Amazigh-speaking regions that are isolated and precarious, as expressed in the Rif, the North-East, the South-East, and the Souss regions.

As a conclusion, being rooted in the patrimonial tradition, the Amazigh discourse should positively respond to questions concerning its usability in terms of historical duration, its ability to offer today's Moroccan society a positive and creative culture background, the viability of the claim of a

metaphysical identity breaking radically with the Other, and the possibility it offers in terms of duration to achieve the phantasmal closing of the social body in the absolute *idiosyncratic identity*.

Modernity discourse Aporia

The issue of "modernity" is central in the cultural discourse in Morocco. We have just seen how the discourses which claim to be "patrimonial" are confronted with the problem of "modernity" embodied by/in the Other and represented by the West. The "reformist" discourse occupies a pivotal position between the complete rejection of the "traditionalist" discourse and the discourse borrowing the path/voice of "modernity". This mixed and "concordist" position shows signs of being one of the factors that led to its failure.

The discourse of "modernity" joins that of "universalism" in postulating that each historical period of Humanity is marked by the predominance of a particular cultural model. That explains the integration in its form of the specifications of the Latin culture during antiquity, of the Arab-Muslim culture during the medieval period, of the European Renaissance culture in the sixth century, of the French classical culture and of the British culture of the Industrial Revolution. In the twentieth century, Anglo-Saxon culture predominates and in the twenty-first century, it is already "Asiatization" that is imposing itself, with China principally. As to the substance of universal culture, it represents the dialectical synthesis of the cultural experiences of all humanity. It would therefore be both illusory and retrograding to turn one's back to universal culture on the basis that it is "alienating", or representing the culture of a specific nation. Universal culture is the property of all Humanity, and it should be embraced without any complex. The discourse of "modernity" is polyphonic in its own way, but with a somewhat discordant polyphony. Indeed, at least two variants coexist in the area of cultural thought, "historicism" and "interculturalism".

"Historicist" Discourse

"Historicism" is defined as a doctrine postulating that any thought, any truth, any value, and any knowledge is tied to a given historical situation and one that is more concerned with the process of their development rather than with their true nature. The historicist discourse stands as a radical criticism of traditionalism. It is based on the following thesis: "the unitary path of historical development, the general truth is conveyed only in and by history" (Laroui, 1974, p. 139). This discourse has developed the thesis stipulating that it is futile that Moroccan culture turns away from "modernity" because at this phase of Human history, the impact of Western culture is unavoidable. This culture represents the dominant culture of the historical phase of the contemporary human community. Consequently, it is advantageous to borrow its positive elements, by mastering them and assimilating them to our own cultural reality, without falling into either an anti-historical attitude, consisting of systematic refusal, or in mimicry leading to alienation. The historicist position par excellence consists in rejecting both the dominant Western culture for being aggressive and alienating, and the traditional lethargic heritage, to adopt a third path, that of openness on to contemporary Western culture, by assimilating and enriching it based on the national culture experience.

Assimilating modern culture requires at least three conditions: knowledge of contemporary culture data, evaluation of achievements of national community in all fields and, finally historical awareness as the ultimate objective of any culture is the development of Man, including his life conditions and his cultural level. According to the proponents of historicism, there is need for connecting Arab-Muslim culture to the liberal Western culture, mastering Arabic and foreign languages, being able to have a general overview over national problems and major international issues in a perspective not of dichotomization but of integration. This third perspective explicitly excludes the quest for specificity, identity and authenticity, which is considered as an option

leading to the deadlock of "Community confinement" and "folklorization" of culture.

Historicist discourse, whose origins go back to the 19th century in Europe, especially Germany, used to be a strong paradigm of Arab thought during the 1960s and 1970s. It was developed by the Marxist petite intellectual bourgeoisie, and it was at the source of notions such as "national culture", "revolutionary culture", "democratic culture", "proletarian culture", etc. This discourse, which stands as an attempt by local culture to adhere to the positivist paradigm in the course of universal history, has not been able to penetrate the "larger masses", to which it was supposed to be destined for various reasons which are not our concern here. Currently, it is losing ground because of the crisis of the Marxist ideology and the subsequent failure of socialist society, as it functioned in the Soviet model and to some extent in the Chinese society and in the "Arab socialism" experience.

Cross-cultural Discourse

Let us recall what we have stated previously: according to "cross-cultural" discourse, Moroccan culture is a field that is irrigated by multiple confluences: Amazigh, Arab, African and Western. Cultural diversity enriches the symbolic sphere in Morocco, provided that oppositions between the various contributors are under control, and that the demarcations are neither alienation nor cultural solipsism. The most advanced theorization of cross-cultural is exposed in Khatibi works, for which "cultural mix" and "cultural blending" are an essential characteristic of the Maghreb, a mix and a blending that are thoughtful and conscious claiming an "uncompromising difference". The privileged places of cross-cultural expression are the Maghrebian French-language literature, fine arts and visual arts. On the other side, the discourse of "modernity" is interpreted by currents claiming adherence to "tradition" as being the cultural and artistic expression of the westernized and alien intellectual bourgeoisie, which makes use of the weapons of dialectics and

rational methods for the purpose of destroying the foundations of Arab-Muslim culture.

After having examined the genesis of the discourse field of cultural production and its expression modalities, it is necessary to point out the limitations of this contribution. Firstly, it is based on a documentary approach, which certainly remains limited and probably provides a static view of the subject matter. Then, it does not claim to provide an exhaustive investigation of the Moroccan cultural field, such an investigation would necessitate sector-specific empirical studies using quantitative and qualitative analysis methods in order to grasp the cultural practices of the different social strata at both vertical and horizontal levels. Finally, it does not provide explanation as to the conditions in which cultural discourses are being produced.

Elite Failure

Moroccan cultural field is rich as it consists of an accumulation of many cultural and linguistic contributions which, if not standing as integrated components in a unitary cultural model, are multiple layers accumulated throughout history. These contributions interact, and the dynamics of this interaction necessarily engenders issues and conflicts. The major issue consists of the resolution of the contradiction whose terms are specificity and universality. Some would question the ability of social actors, especially active groups promoting alternative discourses, to achieve the harmonious synthesis of the cultural and linguistic kaleidoscope. They would also wonder at the awareness level of society as a whole to reject the dominance of the simplistic patrimonial discourse, and at the viability of the rationalist project in a conservative environment. Likewise, they would raise questions on the subversion force of the culture of the Other to overcome the idealistic dream of an elite cut off from the reality of bottom Morocco, and on the socio-cultural efficiency of cross-cultural as a creative synthesis and not as a micro-culture produced and consumed by Westernized elites. It is up to the intellectual élite, whose role is

fundamental in casting light on the issues of the symbolic sphere, to address these essential questions. Marginalizing the intellectual elite by subordinating it to the political power, confining it to the consultative function, and privileging bureaucratic technocracy would not serve as an efficient strategy in front of the upheavals that the world is undergoing globally and locally.

Essay 8
Sufism and Patrimonialism

In tribute to
M. Mokhtar Soussi (1900-1963)

Statement of the Problem

Being endowed with a strong historical legitimacy, the Arab-Islamist Sufism and patrimonialism occupy a prominent position in the sphere of symbolic production. In fact, within nonurban Muslim communities, there was a rise of an elite educated in Arabic language whose position was particularly valued in the socio-cultural field in a context where the majority of the population is of a non-Arabic language and culture, (*âjam*); in other words, it is deprived of any competencies in the area of Arab and Islamic scholarly knowledge. In this context, the mastery of Arabic and of Islamic sciences conveyed by this language is a sign of "divine election" by metonymy somehow; don't the *fuqahā* often say that the Arabic language is *the best language, the language that God has chosen to reveal the Qur'an*, *the language of Paradise*; by the same token, they deduce that they are, themselves, chosen by God to be its depositaries and guardians. The scriptural function has thus been the object of a strong social demand in the communities essentially with oral tradition. Being a rare commodity, Arabic allowed its holders to benefit from advantages and privileges that allow them to occupy a position of symbolic supremacy in society. But with the imposition of modernity by colonization, radical economic, political, social and cultural changes have affected the structure of traditional societies. The established intellectual elite were unable to cope with this new situation, which requires unprecedented skills. Consisting mainly of clerks, *ûlama* and *kuttāb*, the elite has been threatened of being

downgraded as a result of the emergence of a modern elite educated at the Western school. In a changing society, as is the case for the Moroccan one at the advent of independence, important questions spring to the mind of the observer: what are the stakes underlying the transformation in the symbolic situation? What are the strategies of detention/retention of the symbolic power? More specifically, how does the traditional elite react to change to maintain if not strengthen its position in the colonial and postcolonial society? These are questions that we will try to answer starting from the examination of the case of Mohammed Mokhtar Soussi (1900-1963; henceforth M. Mokhtar Soussi), a traditional scholar who lived in a transitional period, that of the problematic passage from pre-colonial to post-colonial Morocco. This is an interesting case in the sense that he represents the model figure of the intellectual who came from a peripheral region (the Souss), and who devoted his cultural production to demonstrate the excellence of the intellect of the periphery within the very reference system represented by the Arab-Muslim culture.

The general hypothesis underlying the analysis of M. Mokhtar Soussi's experience is that the area of symbolic production is the theater of socio-cultural stakes that trigger processes of position stratification in the social formation. Through the processes of knowing, recognizing and misrecognition or even defamation, the holders of symbolic power develop self-defense strategies to safeguard their positions in the social structure (See P. Bourdieu, 1984). The consolidation of this hypothesis would go through three stages in M. Mokhtar Soussi's life : first, the initial education at the *Zawiya Derqawiya* in the Souss area, it broadly constitutes the stage of initiation to Sufism; then the exploration of modern Arab-Muslim culture, which represents the phase of initiation to Salafism in Marrakesh and Fez; and lastly the cultural and political adherence to the national movement, and that is the period of politico-associative activism, exile, imprisonment and official recognition after independence. Finally, the expected result of the suggested analysis is to confirm or refute the idea of the prevalence of sociological determinism in the history of the individual M. Mokhtar Soussi, an individual from a peripheral region

marked by precarity and who, through personal effort and with no support from any social network, embarked into the adventure of vertical mobility in a hierarchical and almost locked structure.

An Outstanding Life Journey

Before moving further, a preliminary question arises: Is M. Mokhtar Soussi "an intellectual"? The phrasing of the question includes a key word whose semantic ambiguity is directly related to the polynomial nature of the social category it refers to. For the case that is our concern here, we can say that M. Mokhtar Soussi is an "intellectual". Indeed, if we retain as a defining criterion of the "intellectuals" category the position that the individual occupies in the social division of labor, namely his belonging to the field of symbolic production, we can recall that M. Mokhtar Soussi invested almost a quarter of a century in the accumulation of knowledge and the rest of his life in education, teaching and scientific production. He wrote a large number of works, twelve of which were published and twenty-six are still in the state of manuscripts (See the bibliography below). The most important of his works is *Al-maâsōl* in twenty volumes. His work is devoted mainly to the cultural history of Souss, the scholarly culture of the *zawiyas* and the *medersas* of this region. But, paradoxically, he has been the object of a limited number of studies; he is somehow an intellectual who is unknown in the Moroccan cultural scene. What are the reasons for such ignorance? They are probably diverse; they are concerned with his status as an intellectual who is immersed in the ambiguity of unclassifiable subjects, subjects submitted to a continuous procedure of classification, of declassification and reclassification within the social structure in a time of historical change.

M. Mokhtar Soussi certainly had a unique destiny. Born in 1900 at *IIlgh* in Souss area (southwest of Morocco), he was brought in a family of Sufis, his father Ali was the founder of *zawiya Darqawiya*. A fatherless orphan, he was first educated at the schools of the neighboring area, then he worked his way up the lather of Arab-Muslim knowledge of his time, successively

in Marrakesh where he followed the teachings of the reformist scholar (*salafi*) Abū Shuâyb Al-Dukkāli at the Ben Youssef Institute (from 1918 to 1923), and in Fes where he was the disciple of the other great *salafi* scholar Al-Ârabī Al-Âlawi at Qarawiyin University (from 1924 to 1928), and in Rabat where he regained his master Abū Shuâyb Ad-Dukkālī from 1928 to 1929. Having completed his training, he moved to Marrakesh where he revealed his talents as a proselyte teacher in his own school of Bab Doukkala and at the Ben Youssef Institute. He also demonstrated his preaching skills in various mosques in Marrakesh, Haouz and Casablanca. Our Sufi was also a politician right from the very beginning. In Fez, he created, with other young students, namely Âllal Al-Fāsī, Benjelloun, Balafrej, etc., the first nuclei of the national movement, notably the *Al-Hamāsa Cultural Association*, which he led, and a secret association whose leadership was entrusted to the *zaîm* Âllal Al-Fāsī. Having chosen Marrakesh as a place of residence, he devoted himself, alongside to teaching, to the training of the political elite (including Abdallah Ibrahim, Mohammed Baṣri), and to the political sensitization of the masses. He thereby created and contributed to creation of a great number of associations, which brought about his exile to *Iligh* in Souss, his native region from 1936 to 1945. After being acquitted, he pursued his action of an activist in Casablanca, as a result of which he was condemned to prison and incarcerated in the penitentiary of Aghbalou n'Kerdous in Tafilalet, then in that of Tinjdad from 1952 to 1954 with prominent leaders of the national movement, namely Ben Barka, Balafrej, Bargach, Baddou, Al-Baqqāli, Âmmour, Al- Âlamî, Benchemsi, etc., (As for Âllal Al-Fāsī, he was exiled to Gabon). Upon Morocco's accession to independence, M. Mokhtar Soussi, "the politician against his own will", as he would call himself, collected the awards of his tireless activity: he was first appointed Minister of the Habous (Religious Affairs) and then Throne Minister until his death in 1963.

The exposition of M. Mokhtar Soussi's career reveals that his multidimensional personality has contributed a great deal to his social and cultural program characterized by continuity, discontinuity and rupture.

Amazighity, rurality, Sufism, Îlm, Salafism and politics have constituted in their immanence and in their interface the modules of this program. As a figure of the Maghrebian traditional intellectuality of the colonial period, M. Mokhtar Soussi is both an interesting subject and object of study for the researcher who is keen to understand the structure and the stakes of the cultural field of this historical period, especially that M. Mokhtar Soussi is undoubtedly not an isolated case which presents so many facets with their idiosyncrasies, their relations of interdependence and their contradictions. Let us limit ourselves here to the examination of three problematic issues in M. Mokhtar Soussi's intellectual experience, namely his relationship vis-à-vis local culture and his management of the trinomial of Sufism - Salafism - politics. The approach of Maghrebian intellectual experience developed here is couched within the global perspective of social issues analyzes relating to symbolic production in Morocco (See Boukous, 1995).

Between Past and Present

To achieve a full understanding of the structure underlying the course of Mr. Mokhtar Soussi, let us reread the introduction of *Al-Maâsōl* where he draws with a puzzling clear-sightedness the dramatic observation of the identity crisis triggered by colonial aggression (the [French] translation is the author's):

> *Yesterday, we had a happy life, in total isolation from the rest of the world by natural barriers from all sides. We lived in an environment that was radically different from the one where we live today. We were anchored in a religion, customs, structures, culture, and values that are familiar to us. And here, we are today rushed into an environment quite opposed to what we knew. But what has happened between yesterday and today? We are invaded by the colonizer with his horsemen and his infantrymen, his thoughts and culture, his policies and his treachery, his radiant civilization, his vital and materialistic sciences, his admirable organization, his productive factories and everything else which has to do with real life [...] And we experienced what had happened to the People of the Cave (Ahl al-kahf); when they came back to life, they found that everything they used to*

know had totally changed [...] The Moroccans rushed avidly to Western civilization, they gave up their customs, culture, and values. This is how we, my fellows and I, who lived before and during the colonial occupation, find ourselves old and out of date, like strangers in Morocco again independent [...] We have to adapt to this change, while admitting the positive aspects of the modern times and those of the old times as well [...] After the independence we are living like marginal people in our own country, we are really excluded from normal life, that of modern times so much embraced by those endowed with social competencies, those who gave up our sacred virtues: Islam and Arabic [...] We are attached to two things: the supreme ideals of the Islamic religion and the Arabic language, the language for which Moroccans, both Arabs and Amazighs, have made sacrifices to make of it the unique language of the country.

The basic project of M. Mokhtar Soussi is thus to reconstitute the Arab-Islamic identity distorted by the colonial system. Behind the transparency/opacity of the ideological discourse, let us try to give a social meaning to the crisis of the traditional intelligentsia during the colonial period, by historicizing this crisis and by bringing it back to the world of symbolic stakes. When M. Mokhtar Soussi was born, the economic independence of Morocco was already strongly threatened by Western Europe and the Moroccan territory was subject to infiltration by the French and Spanish armies (See Miège, 1963). In 1912, Sultan Moulay Ḥafiḍ signed the French Protectorate Treaty on Morocco; very large portions of the country were occupied, including cities and plains. The regions which escaped this domination were limited to the Rif which continued its war for independence against Spain with Muḥammad Ibn Âbdelkrim, the Middle Atlas with Moḥa Uḥammu, the South-east with Âssu Ubaslam, and the Souss with Abdallah Zagour, who fought against French penetration. When M. Mokhtar Soussi left Souss, this region was still pursuing its anti-colonial struggle; it was still part of what the official historiographers and, after them the ideologists of the colonial era, called *bled siba*, *the land of anarchy* that is to say, the rebellious country escaping the authority of the Makhzen, but also a poor country, threatened by scarcity and epidemics. Mokhtar Soussi settled in Marrakesh in pursuit of knowledge-power. He would return to this place of predilection after completing his studies in

Fes and Rabat, in order, as he states, to contribute as *a rural Amazigh* to the national movement by giving it an Arab-Islamic orientation. It is within this context of creeping colonial occupation, popular resistance in rural areas, and anti-colonial political organization in urban centers that M. Mokhtar Soussi's course of action adhered to.

How to explain his choice to leave Souss at the time of resistance to settle in the occupied part of the country? He justifies this choice in *Al-Ma'sûl1* on the basis of the strategic position of Marrakesh, the quality of its elite, its people and life and work conditions which were more favorable than those available in the Souss countryside which was *poor and underdeveloped*. Let us not overlook to evoke the opposite choice made by Al-Youssi, another Amazigh intellectual versed in Arabic language and culture, who lived in the seventeenth century (See Berque, 1958), and point out that the latter had the privilege to work at home in good material conditions. The relevance of treating both scholars as parallel cases lies in the fact that the two clericals have the same background; they are indeed both Amazighs, therefore rural. Al-Youssi originated from a tribe in the Middle-Atlas and M. Mokhtar Soussi from a tribe in the Anti-Atlas; and they were scholars (*'âlims)* whose reputation was prominent among the scientific community of their time. They were both affiliated to a *zawiya*, the first to the *zawiya dilaïte* and the second to the *zawiya darqawite.* Finally, they had both been solicited by the Makhzen, thus associated in one way or another with the central political power. But they were distinct in their political behavior. Al-Yussi received the official honors from Mulay Ismaîl, who nominated him as *Cadi* (judge) of Fes, which represented a religious responsibility with certainly a political dimension as well, and who decided to leave Fes to return back to his tribe of the Ayt Yussi, carrying the bitter taste of power and giving up the struggle against the urban *intelligentsia*. As for M. Mokhtar Soussi, he was appointed minister from 1956 up to his death in 1963, which means that he participated in the first Moroccan governments after independence, and that he was a politician no matter what he would say about that. Can one practice politics against his will? One may doubt this. This is the reason

why we can postulate that joining politics is a choice emanating from a willingness to integrate the fold of the urban elite in order to position oneself advantageously in the hierarchy of the symbolic production of that time. Obviously, the choice of doing politics can be rationalized in various ways, but the fact still remains that it is a choice. The willingness to accumulate symbolic capital can similarly be clear or blurred, but that is not the issue either. What distinguishes the two men would therefore be the absence/presence of political ambition and, beyond this ambition, the search for ascending social mobility.

The difference between the two scholars can be explained by the historical context which is certainly not the same. Has M. Mokhtar Soussi understood the vanity of the traditional resistance of the poor peripheral regions, with no financial means, and with no elite capable of developing a viable political project to counter the economic, military and technical superiority of the West? Did he ponder on the failure of the attempts by Ma' Al-Âynayn and his son Al-Hiba against the French army? Did he draw the conclusion that traditional elite (*Sufi, ûlama, fuqaha, and udabā'*) is historically doomed to perish? If we are to rationalize M. Mokhtar Soussi's career, we should reasonably postulate that leaving Souss at this precise moment in Moroccan history was the best option for such an intelligent and ambitious young man who was preparing to participate in the elaboration of a big project.

Rurality Stigma

For many (See the proceedings of the Agadir symposium, 1984), M. Mokhtar Soussi represents first and foremost a model figure of the intellectual coming from a peripheral region and who has devoted his life to demonstrating excellence of the intellect of his native region, Souss, by adopting an original method of writing his cultural history (See also Sadki, 1984; Taoufiq, 1984). In fact, the discourse of M. Mokhtar Soussi on his *rurality* and his *bedwinism* feeds on ambivalences if not ambiguity. Indeed, on the one hand, he has shown a great deal of humbleness towards the

urban lettered men of Fes in particular, and from Cairo as well (See his hypothetical interview with Ṭaha Hussein in Al-*Ilghiyat*, 1, pp. 217-240), and, on the other hand, he is imbued by his knowledge towards the rural cultivated people and shows a feeling of unveiled superiority with regard to the *uneducated* people of Souss. Without lapsing into mechanistic determinism, it is important to situate our character within the environmental conditions which led to his first education. This makes it possible to understand how he has been shaped by the imprint of an environment, a history and a culture, an imprint that he would keep indelible during all his life experience and which so forged stigmas in his socio-cultural behavior.

Souss is a region with Amazigh language and culture (Tachelhit dialect); endowed with scarce economic resources, it is a place of intense internal and external emigration. It played a relatively important role in the history of Morocco, especially under the Almoravids and the Saâdis, more particularly in the seventeenth century with "the kingdom of Tazerwalt" of Sidi Ḫmad U Mussa, (on the relations between the *Iligh House* and the Alaouite Makhzen see Ennaji and Pascon, 1988). This region is known throughout Morocco to be a fertile ground for Arab-Muslim sciences, thanks to a large number of Quranic schools, medersas and zawiyas where an intellectual aristocracy often of high quality namely in the fields of *fiqh*, grammar and literature is active. In the pre-colonial Morocco, the region stood as a competitor to the other great cultural centers, such as those of Fes, Tetuan, Rabat-Salé, and Marrakech (See Berque, 2001). The originality of Souss, compared to other centers of Arab-Muslim culture, is that the population, including the elite of *ûlamᾱ* and *fuqahᾱ*, is of Amazigh language and culture. In the imagination the Souss peasants, Arabic language and culture are placed on an inaccessible pedestal; they are crowned with their impenetrable secrets, the writing and reading of the Arabic text are skills that are not accessible to them. The holders of this invaluable capital, in a region living according to the symbolic order of the Amazigh orality, and in the Islamic logosphere, are then naturally recognized as being superior. In fact, they live following a lifestyle that is radically different from that of

masses, by the nature of their intellectual work, by their dress of immaculate whiteness, and by their dwelling outside the village conglomeration; they rarely attend secular ceremonies; and they enjoy a great deal of consideration. In the *medrasa* they devote themselves to the education of young students and to their own studies. Their contact with the common people (*al-âmma*) is limited to occasions marked by the liturgical formality, especially at prayer times, and during religious ceremonies, namely the Prophet's birthday, *îd al-fiṭr*, *îd al-ḍḥā*, baptism, circumcision, death, etc., during the formulation of contracts related to marriage, purchase, sale, antichresis, etc., and the writing and reading of letters, or during the regulation of interpersonal and intertribal conflicts. During their leisure time, *ûlemā, fuqahā,* and *ṭalaba* generally engage in their favorite occupation, that is, oratorical and poetry contests in classical Arabic.

The traditional scholar considers that the main evil which impairs the masses is ignorance of the "classical" Arabic language and Arab-Muslim culture, which are considered as the legitimate symbolic products par excellence. Amazigh language and culture do not constitute part of the recognized knowledge of the cultural *habitus* of the community. Somehow oral tradition, everyday culture and the culture of the masses are part of "popular culture" (*ṯaqāfa šaâbiya)*, "vulgar culture" (*ṯaqâfat al-âmma*), culture of charlatans (*ṯaqâfat al-mušaâwidîn)*.... Furthermore, in the social division of labor, another essential symbolic function is incumbent upon the elite, which is allowing the community closer access to the knowledge allowing it to be in conformity with the precepts of Islam, first and foremost; while its accession to *îlm* and to *âdâb* is simply a matter of the unattainable. Yet, when we are aware that we are in a theocentric culture, that individuals and groups are immersed, so to speak, in a religious atmosphere, one will understand the relevance of this social body. A good command of Arabic writing and of the knowledge it allows to accumulate thus enjoys a great social consideration, and the recognition of the value of this cultural competence is reflected in the community by its advantageous position in the hierarchy of the symbolic goods which are

the competing languages and cultures in the region, that is to say the Amazigh language and culture and the Arabic language and culture. M. Mokhtar Soussi was educated in this elite environment, submerged in his intellectual superiority over the uneducated masses composed of the peasants of his region, a region which is said not to be penetrated by the lights of the Arab-Muslim civilization. As a sign of discursive distancing, the author talked of his fellow countrymen using the third person: *they, the people of Ilgh*; *the people of Souss,* etc. This attitude of distancing is corroborated by the fact that, in his monumental work, M. Mokhtar Soussi devoted only a marginal place to the culture, language and literature of his native homeland. How to understand the distance displayed in the discourse by M. Mokhtar Soussi with regard to his culture of origin? Is it a strategy of *concealing* his belonging to the Amazigh group? Is it rather a *simulation* strategy aiming at presenting himself to his reader as a stranger to the Amazigh culture?

The perceptive reader of the work of M. Mokhtar Soussi cannot easily subscribe neither to the "masking" thesis nor to that of "simulation". In fact, we find in the writings of M. Mokhtar Soussi, specifically in the first volume of A*l-maâsûl* pages that attest his knowledge of the local Amazigh culture. With respect to literature, there are minor indications; for example, he related his encounter with the Amazigh poet *Ibn Ighil*, whose poem he appreciated. "*I heard from the Shleuh poet Ibn Ighil eloquent poetry*". In the same vein, our *âlim* demonstrated that he was a keen connoisseur of Amazigh poetry. Thus, in *Khilāl Jazūla*, he recites two verses from Sidi Ḫammu Ṭaleb, on the description of a place frequented by robbers, which suggests that M. Mokhtar Soussi knows by heart the verses of the master of the *Shleuḥ* poetry. Mokhtar Soussi, of course, knows perfectly the religious literature of Amazigh expression; thus, in his book *Iligh qadīman wa ḥadīṯan*, he reproduced eight verses on the *Al-sīra Al-nabawiya* in Amazigh language. In *Al-maâsūl* he provides specific information on the poetic translations in Arab works relating to *îbādāt* such as *Al-sīra Al-nabawiya*, *Al-ḫikam al-âṭā'iya, nūr al-yaqīn, Al-amīr al-šalhīy* (composed by the father of M. Mokhtar Soussi).

M. Mokhtar Soussi also took an interest in collecting local culture. In *Al-ma'sûl*1 he devoted about thirty pages mostly to customs, agrarian rituals, marriage ceremonies, birth ceremonies, and circumcisions, *musems*, religious festivals, food, magic practices, and industries such as ironwork, leather, pottery, weaving, etc. He also evoked youth and adult games, proverbs and sayings, traditional medicine, customary law, and archeological remnants like Agadir and sugar factory. He included more details on this matter in two opuscules which are still in a manuscript state. The first one, titled *Axlāq wa âādāt sūsya* and subtitled in a significant way *Ḥadîth Sidi Ḥammu*, is devoted to the habits and customs in Souss; and the second one is *Qaṭā'if al-laṭā'if*, a collection of tales and stories about social life in Souss. It deals with like the tricks of *fuqahā* and *tolba* and conflicts between European, urban and rural mentalities. According to the author, the objective pursued in this opuscule is to "provide as much reading material for pleasure sake as well as for providing useful information on cultural and social facts". He also left two manuscripts which he, himself, wrote in Amazigh (Tachelhit dialect) which undeniably show not only his intellectual curiosity for the Amazigh culture but also his involvement in this culture. These are two opuscules the first of which is *Al-alfāḍ al-ârabiya fī al-šalḥa al-sūsiya* (*qāmus*), a set of 1248 lexical entries which includes the Arabic terms that moved to Tachelhit. The second manuscript is *Mutaržam al-arbaîn al-nawawiya*, which is a translation into Tachelḥit of the *ḥaditḥs* based on the work of *Al-Imām Al-šāfiî,* a translation undertaken upon the request of the sister of M. Mokhtar Soussi, who did not speak Arabic (See Derkaoui, 1990).

It should therefore be noted that the *âlim* is not the one who is receptive to the doxic tendency: he went out of the beaten track of orthodox thinking since he allowed himself to take the local Amazigh culture as an object of study and of data collection, an object that the *ûlamā* and the *fuqahā* tend to repress in the darkness of the unthinkable and of ignorance. He is therefore distinguished from his peers, the *ûlamā,* who unanimously consider that the culture of the masses using Amazigh or dialectal Arabic is but an expression of superstition and charlatanism,

and that the *âlim* shouldn't demean himself to focus his attention on an object that is so unworthy. Interest in local culture is therefore undeniably an originality of the *âlim* M. Mokhtar Soussi compared to the general tendency of an era dominated by traditional Arab-Muslim thought. In the light of the method used in collecting and presenting the data, we can claim that his approach to the culture experienced by the peasant masses in Souss is similar to the ethnographic and ethnolinguistic approach. Nonetheless, asserting M. Mokhtar Soussi's dedication to the language and culture of his homeland should not lead to the serious fallacy of treating him as a historical pioneer of the current Amazigh cultural movement. This *âlim* is above all convinced of the superiority of the Arabic language and culture, the language *chosen by God to reveal the Qur'an* and also the culture of *adab* (literature) par excellence. This creed constitutes a constant trend in the thought of M. Mokhtar Soussi as it was the case in pre-colonial Morocco and as it is still largely prevailing in the mind of today's intellectual elite (See Laroui, 1977).

Sufism, Salafism, and Politics

The second level of pertinent investigation of M. Mokhtar Soussi's academic career relates to the management modes of the constitutive elements of his thought and his action, namely Sufism, Salafism and politics. He acquired Sufism from his initial education in his father's *zawiya*, the *zawiya darqawiya.* Salafism and political commitment, which used to go hand in hand at that time, were the fruit of his awakening that emerged in Marrakesh, Fes and Rabat as he was in contact with reformist scholars, especially Abū Shuâyb Al-Dukkāli and Al-ârabī Al-Âlawi, and his fellow students who were young promoters of the national movement, including Âllāl Al-Fāsī, Balafrej, Bennani, Bargach, etc. At certain moments of his life, especially in crisis periods such as the break with his elder brother, loneliness in Marrakesh and Fes, the exile in Ilgh, the imprisonment at Aghbalu n'Kerdus, competition with other leaders of the national movement, etc., M. Mokhtar Soussi adopted a new way of life and thought inherited from his education in the Darqawiya Confraternity:

temperance in clothing and food, humbleness of thought, on the verge of fatalism. His leitmotiv then was: *"Mokhtar is but a son of the zawiya, Mokhtar is but a poor sinner".*

M. Mokhtar Soussi's adherence to confraternity movement has often prompted criticism of his peers, especially among the emerging urban elite. Embracing modernity, they look with a suspicious eye to *this chleuḫ coming from the underdeveloped Souss.* The confrerism is associated in the minds of this intelligentsia with regression, charlatanism and political division, especially that some *zawiya* were then manipulated by the colonial authorities. M. Mokhtar Soussi took hold of the education he received among the Sufis of his own *zawiya*; he kept throughout his socio-cultural experience the values of humbleness, integrity, simplicity and high-mindedness which characterize the Sufis. Sufism is for M. Mokhtar Soussi *the cure of souls*, he also believed in miracles performed by Sufis (*karāmāt*) and in magic (*al-siḫr*). He responded to the detractors of Sufism with a criticism to the Moroccans who adopt the Western lifestyle, especially its values, to those who give up their religion and its teachings, and to those who substitute French language and culture for Arabic language and culture. It is a barely veiled criticism addressed to the young urban people he rubbed shoulder with in Fez and especially to the young leaders of the national movement with whom he lived in the penitentiaries of Tinjdad and Aghbalu n'Kerdus, who forgot to perform their prayers, took liberties with the liturgy and sometimes behaved in an excessive modernist way. But the *Sufi* in him generally gave way to the *Salafist*. That is how, upon his settlement in Marrakesh and especially in Fes, M. Mokhtar Soussi discovered the new Salafist teachings and the intellectual seduction of open thought onto modernity while being anchored in tradition. This innovative movement in the Arab-Muslim thought constantly marked his intellect. Indeed, to reform the Muslim community by referring exclusively to the Quranic text and to the *sunna* taking the righteous forefathers (*salaf* al-*ṣāliḫ)* as a model, modernize the national economy by adopting the novel sciences and techniques, and finally to reform the socio-political organization of the community, all this

undertaken in a strict compliance with the precepts of Islam and maintenance of Arabic. These represent so many ideals falling within the scope of an intellectual and existential approach which respects the faith of the *Sufi*, satisfies the spirit of the *âlim* and is consistent with the convictions of the politician.

Returning from his education journey, which went from Marrakesh to Fes and Rabat, where he said to have acquired the right *salafi truth*, M. Mokhtar Soussi turned the *zawiya darqawiya* of Bab Doukkala in Marrakesh into a private school following the model of the schools founded by the nationalists to thwart the francophone schools considered as "colonial culture dispensers". The national movement launched the political watchword for the creation of private schools devoted to the teaching of Arabic and religious sciences. M. Mokhtar Soussi participated in the creation of such schools in Marrakesh, Ben Guerir, Draâ, Telwat, Taliwin, and in Mesfiwa, etc. Could that be considered an indication of a break with the Sufi confreric spirit conveyed by the traditional teaching provided in the Medersa? It was certainly a new option to *fight against ignorance* for the purpose of liberating the country from the colonial rule by assuring the awakening of minds of the younger generations within the framework of an *authentic* Arab-Islamic modern-day education. M. Mokhtar Soussi was therefore a militant with more cultural than political inclinations, who insightfully perceived the importance of education and training for a society affected by illiteracy at a crucial period in its history.

The relationship that M. Mokhtar Soussi entertained with politicking was not always marked by serenity. For many of his companions, M. Mokhtar Soussi was a nationalist Sufi, nothing more. He, probably at his moments of disappointment, hismselt began to doubt his political competences. He once wrote: *"If Mokhtar's determination was solid enough, he would have become a political leader acknowledged by everyone in Morocco, but Mokhtar was not born to be a political leader"* (*Al-IIghiyāt, 1, p.29)*. He also wrote elsewhere that he was cut out for politics like some of his fellow detainees in Aghbalu n'Kerdus. He went unnoticed as he opted for clandestinity. His spontaneous modesty helped him; he placed himself in the back seat,

behind the scenes, as he wrote: "*I deliberately avoid getting involved in an area that is not mine*". He, who trained so many leaders of the national government in Fes and Marrakesh, has had a hard time competing with the other more experienced leaders, especially the laborious ones, who tended to minimize his role in the national movement. He stated again: "*I was, in a way, a fqih in the [political] Party and not one of its leaders".* He even lowered himself to the rank of a second category militant: *"Among politicians, I am but a soldier who executes orders, a follower",* he wrote *in Muâtaqal* Al-ṣaḫrᾱ'.

Let us relate an anecdote that reflects M. Mokhtar Soussi's way of thinking. In Marrakech, upon his return from exile in Aghbalu n'Kerdus, a group of young militants visited him and offered him a bunch of flowers, as is usually done for the political leaders, the *Zaîms*. He wrote in a tone of connivance: "*When I saw these students, I had a smile on the face, that I quickly stifled [...] I was playing the role the circumstances dictated on me [...] The poor man Mokhtar, the humble fqih, the sinner, he who neither aspires to leadership nor does he chase glory; does he deserve getting bunches of flowers*?!" (*Al-Ilghiyᾱt*, 3, p.215). The judgment of the *Zaîm* Âllâl Al-Fâsî, which degrades M. Mokhtar Soussi to the rank of *faqîh* of Al*-jurrûmiya*, *Al-jurrûmiya* is a grammar book in which the *ûlamᾱ* of Souss were the specialists. This must have hurt Mokhtar Soussi in his own self-esteem. Reacting to this unflattering appreciation, M. Mokhtar Soussi wrote undoubtedly with bitterness:

> *"There is the Gabon prisoner, who is dear to us (Âllᾱl Al Fâsī), and his brothers among the leaders of the party; these are the ones who deserve consideration and honors, because they are the leaders of the resistance, not Al-Mokhtar, who is the man of the Al-jurrumiya". (Idem, Al-ilghiyât, 3, p.20).*

M. Mokhtar Soussi seemed also to have sized up politics during his time of incarceration in Tinjdad, while he was living side by side for two years with the political elite of the national movement. The description he gave of the different groups of fellows was meant to be neutral and affectionate; it reflected the attitude of the patriarchal benevolent *Sufi faqîh* placing himself above the melee. He was, however, very sensitive to the cacophony voiced by his fellow prisoners, who differed in terms of

political sensitivities, geographic and socio-cultural origins, education, and doctrinal beliefs. He referred so subtly to these diverse groups as “Republics”. The group that impressed him most in terms of his political project is “the Republic” of Mehdi Ben Barka. M. Mokhtar Soussi undoubtedly had a good political flair.

Some explain M. Mokhtar Soussi's recalcitrant attitude towards politicking as a failure as a politician, an incapacity to impose himself in the national movement’s chessboard, and an incapacity to produce a political alternative within the movement. Confronted with this failure, M. Mokhtar Soussi reportedly “took refuge” in the scientific production devoted exclusively to his native region (See Abu Al-Âzm, Agadir Symposium, 1984.) This judgment is very similar to the sweeping judgment who disregards M. Mokhtar Soussi's contribution to the edification of the national movement and who, paradoxically, turned intellectual work into unpleasant hard work and an idle occupation of a failed politicians. Moreover, isn’t the accession to the ministerial function in the minds of the political class eager for participation in itself a sign of political success? From this perspective, the Minister, M. Mokhtar Soussi, whatever said about his modesty, had taken a great revenge on his political detractors.

Lucidity and Blindness Combined

Having understood that his country was going to change fundamentally with the introduction of the colonial mode of production and its effects on the political, economic, social and cultural levels, M. Mokhtar Soussi, - an Amazigh, traditional intellectual of Arabic language and culture- was confronted with a fundamental question: how to survive in such a system with respect to the material and symbolic sides? His position is all the more delicate given that our character bears a set of idiosyncratic traits that place him in an unfavorable position in the struggle against his opponents on the one hand to the traditional literates, and to the modern elite on the other hand. Amazigh identity had disfavored him because it

carries an intrinsic difference, the Sufism had discredited him as it is associated with regression in the minds of the modernists, and rurality disadvantaged him in the eyes of the urban aristocracy. The latter had been holding the material and symbolic power for a long time, namely including the representatives of families glorified by their Andalusian descent, namely Fasi, Rbaṭi, Slawi and Teṭwani, and from the commercial and real estate bourgeoisie opened on the Western modernity since at least XIXth century, and thus benefiting from a high quality socio-cultural environment.

How could M. Mokhtar Soussi sustain competition with them? Being endowed with great intelligence and an extraordinary aptitude for hard work, he was able to accumulate significant symbolic capital, that is to say the mastery of the Arabic language and its use in the production of modern literature (*adab*). In other words, the price of socio-cultural success has been the proclamation of his unconditional commitment to Arabity and Islam. Now, again, one would question the relevance of such a discourse: connivance, disguise or dissimulation? If we can follow Bourdieu (ibid.) and postulate that the reflection of the scholar on his own practices involves *combined lucidities and blindness*, we will then admit that in M. Mokhtar Soussi's proclamation, there is a discursive strategy whose complexity is commensurate with his singular socio-cultural background. This uniqueness is in fact double edged. It serves the individual in his "personal project", at the turning point of his life, but it fails him in the long term because he had no group or societal political project allowing his ideological leadership to be perennial. The singularity of this trend is, however, today acknowledged by a whole current of political reformism based on religion, a current that brings plebeian elites into power; it is also invoked by another movement which advocates the modernization of the Amazigh culture through the appropriation of new standards.

Essay 9
Cultural Identity Fabric Process

In tribute to
Mohamed Chafik (1926-)

Statement of the Problem

The Amazigh people (*Imazighen*) have been the object of many studies which deal with prehistory, history, language, literature and arts (See bibliography in Bougchiche, 1997). These studies point out that the indigenous population of North Africa is composed of communities which speak Amazigh in the form of dialects. The issue of the origin of the Amazigh people in the northern and sub-Saharan regions of Africa is controversial. The most recent researches based on genetic analyzes reveal a certain similarity between the Amazigh and the Iberians, but that does not allow us to deduce that the origin of the former ones is European, because the interpenetrations between the populations of the two banks of the Mediterranean were attested at least from the protohistory. This entails that: "From a genetic point of view, we can say that Africa starts from the Pyrenees "(See Arnaiz-Villena et al., 2002). During the Neolithic age, the Amazigh made bronze tools and introduced the horse-drawn chariot into the Sahara desert (the famous Libyan Garamantes horsemen). North African antiquity has left us important vestiges, including engravings named "Libyco-Amazigh" discovered in many regions of North Africa (See. Camps 1980, Hachid 2000). These engravings prove that the Amazigh people were in the Libyan-Punic alphabet during the rule of the Amazigh kings and princes (referred to as *igeldan*, *agellid* (sing.)); among the most notorious figures were Massinissa, Micipsa, Jugurtha, Juba I, Juba

II, Tacfarinas, and the Queen Tinhinan, and Kahina, who faced the foreign occupiers (See Benabou, 1976). Following the successive conquests that the region underwent, the Phoenician and the Roman conquests more particularly, the Amazigh language and culture had to gradually bend to the law imposed by the conquerors, and ended up being marginalized. The Roman era witnessed the emergence of a Latinized Amazigh *intelligentsia*; for example, Fronton was the private tutor of the Emperor Marcus Aurelius, and Apuleius was a leading figure of the culture, to whom we presumably owe the first novel of universal literature, *The Golden Ass*. The Amazigh elite were also outstanding in spiritual culture: St. Cyprian, St. Augustine and St. Donatus were the best examples of the Amazigh Christian elite.

The great Maghrebian historian Ibn Khaldun states in his work (The History of the Amazighs ([1378] 1852, Vol.1, p. 199), concerning the inhabitants of this country: "The Amazigh people have always been a powerful, fearsome, brave and numerous people; a true people just like so many others in the world, such as the Arabs, the Persians, the Greeks and the Romans". In fact, the dynasties of the *Aguellid* before, during and after the Roman occupation, as well as the Amazigh Muslim dynasties of the Almoravids (11th-12th centuries), Almohads (12th-13th centuries), the Merinids (12th-15th centuries) and Wattassids (late 15th-16th centuries) reveal that North Africa was ruled by dynasties that have marked its history and landscape, as attested by the many tangible and symbolic vestiges left by these dynasties. With respect to religion, the Amazigh people practiced animism, Judaism and Christianity in the Antiquity. The Muslim conquest lasted many decades during the seventh century. Islam then imposed itself on the people who gradually abandoned the previous religious practices, while adopting different Muslim schools including *Sunnism*, *Shiîsm* and *Kharejism*. At the end of the 20th century, the revival of the Amazigh language and culture was taken up by a social movement in the Maghreb countries, in Morocco, Algeria, Libya and the Sahel countries with the Twaregs. The revival of Amazigh identity is a political and cultural reality, reflecting an identity awakening of the Amazigh people

claiming recognition of their language and culture. This awakening occurs in a context marked by the evolution of Maghreb societies on the political, social, economic and cultural levels, an evolution that induces a process of global change which has repercussions on the social and cultural life of Amazigh speakers. This new situation emerges both inside the Maghreb countries as well as outside these countries (See Chaker, 1989; Boukous, 2012).

Geographical space in which the Amazigh language is currently in use covers nearly five million square kilometers as the entire domain. The communities for whom Amazigh is the first language are, however, scattered over different nation-states, namely Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Mauritania, northern Senegal, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. In addition to these states, others should be added, mainly France, Holland, Belgium, Germany, Spain and Italy where the Amazigh-speaking diaspora lives. There are no accurate statistics on the number of Amazigh speakers; they are likely to exceed 30 million people overall. Communities are usually located in rural areas, mountainous and desert regions, and in large cities as a result of domestic and external migration.

Amazigh Language, Unity and Diversity

The Amazigh language is related to Egyptian, Libyan, Cushitic and Hausa languages. These languages are named Hamitic and they constitute with the Semitic languages the Hamito-Semitic group, which in turn belongs to the Afro-Asian family. Amazigh is spoken by communities scattered across a vast area stretching from the Siwa oasis in Egypt to the Atlantic Ocean, and from the Mediterranean to southern Niger, and historically to the Canary Islands. The Amazigh speaking population consists of more or less compact or dense speech communities; the main dialectal areas from West to the East are Zenets in the Rif, Tamazight in the Atlas,Tashelḥit in the southwest in Morocco; Kabyle, Shawi and Mozabit in Algeria; Zenet in Tunisia, Libya and Siwa, and finally Tamasheq in central Sahara. These dialect areas contain a variety of dialects (See

Basset, 1952). Amazigh coexists in this area with Arabic in the north, and with Hausa and Songhai in the south.

Amazigh represents the only living language of the Libyco-Berber branch of the family named Hamitic (or Shamitic). Its cousins, the Libyan of North Africa and the Guanche in the Canary Islands, have become extinct centuries ago. The connection with Semitic (Hebrew, Arabic, etc.), in the context of what is named the "Hamito-Semitic" family, remains a plausible hypothesis but which requires further investigation at the level of the fundamental structures of the different languages that constitute this family. Considering the situation within this family, the observer can only be astonished by the longevity of the Amazigh language if one thinks of the fate of more powerful languages, such as the ancient Egyptian of Ramses, the Akkadian of Hammurabi and the Punic of Hannon. Some would consider that the secular resilience of Amazigh is due to the attachment of communities to their language and culture, and to the particular nature of their political, social and economic structures. General conditions for Amazigh preservation have, however, changed radically since the constitution of States which are heirs of the Jacobin centralizing model, States whose structure is based on centralism according to the following reductive equation: a nation = a State = a language. This same situation has led many observers of language ecology around the world to predict that Amazigh is part of the batch of candidate languages doomed to extinction in the first half of the third millennium (See UNESCO Atlas of world languages in danger). But, at this point in time, Amazigh is indeed a living language. Its vitality is based on its genetic historicity, its structural autonomy in relation to the languages with which it coexists, the variety of its sociolinguistic functions covering communication and expression of identity, and the demographic mass of its speakers as well as the loyalty of communities which assign it an important psychological and social value.

In the language market, however, Amazigh is experiencing a situation marked by precariousness; it is in fact mainly handicapped by the status assigned to it by the States both in the Maghreb and in Europe, namely the status of a minority language excluded from institutions, particularly

schools, media and administration. This status is the source of the difficulties that Amazigh faces, particularly its dispersion into heterogeneous dialects and its weakness in front of the strong languages which dominate it in an unequal competition context. The first weakness affecting Amazigh lies in its dialectalization inside the immense space which is its own and where it is realized in the form of varieties more or less close to each other. The factors which have led to this dialectalization are diverse: the institutional marginalization and the consequent non-standardization, the predominance of orality, the vernacular function, the dispersion of Amazigh speaking communities and their isolation in centralizing nation-States, underdevelopment in which the Amazigh speaking regions are kept, etc. All these factors have largely contributed to making Amazigh a set of scattered dialects whose fragmented nature impedes communication between speakers of distant dialectal areas. The differences noted between the dialects nevertheless concern mainly the phonetic and the lexical levels. However, the diversity of dialects does not undermine the underlying structure of the language, which is unified and homogeneous with respect to its basic structures. In all dialects, the basic structural elements are roots and templates; the processes of word formation, both at the nominal derivation and the verbal derivation, are common to all dialects. Tense conjugation paradigms also obey to the same processes across all dialects. So it is said that the unity of Amazigh is based on the similarities inherent to its deep structures and that the divergences which distinguish the dialects are surface manifestations.

Amazigh is usually used in a diglossic situation with other languages. It has as privileged domains home, the group and the soil which are its own; Amazigh is thus naturally excluded from the widest situations and those that are mostly marked by urbanity. Paradoxically, it is this marginality that would have hitherto ensured its maintenance. But in the current conditions characterized by the free and structured movement of people, goods, languages and cultures, Amazigh is in situation of contact and competition with more powerful languages, and thus the Amazigh speakers unexpectedly find themselves subject to intense process of

acculturation and loss of their mother tongue. The field-based studies conducted both in the Maghreb, particularly in Morocco, and in Western Europe, particularly in France, Belgium and Holland, point out that the use of Amazigh is declining with generations. In fact, the first migrant generation makes use of supplementary diglossia, especially by using its mother language, the use of a second language is only an addendum; the second generation uses complementary diglossia by using the host language more frequently than Amazigh; as for the third generation, it practices the diglossia of substitution insofar as it generally has only a passive knowledge of its mother tongue. This last stage is in fact a prelude to monolingualism in the second language, which is the Arabic dialect in the Maghreb and the language of the host society in Europe. It thus appears that the linguistic assimilation of the Amazigh people throughout history has taken place through the general process of subtractive diglossia. We can schematize this model as follows: Amazigh speakers have gradually been moving from the practice of monolingualism in their first language to "unstable diglossia" which leads to monolingualism in a second language. It should be noted that in the Maghreb the dialect which swallows up the Amazigh language is not classical or standard Arabic but rather dialectal Arabic.

Demography, Urbanization, and Assimilation

Demographic factor represents crucial key to understand the situation of Amazigh people today. Indeed, the Maghreb countries are involved in an unprecedented demographic revolution whose main characteristics are summed up in demographic dynamics which manifest in a falling population growth, a change in the structure with respect to age, the decrease in the youth component of the population and the ensuing aging tendency thereof. To these aspects, we should add an unemployment rate of about 20% of the population, a high rate of illiteracy and a progress in children schooling. The demographic transition is accompanied, as is the case everywhere, by a process of urbanization that has changed the equation completely since the 2000s. Statistical data and demographic

projections indicate that the urban population increased by 5 to 7 points between 1960 and 2000, whereas it will progress only by 3 points between 2000 and 2050. These data show that the demographic evolution takes place continuously in favor of the urban population, because of the aggravation of the rural world dependency conditions leading to rural exodus. In Algeria, according to the 2016 census, the population has attained 41 million inhabitants; the rate of the urban population is 71% compared to 31% in 1960. At the linguistic level, the rate of the Arabic speaking population is estimated at 78% and that of the Amazigh speaking population at 22%. In Morocco, according to the publication of the High Commissioner for Planning (HCP), *Le Maroc en Chiffres (2016)* [Morocco in Figures (2016)], and the results of the 2014 census, out of a total population of 35 million, the rate of the urban population is 60.3% in 2014 compared to 29% in 1960; the Arabic speaking population is estimated at 72 % and the Amazigh speaking population at 28%. The increase in the urban population can be explained, on the one hand, by the natural demographic growth and, on the other hand, by the rural exodus and the creation of new urban centers and extension of the urban perimeters of cities.

Rural exodus, which intensifies the phenomenon of unrestrained urbanization in the Maghreb since the last third of the previous century, triggers the mixing of rural populations from different Arabic and Amazigh speaking regions at the expense of the "Amazighophony". In fact, due to the degradation of the local economy, Amazigh speaking rural areas are being emptied of their active population in favor of urban outskirts. The Amazigh language has for a longtime resisted to assimilation because of its isolation into specific and naturally protected areas, namely mountains and deserts. Today, these spaces are, on the one hand less economically viable, integrated into national spaces and are so suddenly invested by Arabic language and culture and by the languages and cultures of the host countries. Since the twentieth century, the forced choice made by the active segments of the Amazigh communities to compensate for the lack of economic resources allowing the survival of the group took the form of migration which was first seasonal then permanent towards the

most important urban centers. The latter were mainly Casablanca, Rabat, Fes, Marrakesh in Morocco; Algiers, Oran, Constantine and Annaba in Algeria; Tunis, Bizerte, Gabes and Sfax in Tunisia; Tripoli, Benghazi and Misrata in Libya. In the Western European countries, emigration of the Amazigh people is a general phenomenon of the Maghreb, and it results mainly from the crisis of the rural economy, and mainly from precariousness and poverty. Recall that emigration of the Amazigh speaking population also affected the countries of Western Europe, and it has developed considerably during the decades of 1950s, 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. It involved more particularly the Kabyle people concentrated in France, the *Shluḥ* people in France and in Belgium, and the Rifians in Spain, Belgium, Holland and Germany.

The forced choice of emigration constitutes a marked form of economic exile; it also has social and cultural consequences. In fact, it threatens the survival of the Amazigh language and culture which find themselves within the migratory environment in competition with other stronger languages and cultures and which would lead to the assimilation of the Amazigh. The phenomenon of migration has also contributed to the imbalance in the demographic constituency in the Maghreb countries at the expense of the rural population. In fact, the demographic transition in the Maghreb is fast; it has many economic, social, cultural and linguistic aspects. Its first manifestation is an expending urbanization whose causes and effects are varied. With respect to external migration, it has the same negative effects on language and culture because it contributes just as strongly as the rural exodus to the loss of the Amazigh language. The rural exodus and migration create a situation of contact between Amazigh speaking communities and the host communities. The Amazigh speakers are thus involved in communication situations which require them to use languages other than their first tongue. In the Maghreb, they are led to practice less multilingualism than polyglossia. In fact, multilingualism presupposes a good command of the first and the second languages as well as their use in indifferent contexts; whereas diglossia corresponds to the situation in which the speakers use Amazigh with family members,

Dialectal Arabic with the non-Amazigh speakers, Classical Arabic for religious purposes and French at work, at least for those who work in the modern sector. In the case of the diaspora, they use their mother tongue inside the family and the community, and make use of the language of the hosting society in the social and professional transactions. This situation entails that the share of Amazigh in the language repertoire of the Amazigh speaking emigrants is, on the whole, minimal.

By placing the native urban dwellers and neo-city dwellers in a contact situation, urbanization creates favorable conditions for interaction between languages. This interaction can generate phonic and morphosyntactic interferences, lexical borrowing, as well as syntactic and semantic calquing between the languages in contact. Urbanization can also expand or, conversely, reduce the functions and domains of use of the first language, as it can also, in the medium-term, shift its position from the status of a mother tongue and first language, to that of a second language or even to that of a subsidiary language, through the various stages of transitional bilingualism. The negative effects of urbanization can be dramatic on vulnerable languages in a hierarchical system of languages and cultures through the operation of the mechanisms of the symbolic goods market. These create quantitative dominance in favor of the use of dialectal Arabic, whose mass of speakers is predominant at the national level. This grants the variety with a dominant transactional function including in the cultural field, being the main medium of production and expression of the national culture. In addition, there is the symbolic dominance of Standard Arabic, which assumes the function of the referential language, the official language, the liturgical language, and the medium of scholarly culture. In the context of such a fierce competition, Amazigh remains a language that occupies a subordinate social position. In Amazigh speaking areas, the Amazigh dialects of cities and urban centers lose ground continuously in favor of the neighboring dialectal Arabic. Even in the traditionally Amazigh speaking cities, such as Agadir, Nador, Errashidia in Morocco; Algiers, Bejaïa, Batna and Ghardaya in Algeria, the use of Amazigh tends to decline and the degree of

acquisition of Amazigh as a mother tongue decreases for the portion of younger generation. The observation of the linguistic behavior along with the analysis of the young speaker's performance allows us to fully realize the process of substitution of colloquial Arabic for Amazigh. This process begins at the stage in which the speaker is monolingual in his mother tongue and ends at a point where the speaker becomes an Arabic monolingual speaker. The substitution of the Arabic dialect for Amazigh is the outcome of the effect of the social determinism practiced by the majority group, but this process can be slowed down or curbed by an opposite action of auto-determination from the minor group. The success of this action of resistance to language substitution is based on working out a strategy for the revitalization of Amazigh, along with its implementation in educational, media and cultural domains. Conditions for success can be reduced to the intergenerational transmission of the mother tongue, the loyalty of the community to its language and culture and the commitment of the State to protect and promote Amazigh through its recognition and institutionalization.

Amazigh Today: The Quest for Identity

Amazigh question issue is far from being a fortuitous matter, and even much less "a false problem" for the Maghreb countries. It is a reality which has multiple dimensions, especially political, economic, social, cultural and linguistic one. Amazighity detains a number of anthropological properties which characterize its culture, either regarding its symbolic dimensions (beliefs, representations, worldview), its intangible aspects (literature, songs, collective dance), or in its material dimension (architecture, jewelry, carpets, wood crafting, pottery, etc.). These properties are expressed through patterns and meanings, some of which are universal and some specific. This is to say that "Amazighity" contributes to the anthropological heritage of humanity. The contemporary Maghreb exhibits a polyphonic cultural profile. Indeed, the Moroccan culture tends to be constructed as a national culture composed of constituents each of which having a production site, an aesthetic form

and a cultural substance which characterize it. It includes the classical diptych: urban culture and rural culture; put in simple terms, the first is represented by the culture of Arabic expression and the second by the culture of Amazigh expression. Amazigh culture shapes the collective unconscious mind of the Moroccan being and constitutes the foundation of the underlying cultural personality of the country. It is manifestly or implicitly present in each individual, in his language and in his emotional and social behavior. It is omnipresent in the Moroccan space through toponymy and in the collective imagination through oral tradition. It thus constitutes a component of *the culture of the people* by symbolically expressing the living conditions of the rural masses and their mental representation of the world. The manifest or latent presence of this culture in the mind and behavior is one of the characteristics of Moroccan specificity, the mark that distinguishes Amazighity from other identities beyond the resemblances, similarities, and convergence. However, the Amazigh culture is in a situation, which is probably unprecedented in its history, and which makes it face considerable challenges and stakes. These challenges and stakes are related to the context characterized by the profound changes that are taking place in the Moroccan society, a context marked by the total dependence on rural society and by successive degradation of its cultural heritage and its aesthetics due to the deterioration of the ecological conditions which have favored the production of the outstanding objects of the Amazigh culture areas of architecture, carpets, jewelry, oral tradition and different rites attesting the vitality of this culture. However, the emergence of modern time identity awareness, which is expressed by attachment to language and culture, is a sign of profound willingness for resilience to obsolescence and assimilation, and a sign of social expectations for the revitalization of "Amazighity".

The issue of cultural and linguistic diversity is part of a global context marked by a climate of concern about the future of the world's cultures and societies. The explanatory factors for this atmosphere are essentially: the tendency to reduce the world-wide cultural and linguistic diversity,

the stigmatization of cultural and linguistic plurality by the prevailing ideologies and policies, and the disruption in the community and intercommunity equilibrium caused by globalization. The mobilization of the various foundations of the Amazigh identity exposed so far assures a legitimacy that has its source in the past, in cultural reality and in the international law. The historicity argument of the Amazigh fact constitutes the reminder of *a historical truth* having a function of a parade in the discourse which considers the Amazigh cause an illicit innovation inherited from colonialism. The Amazigh demand is also based on an anthropological legitimacy which refutes the idea that the Amazigh cultural identity is mobilized by the supporters of communitarianism. Finally, the approach to the Amazigh language issue in terms of human rights has an international normative background which assures it ample justification to be credible in the fields of education, culture, media and public administration.

A generalized homogenization process shapes the Amazigh cultural field in the context of the globalization of economic and cultural exchanges. The work of undermining, and eroding, heterogeneity and difference induced by this process manifests itself on a universal scale; it sounds particularly imperious within indigenous linguistic communities undermined by the centralizing options of Nation-States and within immigrant or isolated minority communities in an environment where their language and culture are marginalized. However, voices are raised to safeguard the diversity of the globe ecosystem, space areas of protest against the dominant cultural order are created, communities rebel in the name of democracy against forced assimilation, and poles of resistance are being organized against the proliferation of negative effects of wild liberalism. In this context, there are two conflicting tendencies on the ideological scene for the purpose of managing the Amazigh issue. The first one relies on historical and legal legitimacy and aspires to the official recognition of Amazighity as a constitutive dimension of national identity, while the second one is based on the Arab-Islamist ideology, and considers

that Amazighism ("Berberism") is potentially dangerous both for the cohesion of the nation-state and for Islam as a religion of the State.

On the political side, the central government has exercised tight control over the Amazigh speaking regions patrolled by the security forces, where freedom of movement was subject to severe restrictions. In fact, Amazigh speaking regions have traditionally been regarded as hubs of opposition to central government, mainly Kabylia, Rif and Souss regions. In the current political situation, and in parallel to organizations traditionally regarded as "berberists" (i.e. the Socialist Forces Front, the Rally for Culture and Democracy in Algeria, and The Popular Movement in Morocco), the "Berberist cultural movement", which has been trying to get hold of its share in the ideological arena for some time, attempts to incorporate itself into a political movement to carry through the cultural, linguistic and social demands of the Amazigh speaking segment of the population. The different forms of organization of â*ruch* Movement and civil society are animated by different inspirations, such as federalism, regionalism, communautarianism, the commune spirit, as well as different modes of organization, namely national committees, coordinating committees, local committees, etc. All these organization forms claim to roughly adopt a self-management model of human, material and symbolic resources of the Amazigh regions. This model is considered as a historical legacy in the sense that it was prevailing in the *Berberia* (*Bilād al-Barbar)* until its collapse with the advent of the individual power system brought by the Ottoman authorities in Algeria and by the Makhzenian rule in Morocco. This was followed by the destruction of its political, economic and social foundations by the colonial conquest and its annihilation by the integration of these regions into the bosom of the Nation-states which are heirs or beneficiaries of the Jacobin colonial model. The patterns upon which this movement is based move from the forum practicing lobbying, entryism or infiltration in the political arena to the constitution of an autonomous political organization calling, on the one hand, for the recognition of Amazigh as an official language, the organization of the country into a confederation ensuring wider autonomy for the regions

and, on the other hand, for the reform of the State on the basis of secularism and separation of powers. There is also the internationalization of the Amazigh cause through the establishment of specific organizations such as the "World Amazigh Congress", which searches to federate the different national, political and associative tendencies of the Amazigh world. In the framework of the United Nations program on the International Decade for the World's Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (1995-2004), some international organizations are solicited, including the Commission on Indigenous Peoples, the Commission for Indigenous Peoples of the International Labor Office, the International Center for Human Rights and Democratic Development. The aim of this approach is to raise the awareness of the international community to the linguistic and cultural rights of Amazigh-speaking communities as a full and integral component of human rights. At the economic level, the Amazigh speaking regions are among the poorest in the Maghreb. The agricultural resources are marked by precariousness manifested by endemic drought, infertility of the soil, narrowness and fragmentation of land ownership. The imbalance between the scarcity of economic resources and overpopulation has for long led the active forces of these regions to exodus and to emigration. In Morocco, for example, the economic dependence of the Amazigh people is a striking fact so much so that the Amazigh country was referred to as "the unusable Morocco"; even the lands of the plain of Souss which are rich in agricultural resources are monopolized by administrative and military bureaucracy. Nowadays, the situation has got worse. As a matter of fact, the crisis in national economies and the austere restrictions on migration create an unprecedented social slump, which manifests mostly in the unemployment of young people. It is in this way that the Amazigh-speaking youth, particularly those affected by unemployment, has become the spearhead of the Amazigh cultural movement; a fact which gives a social dimension to the Berberist claims. At the cultural level, the Amazighity discourse is based on a set of notions that form a conceptual framework for Amazighity as an ideological construction. In this construction the notions of the Amazigh people, the indigenous people, the Amazigh nation, *Berberia* (nowadays referred to as

Tamazgha) occupy a central position as supports of the collective identity. These notions connote a voluntarist conception of the unity of Amazighity, conceived as a transnational fact that concerns the Amazigh-speaking community of both the Maghreb and that of the diaspora. The Amazigh Nation thus acquires, just like any other nation, the sense of an imagined community based on the homogeneity of the people, of the political system and of the territory. This nation, however, seems in fact so deterritorialized and polycentric to rest on a homogeneous presupposition. This emanates from an affirmed voluntarist approach that conceals the combined effects of national political contingencies and those of local linguistic and cultural realities. It thus appears that the demands of the "Berberist movement" are at the same time political, cultural, educational and socio-economic. These can be summarized as the constitutionalization of the language, the adoption of a linguistic and cultural policy based on democracy and diversity, the recognition of linguistic and cultural rights, the revalorization of the Amazigh component of the national identity, the integration of the language and culture in the educational system. This is in addition to their use in the public institutions and the media, sustainable development at a regional level, and an equitable redistribution of wealth between regions.

Steady actions have been undertaken for the revalorization of language and culture in the market of symbolic goods. The promotion of language and culture is carried out within the framework of associative or individual initiatives by creative authors and researchers, in the absence of effective institutional support. The measures adopted for the revitalization of the Amazigh language and culture take four forms: linguistic standardization, fundamental research, cultural production, and action of the civil society. It is however clear that these tasks go far beyond the level of efforts made in terms of creation and research and objectively surpass the level of associative cultural action. This explains that, apart from a few timid breakthroughs in the area of civil society activism, the strategies for the preservation and promotion of the endogenous Amazigh language and culture remain highly symbolic

because, on the one hand, there is no institution to assume the responsibility of carrying out the fixed objectives and, on the other hand, it is difficult to conceive of the possibility of a real advance in the absence of a genuine and effective political will.

Amazigh is undoubtedly confronted with forces that tend to maintain the *status quo*, forces that aim to confine it to the status of a minor language and culture. As part of this approach, which denies even the legitimacy of the Amazigh cause, this language and culture are considered as a historical handicap, a hindrance to the insertion of the Amazigh community into the Arab world or the integration of immigrant communities in European societies. Also "Berberism" is regarded as a matter of attachment to the past if not tribalism and as a resurgence of the *siba*, "Berber anarchy", or a hindrance to assimilation. The Arab-Muslim ideology underlying this discourse was that of the elite of the national liberation movements in the Maghreb. After the independence, it became the indisputable *doxa* and the intangible credo which nourished for decades the "Amazighophobia" of the Arabist and Islamist elites, all tendencies combined. These intend to impose the unicist conception of national identity by means of the different ideological, political and administrative apparatuses they monopolize.

Amazigh Question Stakes

The regulation of the process of the transition from etiolation to the revitalization of minor languages cannot be efficient without a political management based on constitutional recognition and institutional implementation. Thus, the historical legitimacy, the official recognition, which concern the management of the status of the Amazigh language and culture, are supposed to be consolidated by institutional relays, particularly in education, media, justice and in the framework of central and territorial government. Accordingly, the effectiveness of the recognition is conditioned by its implementation in public policies, in the monitoring and evaluation of implementation measures taken through

appropriate instruments and mechanisms. These are both the challenges and stakes of promoting Amazighity in the Maghreb.

Historical Legitimacy

The historical dimension is important in the constitution of Amazigh identity. This explains why the historical argument, namely the precedence of the Amazigh population in the North African region, is often used in advocacy for legitimating Amazighity. Yet, the history of the Amazigh people is still to be written because, in general, it is affected by tendentious and ideological readings, which have led some historians activists of the Amazigh cause to present other readings of the history which try to establish the Amazigh autochthony, to illuminate the conditions of Roman, Arab-Muslim and European penetration in the region, and to highlight the historical depth of Amazighity and the resistance of aboriginal peoples (See. Chafik, 2000, Sadqi-Azaykou, 2002).

The Identity Issue

The discourse on Amazighity, just like other discourses structuring the ideological arena, is confronted with the following major problems: the integration of Amazigh identity into a societal project based on equity and modernity, the revolving of the language and culture around other components of the national identity, the conditions for the durability of the language and culture ensuring their development in the market of symbolic goods. Linguistic and cultural diversity is a universal phenomenon; this situation has become factual evidence today. In fact, all human communities, even those with a long history of political, linguistic and cultural centralism, accommodate diversity if not of languages at least of regional dialects and local vernaculars. The same is true for cultures, because the differences attested in cultural expressions (literature, music, arts, architecture, etc.) are a reflection of facts related physical, political, social, economic, region-specific, and local-specific environment.

The issue of identity in the Maghreb is generally related to the debate on linguistic and cultural diversity in the context of the polarities represented by "Arabization", "Francophony" and "Amazighity". The acuity characterizing this debate is to a certain extent explained by the changes in the world, in both central and peripheral entities combined, and which place it at a historical turning point urging it to make decisive political and socio-cultural choices for its future, choices that necessarily have implications on cultural identity. In general terms, the question of identity is conceived of according to two perspectives, a perspective adhering to the essentialist conception of a "pure", closed and confrontational identity, and a vision anchored in the conception of "a hybrid identity", which is pluralistic and under construction. Anchored in this general context, the question of the Amazigh language and culture highlights clearly the paradox between the plenitude of the Amazigh fact, its primacy in the sociolinguistic and cultural reality, and the vacuity in the area of legislation; that is to say the legal vacuum with regard to its political management. The main aspects of the question have to do with the fundamentals and determiners that legitimize Amazighity, alternative approaches expressing at the discourse level the conflict of identity polarities, and the legal framework of language and cultural planning policies.

Amazigh Advocacies

Amazighity is not only a historical, anthropological and legal fact, it is also a socio-political reality of the Maghreb today, a fact that is expressed through the demands of an emerging social movement that the State has to take into account for an equitable management of contradictions which manifest in society. Following the mobilization of the "Berberist movement" during the *Berber Spring* in the 1980s, and as a political offer, the Algerian government created in 1995 the High Commission for Amazighity, (HCA), as an institution dedicated to enhance the teaching of Amazigh and its integration in the media; in 2016, a constitutional

amendment established Tamazight as a national and official language. In Morocco, the Amazigh movement began to emerge at the end of the 1960s; it has since consolidated around *the Agadir Charter* (August 1991), and later around *the manifesto for the official recognition of the Amazigh identity of Morocco* (March 2000). The demands formulated then were at the origin of King Hassan the Second speech in 1994, which announced the teaching of "Amazigh dialects" and allowed the creation of a television news bulletin. Later on, in 2001, King Mohammed VI announced, in the Throne Speech of July 30 and in the speech of Ajdir of October 17, the recognition of Amazigh culture as an integral component of the Moroccan culture, and the creation of the Royal Institute of the Amazigh Culture (so-called *IRCAM*), the institution in charge of the promotion of Amazigh. The culmination of this process is illustrated by the 2011 Constitution, which recognizes Amazigh as the official language along with Arabic. The recognition of Amazigh in Algeria and Morocco was welcomed in various ways. Some assume it as an achievement that should be taken full advantage of to carry out actions in the field of research so as to revitalize the language and culture. In the field of education, this achievement can promote the teaching of Amazigh, and in the sector of the news, it will allow the integration of Amazigh in the media. Others, on the other hand, consider it to be a maneuver for the recovery of power; they organize themselves into political activist associations. In any case, the creation of HCA and IRCAM can act as a lever for the empowerment of the Amazigh language and culture and for their radiance. The effectiveness of their political vocation is dependent on negotiation between the political power and the representatives of the Amazigh movement. In this context, the teaching of the Amazigh language and culture was launched at the primary school level, and university centers were created in Tizi Ouzou and Bejaia in Algeria, and Amazigh studies programs were established in some Moroccan universities.

Revitalization of the Language

The issue of the status of the Amazigh language and culture has been a current issue in Morocco and Algeria for more than a half century now. It has fundamentally been addressed in political terms; the empowerment concerns the legitimacy of Amazigh to benefit from the status of an official language. The revitalization of the language and the upgrading of culture are priority operations in the process of promoting Amazigh. They aim at empowering Amazigh through managing its structures to fully function as an official language. In parallel to the amendment of the Amazigh status, corpus planning also came to standardize the phonic, morphological and lexical structures of the language with the purpose of making Amazigh a standard language. This task is entrusted mainly to the High Commission for Amazighity (HCA) in Algeria and to the Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture (IRCAM) in Morocco. By virtue of the prerogatives attributed to these institutions, research teams are working on the progressive standardization of the language. The methodology adopted is the one that is applicable in the area of *language planning*. With respect to the approach being used, it draws on the best practices adopted at the international level. The results reached so far relate to the establishment of language structures with regard to pronunciation, tense system, general vocabulary, specialized terminology, syntax and spelling on the basis of dialectal data; the preparation of curricula and training material adequate for teaching; contributing to the basic and continuous training of teachers and educational supervisors and finally, in the case of Morocco, the codification of the Tifinagh script and the development of the digital keypad and the Tifinagh fonts. In addition, both IRCAM and HCA have produced a number of reference works, including grammar and specialized lexicon books. The installation of the standard language is progressively taking place in the fields of education (primary and university levels), in the media (radio and TV), in cultural production (written literature, theater, cinema) and in social practices especially in the civil society community. It is needless to mention that the standardization of Amazigh is a progressive process that requires the

continuous development of the language so as to meet the institutional needs and expectations of society and users. In Western European countries which host Amazigh speaking communities, Amazigh is an object of research on grammar, vocabulary and literature. A certain position is also granted to Amazigh in the university education in all of France (INALCO), Holland (Leiden), Spain (Cadiz), and Italy (Naples), etc. In secondary education, Amazigh is tolerated in the case of the timorous program of what we call "the teaching of languages and cultures of origin (ELCO, the French acronym of Enseignement des langues et des cultures d'origine)." In France, where the largest Amazigh speaking community in Europe lives, Amazigh is recognized as "language of France", but without being fully integrated in secondary school education, at the exception of an optional Amazigh subject at the baccalaureate examination.

Consideration of the preceding questions is obviously not the exclusive responsibility of the Amazigh movement; they have to do with a rather global issue which falls within the scope of national responsibility. This is what explains why various forces try to apprehend it each in its own way, after a long period of ignorance, suspicion or expectancy. We can distinguish approximately four approaches that propose themselves as contenders for taking charge of the Amazigh cause in its different dimensions; these approaches oscillate between the cultural, the political, the national and the international.

Which Perspective?

Being the indigenous people of the Maghreb, Amazigh people are in a quest for their identity just like other communities around the world. The issue of identity adheres to a global context marked by a climate of concern about the future of cultures, languages and identities of the world. The explanatory factors for this climate are essentially the tendency to reduce cultural and linguistic diversity at a global scale, the assimilation of vulnerable identities, the stigmatization of cultural and linguistic pluralism by dominant ideologies and policies, and the

upheavals triggered by globalization in the community and inter-community equilibrium. In this context, the Amazigh identity advocacy is based on the international law related to the recognition and protection of cultural and linguistic rights, within the general framework of UN normative instruments, namely *the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights* adopted in 1948, in its article 27; the *Declaration of the United Nations General Assembly making of the Decade 1988-1997 the World Decade for Developing Culture;* and the *UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2005).*

Mobilization of the different foundations of Amazigh identity developed in this text ensures a legitimacy which draws its source in the past, in the cultural reality and in the international law. The historicity argument of the Amazigh situation constitutes a reminder of a *historical truth* which functions as a parade in the discourse that considers the Amazigh issue as an unlawful heresy inherited from colonialism. The Amazigh demands are also based on an anthropological legitimacy which denies the thesis claiming that the Amazigh cultural identity is mobilized by the advocates of communitarians. Finally, the approach to the Amazigh language issue in terms of human rights benefits from an international normative referential which grants it with ample justification to be reliable, to some extent, in the areas of education, culture, media, and public administration.

In spite of the complexity of the problems facing Maghrebian societies, the latter fail to establish a management system of a rational and equitable grasp of their realities, particularly those inherent in linguistic and cultural diversity. The challenge of this problem lies in the regulation of the contradictions within the centripetal tendency which reduces plurality to singularity, diversity to unity and unity to oneness. The communitarian tendency which proclaims an absolute, irreducible and inflexible difference stands on the other side. The transition from a society based on polarities of identity relying on conflicting ethnolinguistic or religious mechanical solidarities to a society structured by agreement-based organic ties which establish social cohesion represents the crucial

stake of the transformation of Maghrebian communities. It is thus obvious that the fundamental challenge is to know how to manage the dichotomy of *universality* and *specificities* within the framework of the recognition and guarantee of human rights, civil rights, economic rights, social rights, and cultural and linguistic rights. The durability of Amazigh identity, language and culture is one of the challenges of the contemporary evolution in the Maghreb and Sahelian societies. In this perspective, and particularly in the context of the constitutional provisions that recognize that Amazigh is an official language along with Arabic, it becomes crucial to consider that the cultural issue should no longer be thought of and acted upon in terms of the contradiction between *Arabity* and *Amazighity* but rather in terms of citizenship, represented as shared values in terms of "Moroccanness". Finally, the Amazigh issue arises increasingly not only in terms of cultural and linguistic rights but also in terms of socio-economic and political rights. Thus, the culturalist movement is gradually changing into a social movement calling for social justice, economic equality, and political democracy in order to reduce disparities, if not eradicate them, as much at the national level as at regional and local levels. It is in a way a contribution to modernity and democracy.

Essay 10
Literature, Reimagining Identity

In tribute to
Ali Sadki-Azaykou (1942-2004)
and
Idir Hamid Cheriet (1949-2020)

Statement of the Problem

We intend in this essay to take a critical look at an important aspect of cultural production, namely literature. The objective is to elucidate the modalities of establishing the literary corpus as it is integrated in the syntagmatic axis of *reimagined identity* (See Bagga-Gupta *et al*., 2017). The approach opted for is an analytical one; it draws on the sociology of literature and literary criticism. The analytical methodology is basically diachronic; it provides a panoramic and dynamic view of literary expressions in their traditional and modern development. The analysis herein focuses on the case of the literature expressed in the Amazigh language.

Traditional literature can be identified via two veins, the oral and the written vein. The Oral vein is associated with the rural world, with its logosphere which reinforces a primary identity qualified as being archaic and transferred from generation to another within the family by women, generally the grandmother or the mother, and by the lyric poets and story tellers in public places, in villages and Mussems. This "literature" was the object of collection, transcription, and study by military officers, missionaries and scholars during the colonial period in the French, Spanish, German and English languages and in Latin characters. These works have been relayed by postcolonial researchers in the same

languages, in Arabic and in Amazigh. As for the written vein, it goes back to the preceding centuries. It includes manuscripts in Arabic script, most of which have been reedited, and consist generally of texts that popularize the Malikite School. It expresses the "Muslim side" of the Amazigh identity. Today, a modern literature written in Amazigh, Arabic and French is being created in the context of the emergence of urban educated elite which is committed to the process of the call for identity adhering to the discourse of cultural and linguistic rights. Literary production is mainly composed of collections of poetry but also experiences of novel writing, short stories, essays and drama texts which come to enrich the repertoire of literary expressions. The process of shift to writing was accompanied by a number of phenomena related mainly to the emergence of scholarly elite who appropriates new concepts and new techniques concerning the choice of the script (Arabic, Latin or Tifinagh), the loss of salient properties inherent to orality, and the advent of new cultural challenges. This literature expresses the "modern side" of Amazigh identity. The edifice of the Amazigh identity has thus been constructed throughout a process whereby each component is a sequence with specific history, function, production and transmission modalities of its own.

Oral Literature and Savage Mind Prejudice

The main knowledge source of traditional literature is the work by Henri Basset (1920) *Essai sur la littérature des Berbères* (Essay on the Literature of the Berbers, henceforth ELB), which is still considered today as the first outstanding introduction to the Amazigh traditional literature. It represents a stage in the history of the discovery of the Maghreb culture. The end of the XIXth century and the beginning of the XXth century corresponds to the time of triumphant colonialism; scientific missions, which were designed to discover the to-be-colonized places and peoples, were the prelude to the military conquest; and this is what explains the proliferation of studies on languages, literatures, customs and institutions of "overseas countries". The institutions, the logistical means and executives were not missing during the launching of the colonial

project. One of the leading figures of this project was Basset (1892-1926) who also was one of those scholars who served "berberology" a lot. Originating from a family from Lorraine, he was one of the real connoisseurs of the Maghreb along with his brothers, Rene and Andre. As a researcher, professor at the Faculty of Letters of Algiers, Deputy Director of the Higher School of Arabic Language and Berber Dialects of Rabat, he devoted himself ardently to the ethnographic research of the local culture of Arabic and Amazigh expression. A premature death put an end to an academic career which was expected to be a bright one.

When the first edition of *ELB* was published in 1920, the Amazigh studies were then sufficiently advanced to give rise to the monographs devoted to the description of the grammatical structures, bilingual dictionaries and collections of texts covering the main dialectal areas, but there was a serious lack of a review work on the knowledge accumulated until then. The *ELB* came to fill this gap in the literary field. This pioneering work was innovative in its time. Although the author was keen on formulating the disclaimer that his work was addressed less to specialists than to amateurs of the *folklore* and of North Africa, it should still be admitted that this caution note was just a rhetorical one when we know that the study is still considered today an obligatory prerequisite for any researcher working on the Amazigh literature. In fact, before the publication of this work, the reader certainly had at his disposal a collection of texts collected from almost all areas of the literary field, but these were mostly texts presented as a supplementary corpus to the study of the grammar of the spoken varieties; they were rarely collections of texts considered in themselves for their literary value. However, there were rare analyzes of the expression and content of texts, and there were extremely rare attempts of literary aesthetics theorizing, except for the essay of Stumme (1895) which sheds illuminating insights on the Amazigh poetics.

Within the historical and scholarly conditions of that time, and starting from an overall rudimentary harvest, *ELB* provides a clear and insightful review on the state of a literature then little known. Basset distinguishes

three types of production: written literature, legal literature and oral literature. This categorization is relevant in so far as it takes into account the diversity of the sources of this literature, its cultural and social functions and its production sites. The exposition of oral literature covers the largest part of the work; it represents the dominant component of the Amazigh literary production by the diversity of its genres and the quantity of materials it offers. Prose is composed of tales (fairytales, pleasant tales, and animal tales) and legends (historical, religious, hagiographic and etiological). According to Basset, prose is the product of oral tradition which is received and retransmitted without any effort of creation: "it is inadmissible to the Berbers, as to the primitives and even the half-civilized people that he who recites a fiction narrative can rely on his own imagination" (*idem*, 78). Two ideas dominate the author's analyzes: the deeper level unity of the literature and the presence of patterns and themes common to both shores of the Mediterranean.

ELB is undoubtedly a useful work for the scholar specialized in oral tradition and for the reader interested by the Maghreb in general. It provides insightful information on the main genres of written and oral literary production known at the beginning of this century, and the approach adopted by the author is inspired by comparative literary criticism. Being essentially descriptive, *ELB* is centered on ethnographic study of the themes. If the metrical structure was the object of interesting observations concerning poetic prosody, the typology of the poetic genres as well as the internal structure of prose texts were, however, not thoroughly investigated. Reasonably, one cannot ask for such requirements when evaluating a work elaborated at a time when structuralism was still embryonic (See de Saussure, 1916). On the other hand, the reader will be somewhat surprised by the value judgments included in *ELB*. Indeed, in many pages, H. Basset has given free rein to pejorative appreciations which were en vogue at that time and which consist in evaluating the material and symbolic production of the colonized peoples based on the historical conditions of the West, and on the basis of the cultural norms and aesthetic canons which are dominant

there. Thus, for example, one reads under the author's pen the following lapidary conclusion: “The Berbers have remained at the stage of laying the foundations and have left scattered stones: they never possessed the requisite architecture which it alone can assemble them: the creative imagination (Ibid, p.179). Epistemic blockage attested in such a view is explained by the fact that *relativism* and *difference* were still unthought-of notions in this period of the history of human thought.

There is no doubt that *ELB* represents a pioneering milestone in the history of the Amazigh literary studies; however, since the publication of this book, the literature has evolved under the impact of the radical changes undergone by society during the colonial and postcolonial periods, the main indicator of this evolution is the tendency to move from orality to writing. If traditional folktales and legends, rivaled by media fiction, gradually fall into disuse, prose is being enriched with new genres such as short story, novel and drama. Poetry, which remains the principal expression of literary genius, evolves in terms of expression modes and content by integrating new aesthetic forms and patterns of modernity. Literary criticism has also been revived; by integrating the contributions of modern theories, it allows for a better understanding of the different dimensions of Amazigh literature and for a real appreciating of its specific tonality in the polyphonic concert of the universal literature. The anthropological analysis of the content of this literature highlights the tensions that animate rural society and reveals the intense process of socio-cultural change that takes place there. It shows in particular that the traditional economy is being destroyed by the corrosive action of the monetary economy and that the traditional social structures themselves are being dislocated. From this perspective, oral literature is far from being a fossilized product in which only myths, legends and patterns of primitive, ancient, and medieval societies.

With *ELB* we have a considerable amount of oral transcribed literature testifying to the diversity and richness of its different components marked by the characteristics of orality in form and by the values of the rural society in content. Oral expression is essentially expressed at two levels.

On the one hand, it puts the "producer" or "the interpreter" in direct interaction with his audience during family evenings, for example through storytelling; or in public places during the performance of collective dances (*aḫwaš, aḫidus*) or during the poetry recitation (amarg, tanḍḍamt, izli, tamawayt, etc.). On the other hand, orality is based on prosodic elements such as intonation and rhythm that infuse the oral text with life and communicative force. The oral literature is thus the product of the imagination of its creators; for this reason, it does not necessarily reflect the material conditions of their existence. But if Basset's *ELB* provides us with the state of traditional Amazigh literature, today the panoramic picture has to be completed by the evolutions which this literature has undergone during the last decades. In fact, we are witnessing a renewal in the literary expressions which leads to the creation of new genres and the treatment of themes related to modernity.

Traditional Poetry

Poetry represents the heart of the Amazigh "literature" in its traditional expressions produced by the *imdyazn*, the *imarirn* in their cultural context and their ancestral themes. Poetry, more popular than prose, is composed of distinct and varied genres; it is the product of individual creation, thus it is more marked by innovation and change than prose. Its themes stem from various inspirations: love, morality, religion, war, epigrams, exile, etc. Basset adopts categorical judgments on this poetry:

> *The poems do not display a great deal of originality neither of thought nor of expression (...) I admit that these attempts, can involve considerable work of generalization for little cultivated mind, more effort than what they spend to find some beautiful comparisons; but we would appreciate it, because in this area, it is in our eyes neither out of naivety nor freshness, but awkwardness and puerility.*
>
> (ELB: 55, 255)

This judgment, which may sound lapidary, has to be tempered if we take into account the contribution of a large number of "collectors", researchers and writers who put at our disposal today a data corpus and studies which would allow for the elaboration of an almost exhaustive overview of the production of the Amazigh traditional poetry. Let us make reference here to the most significant contributions of the Kabyles: *Les Chants berbères de Kabylie* (1939) by Amrouche, *Les poèmes de Si Mohand* (1960) by Feraoun, *Le grain magique* (1966) by T. Amrouche, *Les Isefra*s de Si Mohand (1969) and *Poèmes anciens de Kabylie* (1980) by Mammeri. In Morocco, the most known corpuses are *Amanar* by Amẓal (1968), A*l-šiâr al-maɣribiy al-amāzīɣiy* by Amarir (1975) and by the same author in (1985) A*l-šiâr al-amāzīghī al-mansūb ilā Sidi Ḥammou ṬṬalb; Recueil de poèmes chleuhs* by P. Galand-Pernet (1974); *Imarirn: mašāhīr šuâarā' aḥwaš* by Assid (2011), and *Kunûz al-Atlas al-mutawassiṭ* by Hamzaoui (2014). These corpuses show that poetry represents the most important and most popular genre in the Amazigh literary production. Poetry is generally accompanied by musical backing; it is organized into pieces in which the themes are generally lyrical, religious or moral. The poet-singers are assigned different nicknames, depending on the region, the type of poem recited, the instrument used to accompany them, the place where they perform their art:

- *Amdyaz* is a poet-singer who, in the way of a troubadour, moves in the tribes which belong to the same cultural area as his, which is mainly Central Morocco.
- *Rays* is equivalent to *amdyaz* in the Souss region; however, the latter has become a real professional poet-interpreter, most often installed in the city where he records his production and responds to an increasing demand.
- *Anššad* is more a poet than a singer; he recites long poems whose major themes are religious, moral and social.
- *Amarir* is exclusively poet, he shows up during village ceremonies, especially during *the mussem*; his achievement is limited to a few verses that he chants and that the participants in the *aḫwaš* repeat in chorus.

- *Anḍḍam* is a poet with prestigious status; the poems he recites during intervillage and intertribal meetings have a considerable impact on the audience; *Inḍḍamn* (plural form) usually challenge each other in contests in the presence of a large and passionate audience.

Poetic genres are themselves varied:

- *Izri* is a set of verses characterized by rhyme and rhythm; these verses have a lyrical content and they are sung in a group in the Rif. *Izli* does not include rhyme; it is performed during the *aḫidus* by the dancer-singers or by the troops of *šyukh* and *šikhat* in central Morocco.
- *Aghennij* is a type of poem marked by rhyme and rhythm; it is common in central Morocco and the Rif.
- *Tamawayt* consists of a single verse or of few lines; it is sung mostly by one singer.
- *Tayffart* is a poem that is longer and more condensed than *tamawayt*.
- *Urar* is a long poem, which belongs to *amarg* or to the sung poetry; it is based on assonance and not rhyme.
- *Tasuγant* is hummed during wedding ceremonies;
- *Ladkar* are poems with religious content;
- *Tazrrart* is a lyrical genre sung mainly by women, and
- *Tamawašt* is a satirical poem.

The contribution of scholarly research to knowing the nature, function, genres and versification of Amazigh poetry is a valuable contribution, in the sense that it has provided a considerable amount of knowledge (See Galand-Pernet, 1974, 1998). The issue of metrical structure has attracted the attention of many researchers; for some it is syllabic (See Bounfour, 1984), while for others it is essentially rhythmic and melodic (See Jouad, 1996); The latter had the merit of deepening the study of the Amazigh metrical structure by expliciting *tiyat,* or the monosyllabic phonetic entities constituting a melody, and they are: *a, ay,*

li, la, da, lay, dal, lad, lay, lay, layl, dayl, layd. These basic works of Amazigh metrics were pursued by Dell and M. Elmedlaoui (2008) in the study of poetic metrics and musical form in the traditional song of Souss.

Folktale as a Major Genre

We have important collections of tales, and we make reference here to corpuses edited by Stumme (1895), Emile Laoust (1949-1950), Boukous (1977), Stroomer (2001, 2002, 2004), A. Roux (posthumous editions 2007, 2009), among others. These texts allow the researcher and the amateur to realize the variety of expression modes and the richness of themes of this oral genre. The tale is illustrated by different categories. Laoust (1949) distinguishes in the category of "the Amazigh tale": "the fairytale", "the animal folktale", "the hagiographic tale", "the pleasant tale" or bawdy tales. The fairytale is generally defined based on certain functions of characters the most common of which are: one of the family members leaves the house, the main character serves a prohibition order, the forbidden is transgressed; there is a gap in his group; the main character leaves the group to fill a gap; he undergoes trials in which he succeeds; he receives a magical object that sounds to be the panacea (See Propp, 1970).The patterns which constitute the *fairytale* are widely found in the Amazigh tale. Exile is the key motive which triggers action. The causes of the hero's being away are variable, and are usually reduced to the transgression of the prohibition and the ostracism sanction which follows from it. For example, the "hero" is condemned to leave his family because he disobeyed his father, because he stole or because he committed a murder of a member of his lineage, etc. Absence of the male triggers disturbance within the group; thus, the absence of the husband leads to tragedy; the spouse is then coveted by other males and the children are abandoned. The character of the greedy Jew is common in the *fairytale*; it is he who steals the *kaftan* set with precious stones to take it back to the Queen of the Christians, covets the magic cup entrusted by the pilgrim to his spouse, promises the earth to the lumberjack's wife in return for the

magical bird, etc. The magical auxiliaries are the mediators between the imaginary - welcoming – world and the real hostile world. The nature of the magic object varies depending on the tale: it is the ring that commands the *djinnis*, the *sheshia* (Fez) that makes invisible, the oriental slippers that remove fatigue, the stick that enables to fly, the pipe that produces gold, etc. The role of imagination is thus to enable man to transcend the vicissitudes of existence by creating a life environment made of equilibrium, abundance and serenity. Thus, the poor lumberjack owes his fortune to the bird which lays golden Louis, the young boy who is thrown in the bottom of the abyss by his jealous brothers is rescued thanks to the magic ring; the exile of the ostracized troubadour is only attenuated by the discovery of a magic cup in the entrails of the fish; Fame and her brothers escape the rage of the ogress only thanks to the magic loop; the indigent brother owes his happiness to the magical pears, his ungrateful brother owes them horns (See Laoust, 1949). In the Tachelhit tradition, the myth of *Ḥmad Unamir* occupies a special position in the Amazigh narrative of Tachelhit expression; it cradled rural children in order to durably mark their relationship with the mother, their rapport with the group and to the hereafter. It has been relayed in the songs of ways (See Bouake Anššad), and today by video films and by literary rewriting (See Bouras, 1993). It has also been the subject of many academic studies. In Boukous (1977) we find an inspired reading of the Russian formalist V. Propp (Ibid) and the "actor model" by Greimas (1966), which highlights a universal structural device based on the following "agents": "the subject" who has to accomplish or undergo a mission consisting of solving a problem, filling a gap; "the object" that is sought by the subject and that may be material or immaterial, its appropriation marks the outcome of the mission; "the addresser" of the request can have the solution to the initial problem or facilitate its resolution;"the addressee" is the beneficiary of the object sought by the subject; the "adjuvants" or auxiliaries come to the aid of the "subject" in order to accomplish his mission; "the opponents" of varying natures constrain the process of carrying out the mission by "the subject". The relationships between the different "agents" are established on the basis of three axes: the axis of will establishes a favorable connection of

conjunction or an unfavorable one of disjunction between "the subject" and "the object"; "the axis of capacity" connects the "adjuvants" and "the opponents"; and "the axis of knowledge" puts "the addressor" and "the addressee" in a situation of transmission and communication. The reading provided by Nervi (2013) is of a mythological nature; it points out permanence and metamorphoses in *Unamir*:

> *From one version of the myth to the other, there are "derivation" processes which occur and can go to the extent of producing the reverse of the meaning of the mythical tale (...) The intertextuality employed in works (which exploited the myth) illustrates, on the one hand, the fertile and invigorating encounter of the collective imagination with the individual imagination of the author and, on the other hand, the permanence of the myth, its vitality and its shape-shifting potential in the course of its metamorphoses. These rewritings have been achieved through the integration and enlargement of mythemes already integrated in Unamir's narrative, such as wandering and maternal love.*

With respect to the anthropological reading of the fairytale (See Lacoste-Dujardin, 1970), it shows that "the hero" of the *fairytale* is a male "subject" who faces a hostile situation of material shortfall and/or symbolic deficiency that threaten the group for which he is responsible. Therefore, he quits his home at the request of an "addressor" (father, *ṭaleb*, grandmother ...) to satisfy a "recipient" (mother, wife, family, group), aided by "adjuvants" (bird, shepherd, angel, magical object ...) to make an initiatory journey intercepted by pitfalls of "opponents" (ogre, snake, Jew, Caïd, merchant...). The moral and physical courage enables him to triumph over the different trials he is confronted with; his return brings abundance and serenity to the group. In the absence of man, the ideal woman is the one who manages the household by providing for its subsistence, keeping a watchful eye on grains and showing abstinence and patience (like Penelope); the ignoble woman is the one who fails to abide by this norm; she is stigmatized and ultimately chastised. At a level superior to that of the restricted group, antagonisms are managed within the context of a particular conception of the power. In fact, the cohesion within the extended group is maintained by the exercise of a relative equality

between peers; the person who holds the power has a fundamentally corrective authority within the group of which he is, above all, the defender against the external threats and the moderator of the internal tensions. In some cases, the group is subjugated to individual power which threatens the integrity of rural social and economic structures and goes against traditional values. This type of power is based on hoarding, usually resulting from spoliation and not from productivity, from prestigious ancestry and numerous descendance and not from solidarity with the group, and finally from violence and not from consensus. The two types of power portrayed by the *Amghar* and the *Caïd* are represented in a largely differentiated way in the fairytale. This conception, largely accredited by folklorists and comparatists, places this "literature" on a timeless level, and therefore places society which produces it on an ahistorical level. An anthropological reading of oral production reveals a sexual division of society. Man's world is that of external activities and relations with nature in its domesticated and hostile manifestations; it is the center of the privileged economic activities, namely agriculture, livestock and trade. Man pretends to be a defender of the social order against internal and external attacks; he thus assumes the function of guardian of the group durability. In addition, the supreme value lies in manliness. Woman's world, on the other hand, is limited to the household: woman reigns inside the house, her principal functions relate to procreation, nurturing and production; the major value in this universe is fertility. As for the hagiographic tale, it can serve historical research; For example, Drouin (1975) studied a hagiographic cycle in the Middle Atlas that casts light on an interesting historical period, that of the struggle of the dawning Âlawit dynasty against the Zawiya of Dila, the destruction of the first zawiya by Mulay Rashid and the foundation of the second one, the role of the Sufi Sidi Boubker, the influence of *Imhiwash*, intertribal conflicts (Ayt Sokhman, Ayt Oumalou, Icheqqirn ...). By means of the prudential rules in use in historical research, particularly the control of the chain of transmission of testimonies, the use of the hagiographic tale as an oral source can compensate for the scarcity or absence of written sources in the Amazigh regions.

Written or rewritten folktale addressed to children or adults is an intermediary genre between the oral and the written tale; it has been the subject of about thirty books written in Tifinagh, Latin or Arabic script. The first experiment is that of Boras (*Umiy n Ḫammu Unamir*, 1993). It was followed by others, namely Akoudad (*Insi d wuššn*, 2004); A. Ikken, and A. Kich (*Iddr nn yagh insi anu*, 2005); Akounad (*Umiy n illis n ugllid*, 2005); Agnaou (*Amušš abṛbaš,* 2005; *Awlk amarir*, 2006); Demnati (*Tagllidt nayt ufella* 2005); Assid (A*fgan d ulgmaḍ d insi*, 2006);. Khalafi (*Tif ayyur tif tafukt*, 2008); Zaheur (*îša mmu ighd*, 2010); Benhessi (*Titrit d tgllidt*, 2011); Ouhmmou (*Udmawn ikrurn*, 2010); Alilouch (*Ini i usgmi*, 2013); Ayt Bahha (*Marsid*, 2013; *Tallast*, 2017). These narratives are inspired directly from the structure and functions of the oral tale; they are principally intended for children through the teaching of the Amazigh language and culture. For some authors, it is considered a preparatory practice to narrative writing, a learning experience of narrative writing.

Performance Arts

In the area of the performance art, such as *Boughanim*, *imâshar*, *bilmawn*, *birḍus,* the oral theater of the *ḫalqa* falls within the large set of the rudimentary forms of theatre. The initiators of this dramaturgy were amateur bands, namely *Hardamssu* from Dcheira in the 1930s; later on, the *Ayt Lemẓar* and *Tabghinouzt* Association during the 1950s. The embryonic manifestations of the Amazigh drama represented by the *ḫalqa* drama reveal that the creator is undoubtedly in command of the technique. He has the art of portraying in a few scenes the essential elements of the drama and development of action; he excels in the painting of his characters with a few sharp features, and creates comic effects based on language and situation. He succeeds in building characters that are demarcated as much by their character as by their behavior by placing them in judiciously selected situations in order to reveal all the aspects of their personality. This process serves the ultimate purpose of the creator who is to entertain his audience by enlightening them. The main popular

artists are *Baqšiš* in the southern area and *Aẓayyi* in Central Morocco (See Qasri, 1985; Benbrahim, 2017).

The traditional characters of this theater are the *bujadi* or the simple peasant who migrated to town, the *mdini* or cunning townsman, the naive husband and the domineering wife, the omnipotent *sheikh* and the obedient peasant, the hypocrite and the *ṭolba*, etc. The performers are limited to two characters; more generally, there is only one performer who plays the role of all the characters in the scene by producing different modulations of the voice: high-pitched vs. low-pitched, quit vs. loud, strong *vs.* weak; and contrasted rhythms: lento *vs.* adagio, lentissimo *vs.* presto. The decoration consists of elements with symbolic function, the turban for the *bujadi*, the glasses for the *mdini*, the *serwal* for the domineering woman, the veil for the submissive spouse, the dagger for the *sheikh*, the white *djellaba* for the *fqih*, the slate for the *ṭaleb*, etc. This theater is rooted in popular life; the scenes which it stages in rudimentary sketches reflect the different aspects of village daily life with its tensions, rural exodus with the hopes and disillusions related to it.

Elementary Forms

The proverb, the saying and the riddle constitute genres called "elementary forms"; these forms are as common as the tale in the Amazigh oral tradition (See F. Bentolila, 1987). The proverb and the saying represent in a way a quintessence in terms of both form and content in the sense that all the wisdom, philosophy, and experience of the group are synthesized into a concise formula.

- In fact, the proverb does not generally exceed the level of the sentence or proposition. Here are some examples:
  - *innad tiwi tmadirt awint waman*

    "What the spade brings is taken by water"

- There may be cases which exceed this level when it comes for example to dialogues:
  - *inna yas wazzan baba tẓẓa thruyt ɣ wuššn, yini yas babas mliyyi ka mani kkant nkki ad issnn manwa iẓẓan ɣ wayyaḍ*,

    "The child said to him: Father, the sheep is chasing the jackal. The father replied: Tell me only where they have gone, I know who is chasing the other".

- The proverb constitutes a semantic system of connotative meaning where the deep meaning is to be sought beyond the first and surface meaning:
  - *trit tibẖar ɣ ṭitt n tfullust*

    "You are hoping to have farms in the chicken's eye"

- The proverb states a general truth:
  - *wanna ur ixaliḍn asif ar iṭṭar*

  "He who is not familiar with the river stumbles"
  - *wanna ibbi ulgmaḍ ar t issiwid izikr*

    "Whoever is bitten by the snake is afraid of the rope."

- Sometimes the proverb is based on grammatical parallelism with or without inversion of the elements:
  - *iɣ nufa tasa, yiliẖ aɣ tirgit, iɣ nufa, tirgit yiliẖ aɣ tasa*

    "If we have a slice of liver we are in short of embers and if we have the ember we have no slice of liver"
  - *iɣ tusit takššult, yasi rbbi tafunast*

    "If you take away the milk, God will seize the cow"

- The moral lesson transmitted by the proverb and the saying consecrates values such as work:
  - *yuf yan ak imlan yan ak ifkan*

"Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day; teach a man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime".

- The proverb praises the maturity of mind and depreciates triviality:
  - *kkan akk^{w}, middn tagant urrin d, nttan iɣama nn gis*

    "Everyone who has been to the forest came back; as for him he stayed there".
- It stigmatizes unconsciousness as in the following example:
  - *tzznzit igr, tsɣt anrar*

    "You sold the field to buy the threshing floor"
- It encourages modesty:
  - *ur ittini lḫbaq žžiɣ*

    "Basilic does not boast of its smell"
- It exhorts dignity in adversity:
  - *anẓid iɣ yad ikmḍ, yall tagayyut*

    "Even burnt alive, the squirrel holds his head up high"

Riddle is a poetic form that takes the shape of a game following a "question- answer" formula. In this genre, the search for stylistic effects is based on lexical analogies, metaphors and assonances. Metaphors generally have an unusual character where the apparent paradox has the function of a test. Thus the riddle is an utterance whose opacity aims to challenge the decoder's capacity for interpretation. Indeed, it conveys a hidden meaning that is beyond a signifier, which is itself unhooked. The relation between the signifier and the signified is more arbitrary than in ordinary language. The meaning of the riddle can only be decoded by an audience that have both linguistic and the cultural competence of the group, because it is not enough to understand the linguistic signs that make up the frame of the riddle; there is need for grasping the cultural referent.

Riddle draws its themes from different areas of the environment. Here are some examples:

- The life cycle:
  - *ṣbḫ igg'u kh ab' a ɣa, wzynha igg'u kh tnayn, ɣa wešši igg'u kh trata (bnadm) (asymi, ayaz d uwssa)*

    "He walks on all fours in the morning, on two at noon and on three in the afternoon: the human being (the baby, the adult and the old man).
  - *immudda ur d yiwrri (lmayyit)*

    "He traveled and never returned (the dead)".
- The plant kingdom:
  - *immut d uzzif ikkr d amnay, yasy tfala (aḫbub n umzgur)*

    "He dies down into the ground and gets up a rider brandishing a dagger (corn kernel)"
- The human body:
  - *amlal issrwat, aẓggʷaɣ ittra, lbḫr issmun (tiɣmas, ils, tadist)*

    "The white shells, the red brews, the sea picks up (the teeth, the tongue, the stomach)"
- The animal world:
  - *tfš rbâa i ygnna, tfš rbâa I wašal, tfš rbâa i bab ns* (*tafunast*)

    "It gives four to heaven, four to earth and four to her owner (the cow)"
- The cosmic world:
  - *tišišt n trufin tgn f imi ur žžu tffi (itran ɣ ignna)*

    "An overturned winnowing basket (vannus) that does not empty (The stars in the sky)"

Religious and Legal Literature

The available corpus shows that traditional written literature consists mainly of religious texts; those known are written in Arabic alphabetic letters. Only a few documents reached us, including the *heretic Qur'ans* of Berghwata and Ghomara, the *âqā'id* of *Ibaḍit*, and the translation of orthodox works of proselytes, such as Ibn Tumert (*al-muršida* and *al-tawḫīd*). The two books by Awzal (*al-Ḫawḍ and Baḫr al-dumūâ*) as well as a work by his tutor Aznag are the only complete collections available. Basset (1920) qualifies communities which produced this literature as "a people without historical traditions, for whom the idea of a literary document was incomprehensible" (p.45). The Amazigh people have distinguished themselves in another area of symbolic production, that of legal literature. It is often oral but sometimes written as well; it conveys a part of the Amazigh customary law named *qanoun*, or *azerf* that is the law which regulates in terms of management of economic resources and socio-political organization. About this literature, H. Basset (ibid) wrote that "It would be a mistake to consider it as a conscious manifestation of a single legislative will "(p.62).

"Neo-literature" as a Quest for Modernity

The emergence of a modern literature has benefited from a favorable context which consists first in the civil society background and then in the institutional support. The main associations that have supported and encouraged culture are *The Moroccan Association of Research* and *Cultural Exchange, Al-'inṭilāqa al-ṯaqāfiya, ANCAP-Tamaynut,* then *the associations Ilmas, Association Summer University of Agadir, Asid, Tawiza, Tirra*, etc. The creation of magazines, bulletins (*Arratn, Amud, Tifawt,* and *Asinag*) and literary pages in newspapers (*Tasafut, Tamunt,* and *Tamagit*) devoted to literary production also participated in the revival of the Amazigh literature. Some institutions, such as the *Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture (IRCAM)* and the *Ministry of Culture*, provide important support by offering associations the financial and material means to organize cultural events, meetings and

festivals allowing therefore for exchange and training, and taking charge of publishing and dissemination of literary and artistic creations. Similarly, the prizes awarded to creators have encouraged them to persevere; these awards include the prize of literary creation awarded by IRCAM, the Ministry of culture, 2M TV Channel, Tierra Alliance, etc. This context has marked the new literature, hence its militant and engaged character in the "identity struggle". This literature includes poetry, narrative and drama expressions.

Modern Poetic Expressions

Written poetry represents a relatively new genre in the Amazigh literary production; today it includes about 130 collections (See the bibliography in Afqir and. El Mounadi (2012)). The transition to writing is considered in itself as an act of modernizing the language, of refounding the literature and, beyond that, an act of cultural mobilization in the process of reconstruction of the Amazigh identity. Modern creation draws on three major reference sources, namely getting inspiration from traditional oral and written poetry, openness to the scholarly experiences of other peoples and academic research on poetic forms.

In the Tachelhit variant, Mestaoui (*Iskraf*, 1976 and *Taḍsa d imṭṭawn*, 1979 among others) is considered, with Amẓal (collection *Amanar*, 1968), the initiator of the movement of transition from oral to written poetry; while appropriating the traditional poetic mold, he evokes social themes drawn from the phenomena induced by the evolution of the Amazigh society. Militant poetry has a preponderant part in poetic production, mainly with H. Idbelkassm (*Taslit unẓar*, 1986, *Asqsi*, 1991); Akhiat (*Tabrat*, 1989). The poetry of Sadqi-Azaykou (*Timitar*, 1988 and *Izmuln*, 1995) is considered an experience that establishes the junction between traditional poetry and the modern one; it is characterized by a rhythm that borrows from predecessors while being creatively activating lexical resources and unprecedented rhetoric, and especially by addressing the theme of identity within the discourse based on cultural rights. His poem *Awal inu*,

which is a hymn to the mother tongue, is the most complete illustration. Other poets follow suit, notably Tabaâmrant (*Tamagit inu*, 2002); Ajgoun (*Iẓuran n tudrt*, 2006, *Tizlfin n ulili*, 2007); and. ldlmoudden (*Tazdayt*, 2015). In the Tarifit variety, among the first poets to have published their poems, we can mention. Ziani (*Ad arīḡ g tẓrut*, 1993), Moussaoui (*Yasfufid u âga*, 1994), and Mimoun (*Zi rid žaḡ,* 1994);. Wariachi (*Isremḏ iyi wawar*, 1998); Chacha (*šway zi tibuhliya âd war tiwad*, 1999); they are followed by Akoudad (*Tiqqt*, 2004); among others. In the Tamazight variety, it is worth mentioning Taos (*Ilidžigen*, 1996); Hadachi (*Tislit n ku yass*, 2001); Oudadess (*Isfrades*, 2008, *Mririda*, 2013); M. Mellal, (*Anzwum*, 2006); Lekbir, (*Inuẓar*, 2007); Alilouch (*Amksa*, 2007, *Taḍfi n wurar*, 2010); Ikan (*Iludi*, 2009, *Tužžut taqburt*, 2010); among other ones.

If "traditional poetry" is distinguished from "modern poetry" by the fact that it is improvised and sung in *asays* plaza by *imarirn* in the Souss tradition (See Assid, 2011), and in *aḥidus* where it is performed by *imdyazn* of central Morocco (See Hamzaoui, 2014), the "young poetry", meanwhile, is characterized by themes and a poetic style that intend to overtake the poetry of the pioneering generation, that is the one which began to write and publish starting from the 1970s. It is represented by an educated youth, originating from the urban milieu and trained at the school of the Amazigh cultural movement. Among the most well known poets are Akil, (*Tihmi n waḍu*, 2002); Elmannani (*Sawl s ighd*, 2003, *uraw n umṭṭa*, 2008); Ouagrar (*Tinitin*, 2004; *Tinu,* 2010); Aboulkasem-Afulay (*Iklan n mggu*, 2007); Amgroud (*Agad n tidt,* 2008; *Ugzirn,* 2009; *Inagan*, 2010), Arouhal (*Aẓawan n urmmaḍ,* 2009); Blilid (*Imakrn n tafukt*, 2009); Moumouch (*Tirẓi*, 2010); Moujahid (*Iruḫ zzman*, 2010); Abernous (*Abrid ad užnna*, 2013); Ikken (*Hiyak i tawenza*, 2010); Touw (*Tasudmt tabrkant*, 2010); Amalik (*Užžan d wussan*, 2015), Bouhmidi (*Tanssist*, 2017); and others who are even younger. Their poetic experience stands out from that of their predecessors by the recurring reference to the poetic universe of Sadqi-Azaykou. It is also marked by a certain number of characteristics that. Ousouss (2010) delineates in his analyzes as follows:

- The use of a well constructed language, Amazigh that is free from loans;
- The choice of evocative and abstract titles; the choice of Tifinagh, Latin and less often Arabic writing script;
- The use of standard-style Amazigh with, however, an opening on the rhetorical resources of the geographical varieties of Amazigh;
- The predominance of egocentrism of the ego beaten and assaulted by the domination of the language and the culture of the other;
- The pursue of innovation in the composition of poems;
- The diversion from the traditional rhythmic structure based on *tiyat*;
- Recourse to symbolic violence manifested by expressing protest and transgressing taboos;
- A relative effort of a writing that mobilizes the resources of poetic imagination and figures of style transcending ordinary language;
- The presence of the philosophical and metaphysical dimension as expressed in universal thought; and
- The use of certain heritage specificities such as the saying, the myth of Unamir, the quote; etc.

The young poetry of Amazigh expression remains of unequal value; in addition to texts marked by an ordinary prosaic writing, lacking any poetic breath, there are some rich and promising collections which proclaim an evolution in poetic writing. It is, however, premature to consider that we are dealing with a "school of poetry" whose aesthetic foundations are established by academic literary criticism, which is often lacking.

Narrative Text, an Emerging Genre

The *novel* written in Amazigh emerged at the beginning of the third millennium in the context of the awakening to modern identity awareness. Today we have about thirty narrative texts that can be classified under the genre "novel". The novel writing experience was inaugurated in 1996 by Chacha *Rẓ ṭṭabu ad tffɣ tfušt* ("transgress the taboo so that the sun can come up"). From the outset, we notice that the writer assigns to literature a function of liberation which consists in breaking the multidimensional taboos which impede the Amazigh people from progressing towards a bright future. The theme of identity is a structuring theme as it is the case in poetic production, an identity rooted in the phantasmagorical valorization of language, culture and space. This theme can take several forms, for example:

- Schizophrenic identity immersed in the fantastic (Bouzeggou, M. *Tišri x tma n tasarrawt*, 2001);
- The modality of exile through the cultural and linguistic exile of the Amazighe (Akounad, *Tawargit d imik*, 2002; Haddachi, *Memmi-s n ifesti d awal*, 2002; Ikken, *Asekkif n inẓaden*, 2004; Azergui, *Aghṛum n ihaqqaren*, 2006; Ferhat, *Iẓuran*, 2011; Azergui, *Imggura g imaziɣn*, 2017);
- The destiny of the rural woman who was subject to the rape of her body and her identity (Aboulkacem, *Imula n tmmktit*, 2002, Bahloul, *Tawenza*, 2011);
- The journey of the young man searching for knowledge and struggling with the throes of alienation (Bouyacoubi, *Igḍaḍ n Wihran*, 2010);
- The effects of social transformation, emigration and intolerance (Bouadidi *Aḍil n isrdan,* 2011);
- The search for fortune and its mirages (Akounad, *Ijjign n tidi*, 2007);

- The struggle of peasants against the dispossession of their ancestral territory (Samira, *Tasrit n weẓru*, 2005; Ouchna *Uddur n umur*, 2007; Sabri, *Azrf akušam*, 2009; Akounad, *Tamurt n ilfawn*, 2012).

If rurality is most of the time considered as a cultural space of romance, for Lasri in *Isnḍal n tmagit* (2013), the city is the stage for the plot of his novel, with characters anchored in the distorted "modernity" of southern countries, for its culture, its composite temporality and its environment. The characters remain confronted with the perpetual question of identity.

At the level of narrative writing, the reader observes the same haunting of the identity quest through the search for the language in its lexical purity, its rhetorical idiosyncrasies and its cultural resources, the use of the patrimonial culture patterns, spaces and temporalities invested with mystifications. In general terms, the novel written in Amazigh tries to be in command of narration that structures the story and develops the plot; however, the mastery of description is usually lacking, both of the physical and psychological description of characters as well as that of the landscapes of the environment. The adopted narrative structure is most often of quinary type; it includes (i) the initial situation, or the beginning of the story; (ii) the disturbing factors; (iii) the events; (iv) the element of resolution and (v) the final situation; as many elements that contribute to the coherence and organization of the story, however the use of the narrative structure requires skills that have to be mastered. On the other hand, if we admit that the narrative text is the sum of "context" and "episodes", then the narrator has to ensure that the "context" presents characters and situates them in a given setting.

The novelist often barely masters these skills, and fails to provide his reader with the means to grasp the mental state that can reveal the triggering event and the effects inflicted to characters and which highlight the application of their "program". On the other side, the generation of episodes and their connectedness is another weakness of novel writing which sometimes ends up by being a mere incoherent concatenation of actions (See Fayol, 1994). Finally, there is a serious

deficiency in mastering the elements that Barthes (1966) considers to be the pillars of the narrative structure, namely the narrative language, functions, actions, narration, and narrative text system. It should also be noted that literary criticism that can contribute to the development of the writer's skills is still in its beginnings in the Amazigh literature (See Mouhsine, 2012, Ouzzine, 2018).

Like the *novel*, the *short story* is a recent genre in the literary production of Amazigh expression (See Ousouss, H. 2018; Najah, 2016). Around a hundred stories have been published between 1988 and 2017. This production has achieved a considerable evolution since its emergence in the late 1980s, namely with *Maryann* (Idbelkassm 1988), *Tighri n tbratt*, (Safi-Moumen, 1993), *Timzgid u fella* (Hamza, 1991); *Fasilisa tafalkayt* (Akounad, 1996); *Gar tagmatt* (Akounad, 1998); *Anzlif* (Achiban, 1998), until the creation of IRCAM which marks a stage characterized by the institutional support to literary creation via cultural associations, namely *Rabitat Tirra*, which edited about 60 short stories between 2010 and 2017, often with the support of the Ministry of Culture. Let us mention some of these collections: *Tlla d warraw ns* (Garhou, 2010); *Tašš lli d istmas* (Mourabih, 2011); *Tawada n ussan* (A. Ifqqirn, 2012); *Kra n tfras*, (Elmannani, 2013); *Ijddign n ktubr* (Sabri, 2014); *Uššan ilsan tiggas* (Akounad, 2015); *Imkkurarn n yiḍ* (Lfaqir, 2016); *Ahiyyaḍ* (Jankhar, 2017). It is also worth mentioning the literary prize awarded by certain institutions, namely the IRCAM (such as *Amlala n isxawn nx* by Bouchkhar, 2011; *Uddur n umur* by Ouchna, 2011; *Tazdayt* by Idelmoudden, 2015). The prize of literary creation, awarded by 2M TV channel, also contributed to the encouragement of writers (examples: *Tawgrat* by Najib, 2009; *Aggu n twargit* by Arouhal, 2010; *Gar tawargit* by Nafiâ, 2012; *Adfl d imttin* by Dahou, 2012; *Amuddu d imṭṭawn* by Harak, 2014. For the first time in the history of the Moroccan Culture Prize, the Ministry of Culture awarded the prize of Amazigh literary creation to Alahyane in 2018 for his collection of poems *Sa iggura dar illis n tafukt,* and to Firach for her novel *ask^{w}ti n telkkawt*. It should be noted that both texts are published by *Rabitat Tirra* in Agadir.

This is certainly an event that will have a positive impact on the development of literary production of Amazigh expression.

The narrative texts are characterized by an obvious heterogeneity manifested by the unequal length of the short stories which may range from a few pages, as in the case of *Uzuzzr n imṭṭawn* by Belcaïd, M., 2014; *G umalu n ulawn* by Moumouch, 2015; *Tirsal g umrsal* by Ayt Hsayn, 2016, to some dozens of pages, as in *Aggu n twargit* by Arouhal, 2010; *Iḍaburn n tayyu* by Haydar, 2011; *Amnad g tudrt* by Abaghaj, 2014, etc. The target reader is just as varied (child, adult, woman...) as themes (social problems, identity, activism, heritage, nostalgia ...) and the script system which can be Arabic, Latin, and/or Tifinagh. The writing style distinguishes narrative texts according to different registers (romantic, symbolic, ideological, realistic, satiric, philosophical, surrealist ...). The production related to the short story of Amazigh expression is still at a maturation stage. The mastery of the art of narration according to the principles of modern literary criticism requires that writing should be concise, dramatic, intense, at a fast pace, without digression, and with situating characters in a real or likely environments or situations. The fall in the story should be unpredictable, surprising, and the sequence of episodes coherent. According to Pascale Gautier, a female writer: "*The short story must be a perfect geometrical figure; everything lies in ellipsis, the movement then the fall. The short story is like a portrait, a hint about which the reader has a fleeting vision.*" As far as the scriptural approach is concerned, the major peculiarity of literary writing of Amazigh expression lies, generally, in the approach of the *intradiegetic* narrator writer along with a second degree narrator who tells the other characters of the story another story in which he is present with his beliefs and conceptions.

Drama Text

The drama text is a newcomer to the Amazigh literary production. Today there are about fifteen texts that are produced mainly in the Souss and the Rif regions. They include relatively accomplished attempts,

namely with the inaugural text *Ussan smmiḍnin* by Safi-Moumen (1983), followed later by *Anaẓur d middn* by Azerual (2008), *Waf* by Bouzeggou (2009), *Taslit n uẓru* by Abernous (2010), *Is sul nedder* by Azergui (2010). Children's drama has its own share with *Tawwuri tuf* and *Arbatn d wasif* by Azerual (2008), *Idir amksa* by Abernous, (2008), and others. The interest granted to "modern" drama by a fairly large number of cultural associations, especially in the Souss and in the Rif, is incorporated within the context of the emergence of identity awareness carried by the Amazigh cultural movement. The birth of "modern" Amazigh drama benefited from a number of factors, the most significant of which were the emergence of an elite carrying the Amazigh cultural project, the publication of literary creation works, magazines, radio and, later on, television programs, the influence of amateur theatre written in Arabic, institutional support (The Ministry of Culture, IRCAM). In addition, the training that certain playwrights benefited from within the context of training programs by specialists abroad made it possible to create training workshops locally and to produce acknowledged achievements, particularly those by troops such as *Ouimerz, Tifsouine, Asays n imal, Tafoukt, Fawanis, Dramidia*, etc.

The embryonic character of drama text production in the literary creation of Amazigh expression and the quasi-inexistence of related criticism impede speaking about a constituted genre. It shows that insufficient training and practice remains a serious obstacle for mastering the fundamentals of drama writing. As a general rule, the examination of the available works reveal the absence of a uniting idea underlying the text impeding coherence of characters, both as individuals and in relations with each other, the consistency of the "conflict" between them, and the cohesion of situations. It is necessary that the structure of drama texts should receive the greatest attention, especially the level of exposition which presents the basic elements of the situation: the characters, the setting of the action; the conflicting relationship which complicates the situation between protagonists and antagonists; the progress of the action through the sequence of episodes; and the climax or culminating point of

the action preparing for the resolution of the conflict, thus leading to the denouement which illuminates the articulation of the action elements.

Female Presence

The presence of women is visible in the literary production, which constitutes a socio-cultural indicator of the degree of formal education of the Amazigh-speaking girl and her participation in the renewal of the Amazigh culture. Let us mention the main female authors: the pioneers Agnaou with her short story *Taẓerẓit* (1990); Nafiâ (2012, 2015, 2016); Dikr (2014, 2016, 2017, 2018); Mouhjjane (2015); Boutaleb (2015); Legjda (2017, 2018); Belmoudden (2015); Bazhar (2015, 2018); Al-Adouzi (2016); Firach (2016); Eldnani (2013, 2015, 2018); Faiz (2013, 2018). *Rabitat Tirra* has even devoted one of its publications in 2017 to a collection of short stories produced exclusively by young women. The authors have produced collections of poems, short stories, novels and some drama texts, whose themes revolve around identity *topes* as a "recurrent narrative configuration" (See Weil, 1990).

From Logosphere to Graphosphere

Poetry, folktales, proverbs and riddles represent the major genres of oral tradition. Different generations have transmitted this literary heritage by introducing limited changes to it. Apart from the poetry works where the imprint of individual creativity is manifest, we can say that the Amazigh traditional literature expression is a group creation. However, this literature cannot be limited to oral tradition because there are forms of written literary creation that enrich and renew Amazigh literary expressions. This new literature appears to be in favor of the emergence of a modern elite open to the world literary expressions in the sociopolitical context of the post-independence era marked by socio-political and cultural changes, and by the quest for identity and by the human rights culture. Unprecedented genres have flourished, namely the novel, short story and drama, but they represent a still young literature that is

quantitatively limited and that is marked by the seal of ideology and by militantism expressed through intradiegetic perspective carrying recurrent *topoi*, themes, situations, and common motives which often still mark its quality and maturity, and whose emergence is conditioned by originality in creativity and mastery of writing techniques.

With respect to the mobilization of literary creation in the project of "reimagining identity", we can say that the oral literature corresponds to the stage of the "logosphere" correlated with the sensitive identity awareness, whereas the wellness to integrate the expression of modern identity awareness correlates with the stage of the "graphosphere". It is understood that the nature of the "realm" is only an indicator of the process of transformation of the Amazigh identity consciousness from the stage of "traditional awareness" to that of "modern awareness" (See. Ouazzi, 2001).This impetus lacks an approach which draws on the theory of "mediology" (See Debray, 1994), so that the ideological construct becomes a sociological reality carried by social actors, and more particularly by a social group. Adherence to this latter would ensure cohesion over time around a common belief in an external referent (mythical past, transcendence, ideal project, values posited as universals) that binds the community. This reference, i.e. the "unconscious religious background" of the political, is referred to as the "non-fulfillment point". To do this, it is necessary to master the "mediaspheres", the "logosphere" or oral transmission, the "graphosphere" or the print medium, "the videosphere" or the analog memory, and the "hypersphere" or digital networks. In peripheral society where illiteracy is considerable, there has often been a (forced) economy in the use of the "graphosphere" allowing access to the "new culture". This fact points out the importance of the infrastructure created by information and communication technologies, with no technological determinism prejudice, since "mediology" emphasizes "mediation" not "communication". More specifically, "mediation" is conceived as a pivot point between a technical face, that of "the organized matter" and a political face, that of "substantiated organization", knowing that carriers and tools are effective only when

relying on institutions, communities, production sites that disseminate and legitimize them.

Essay 11
Graphology and Symbolic Violence

In tribute to
Jack Goody (1919-2015)

Statement of the Problem

The object of the present essay adheres to the general issue of symbolic violence and more specifically to the logic of "graphic reason" as a means of standardizing and domesticating the spoken word and the imaginary that it underlies (See Goody, 1977). This is to reveal the impact that the "logosphere" undergoes when it competes with the "graphosphere" while being subject to the reducing power of the graphic system. Such a way of raising the problem of the relationship between orality and writing is completely at odds with Derrida's (1967) thesis. The latter postulates that the hierarchy imposed by the "metaphysical attitude" of the Western philosophical tradition, between an omnipresent word and a constantly refused and repressed writing consists in a willingness to reduce the difference by assigning a negative connotation to writing: "Also, deconstructing this tradition would not mean overthrowing it, and disculpating writing; it is rather to show why the violence of writing does not occur in innocent language" (Ibid, p. 55). From this "deconstruction" of language, which aims at the restoration of rewriting, emerges the necessity of a science of rewriting, and of a "grammatology". Its aim would be to determine the conditions for the emergence of writing in the past thinking, and its place in future thought.

Our primary concern here is not to reverse the perspective following the Derridian thought but to show how some transcription modes lead to the evacuation of certain fundamental aspects of poetic work. The aspects

which we would be concerned with here are the prosodic phenomenon, more particularly intonation, stress and rhythm. The illustrations that we will be using are taken from the literature of Amazigh expression, namely Tachelhit dialect (Southwest of Morocco); with respect to the problem and analysis, they imply to have a more general scope.

Orality Transcription

By "transcription techniques", we mean both the graphic systems and types of transcriptions used to fix speech using conventional symbols.

Graphic Systems

The literature of Amazigh expression has been transcribed using diverse graphic systems: the Arabic alphabet (e.g. Awzal texts and contemporary production), the Latin alphabet (e.g. texts collected during the colonial time, and those collected by modern researchers), and finally the Tifinaghe alphabet (for example the texts published by the Royal Institute of Amazigh Culture). The problems posed by these systems are numerous and diverse (See Galand, 1977; and Chaker, 1983; Elmedlaoui, 1999).

Types of Transcription

There are two models of transcription in which Latin characters are generally used, the first one has a phonological aspect and the second one has a phonetic aspect:

- The phonological transcription takes into account only the secondary articulation units having a distinctive function in the language, namely phonemes. It is an abstract transcription in the sense that the graphemes used represent the underlying phonic system of the language and not the surface units which are encountered in the diversity and variation of performances;

- As for the phonetic transcription, it represents an effort towards a restricted transliteration of speech into graphemes. This type of transcription has the merit of restoring the phonetic particularities of the dialectal and idiolectal variations. However, no matter how faithful, accurate and meticulous a transcription may be, it can only be approximate; it is quite inadequate when it comes to accounting for suprasegmental facts such as intonation, stress and rhythm, let alone gestures, mimicking, scansion, psalmody, and so on. These aspects fulfill important functions, particularly in literary production, mainly the expressive and the poetic functions.

Relevance of Prosodic Features

The relevance of prosodic aspects, including stress, intonation and rhythm, is investigated here in the light of language functions and the impact of transcription on interpretation.

Primary Function and Secondary Functions

It has often been argued that the main function of language is the one known as the cognitive function, or more generally the communicative function; the poetic, expressive, co native and phobic functions are considered by linguists as secondary functions. In addition, for many linguists, the fundamental elements of language are the units of the double articulation (phonemes and modems), the prosodic aspects and the functions they convey are said to belong to the "-ethic" and not to "-emir" domain (See Martinet, 1960), while suprasegmental properties may have a distinctive function in certain languages (for example, tone and stress). Jacobson (1963) was one of the rare linguists who showed that the act of communication is a bundle of linguistic functions, not to forget Troubetzkoy's reflections on phonostylistics (1939) (1939) and Fonagy's (1983) contribution on the dimension symbolic of phonation. On this basis, we are inclined to think that the so-called secondary linguistic functions are conveyed less by the segmental units (phonemes) than by the

suprasegmental features. It is often alleged that these latter cannot be depicted in a systematic way. Admittedly, in the absence of adequate instrumental analyzes, the task looks to be delicate, but already, we can say that the "expressive" and "emotional" elements of discourse constitute a system of autonomous relations governed by rules, even if - at first glance - it may look that the nuances expressed for example by tone are infinite and that a variety of semantic interpretations can be assigned to the same single intonation contour. In fact, the semantic variation does not affect the fundamental meaning of the utterance; it is rather an "axiological" modulation with an implicational nature.

Transcription and Interpretation

The process of transcription of oral literature is not a simple technical operation; it includes, of course, purely "technical" aspects such as the adoption of a graphic system for fixing sonority *continuum*, the option for the phonetic or the phonological transcription, etc.; but it also includes aspects bearing the subjectivity of the transcriber who is then not only a "technician" who transfers speech into written state but a participant who is socially and culturally anchored. If replacing phonemes by graphemes does not create major problems for the transcriber, the restitution of the prosodic facts proves to be more complex because of the technical limitations of the symbols generally used to transcribe these features, namely the following "punctuation marks" : [! ? ?! ,; . - ...]. In addition, these symbols can be converted into various and sometimes contradictory axiological values, for example the question mark can express a neutral, implicative, indirect, rhetorical, or false question, etc.

Let us consider the following example taken from a sketch by the popular humorist Fars nicknamed "Baqshish" (See Boukous, 1977, p.164). The scene features two seasonal workers and a farmer discussing wages. The farmer asks the following question:

(1) mnašk ad awn fkan? "How much have you been offered?"

This question can receive several semantic interpretations according to the intonation contour of the sentence; For example, we can elicit the following interpretations:

i. A neutral question (without implication);
ii. A question with a familiar tone;
iii. A question with an aggressive tone;
iv. A question with a sarcastic tone;
v. A question with a dubious tone;

Etc.

The question mark is therefore loaded with semantic ambivalence that can be mingled with ambiguity. It is therefore necessary to undertake a thorough reading of the text and especially to know the cultural and linguistic *habitus* of the community concerned so that the reader can transcend ambivalence and remove ambiguity.

Stress, Intonation and Rhythm

The example that has just been given clearly shows the power and implications of interpretation from transcription. The identification of this power and of these implications is complex, and has to be grasped both at the level of encoding and at the level of decoding of the text. It is also required to enter the places of registration of the agents of this task, namely the transcriber and the translator at the stage of encoding, the decipherer and the reader at the decoding level. It is also necessary to draw a distinction between the position of the decipherer, or the reader of the transcribed text, and that of the reader of the translated text. Finally, let us note that when we are dealing with a translated text, the levels of encoding and decoding overlap, which makes interpretation even more random, since we ultimately have to interpret a second-hand product. The

encoding and decoding processes can be visualized using the following figure:

(2) Source data: oral text

N1	Encoding by Al in L1 of P1	
A2	Transcriber	Translator
N2	Encoding in L'	Decoding in L1 ↓
		Encoding in L2
P2	Transcribed text	Tanslated text
A3	Decipherer	Reader
N3		Decoding

Where:

Al = Agent 1 or 'author' of the oral text
L1 = Language of the oral text
P1 = Product1 or source oral text
N = Level of the process
L1 = Language -etic /-emic
L2 = Language of translation

We have seen how the transcriber is technically limited in his task because of the limitations of the adopted transcription systems and transcription types themselves. Let us now understand how the oral text is permeated by prosody.

Stress Assignment

The deciphering of the transcribed text is certainly based on the adopted transcription model, but the transcriber is far from being a passive agent who mechanically undertakes the text transcription; on the contrary, he makes use of his right to interpretation. Let us consider verse 1 of the following stanza from the poem *nkk dim a nmun* of Mestaoui (1979, p.49), sung by Ammouri:

(3) *tazzwit nra nikk dim a nmun*

ard nnkkr zikk ɣ uzuzwu

nasi d ažžig umlil nẓḍi t

nskr tammnt išwan nbḍu tt

nssimim iss ils n yan igan amaḍun

zund asafar ižižžin middn

Each of the morphemes of the verse 1 in (3) can be rendered prominent through the process of stress assignment (marked by '). This verse can thus receive five phonetic interpretations:

(4)

(i) 'tazzwit nra nikk dim a nmun

(ii) tazzwit 'nra nikk dim a nmun

(iii) tazzwit nra 'nikk dim a nmun

(iv) tazzwit nra nikk 'dim a nmun

(v) tazzwit nra nikk dim 'a nmun

(Where ' = stress)

These phonetic interpretations introduce semantic nuances whose values are important from the performative point of view; but, there is no graphic symbol in the text to indicate the nature of the stress pattern. A great deal of interpretation freedom (and arbitrariness) is therefore left to the reader.

Intonation

Faced with the neutrality of the segmental representation of the text, the reader can make multiple readings of this text, since the latter is invested with various phonetic-semantic properties. These properties can

be governed by contrast in the melody curve; this differentiation is determined by the following factors:

(i) Register (high/ low);

(ii) Deviation(significant /low) between the intonation levels;

(iii) Melodic contour (rising/falling) or complex (rising/falling / falling/rising);

(iv) Contour duration (long/short); and

(v) Contour intensity (strong / weak).

Let's consider the initial utterance from the Fars sketch (ibid) to illustrate this phenomenon: *muḫmmad trit azaɣar?* "Mohamed, do you want to go to the plain?" This utterance can be assigned many melodic contours according to the structural organization composed of the properties which have been enumerated; we will retain the following contours:

(i)
ɣar
mmad trit aza
muḫ

(ii)
ɣar
trit aza
muḫammad

(iii)
trit ɣar
muḫammad aza

(iv)
azaɣar
muḫammadtrit

(v)
trit
muḫammad azaɣar

(vi)
mmad
trit azaɣar
muḫ

(vii) ɣar
aza
trit
muḫammad

Semantic values that we think can be assigned to each of these contours are respectively as follows:

(i) Neutral question (with no implication)
(ii) Question + invitation
(iii) Question + incredulity
(iv) Question + focalization of the last morpheme
(v) Question + disappointment
(vi) Question + indulgent disapproval
(vii) Question + acute disapproval.

Rhythm

Rhythm is considered as another important component of discourse. Each discourse register corresponds to a specific rhythm; more than that, it appears to us that in the Amazigh literature, rhythm and discourse are intimately connected. Let us take the example of the religious literature and that of 'the profane' literature:

(i) The rhythm of the religious text is that of the psalmody, the movement is ample, slow and humming: consider for example the recitation of the two following verses taken from *'al-Ḫawḍ* by Awzal.

(6) lbab llɣusl daɣ nttan att id awiɣ

âwn iyyi gis aws iyyi gis a bab inu a lbari

(ii) With respect to the 'profane' poetic text, rhythm manifests as scansion; it is parsed here into feet according to rigorous metric rules (See Jouad, 1983, p.98). As an example, consider the following verse from a sung poem:

(7)	O	W	S	W	O	S	W	S	W
	a	ri	ttay	la	ll	ba	za	ritt	rus
	w	w	s	w	o	s	w	s	w
	a	ri	ffal	ta	ɣu	fi	ɣi	kal	ni

Transcription of these texts is of no help to a reader who does not master the prosodic structure of the language in which this literature is produced. Similarly, the reader who is unfamiliar with the metrical structures of the poetic genres of the literature in question is not immune from errors in metrical versification.

Prosody, Translation and Interpretation

Translation in general and that of the oral text in particular cannot either be regarded as an exclusively technical operation; the output of translation operation is loaded with subjectivity, cultural prejudices, and generally with the translator's ideology. In addition, the transcribed and translated speech is subject to amputations and distortions which mutilate, impoverish and objectify it. The translation sounds then doomed if not to inadequacy at least to approximation, precisely because of the irreducible nature of cultures and to a certain extent of the linguistic structures of the source-text and those of the target-text.

To limit ourselves to the oral literature, we notice that the translator opts for a specific interpretation while the text is loaded with semantic potentials, and nothing, except arbitrariness, can justify the translator's option for this or that interpretation to the exclusion of this or that other one. In fact, in the choice of an interpretation, let us reiterate it; taking into account the prosodic elements is decisive.

Let's go back to Fars (Idem) to illustrate the relationships between prosody and interpretation.

(8) Consider the following two utterances P1 and P2:

P1- *muḥammad trit azaɣar?* "Mohamed, do you want to go to the plain?"

P2 - *riɣ t !* "I want it!"

We have examined in (3 b) the question included in P1 from the point of view of intonational contour; let us now consider the answer in P2 *riɣ*:

- At first glance, there is no cue in the oral text indicating the presence of an exclamation mark, we could have expressed the pause using a dot (.); the interpretation of the pause as an exclamation is a choice of the transcriber and/or the translator;
- Translation of *riɣt* by "I want it" is also arbitrary because other translations are possible, such as: *indeed, definitely, willingly, of course, I wish to, I would like to go there; I want to go there, obviously, etc*. Here again apparently, that is to say on the basis of the data of the oral text, nothing justifies the proposed translation, or else nothing can exclude the other translations. The adopted translation is liable to be adequate only if the translator has the possibility to have access to the oral text, and still it would be necessary to master the source language as well as the target language in their slightest nuances. These nuances are clearly perceptible in the melodic curve of the utterance as can be noticed in the chart proposed in (9) below:

(9)



(I) Enunciative value

(ii) Implicational value with an aggressivity peak

(iii) Mitigated desire

(iv) Vivacious desire

(v) Assent + recognition

(vi) Marked aggressiveness

(vii) Frustrated desire

It appears then that along with intonational features, the rhythmic and stress elements contribute to a large extent in assigning a translation to a spoken discourse. Indeed, the adoption of a specific rhythm, (Slow / fast / jerky rhythm) can express emphasis / prosody / emotion, etc. Placing stress prominence on a morpheme or on a system leads to the prominence of this element. Thus, the prosody-meaning pairing should be taken into consideration in the translation process.

Orality and Graphic Reason

At the end of this brief examination of the relations holding between writing, prosody and interpretation in the oral text, two observations stand out, one is theoretical and the other is methodological. Through the particular example involving certain fragments of Tachelhit dialect literature, we have tried to shed light on some phenomena inherent to the passage from orality to writing or figuratively, the fixation of speech into writing; we can say that in this process speech is grappling with (the forces of) the graphic norms. By the way, the metaphor conveyed by the expression "fixation through writing" is in itself eloquent, the fixation leads to forced immobilization, to the neutralization of dynamism and the annihilation of vitality. Without wishing to call into question this valuable asset of humanity which is writing, because after all, it is writing that allowed it to emerge from prehistory; it is clear that writing acts as a reductive order moving in the direction of impoverishment and the disembodiment of speech. In this respect, we can say that the audiovisual instruments made available by modern technology, especially the video, are becoming vital to overcome the graphic systems so far in use. In the current state of things, we can say that writing functions in the same way as the other social institutions, institutions based on imposing norms through constraints(cf. Durkheim, 1895), a constraint which is said to be collective and 'thus' freely accepted by individuals. On another side, Goody (1977) talks about "the domestication of the savage mind" through writing, that is writing acts as an instrument/a spot of power and exercise of symbolic violence.

It also follows from the analysis being conducted that the mastery of the prosodic structures and that of their meaning are crucial in the process of interpretation both at the level of perception as well as that of realization (spoken and written). However, the graphic transcription, whatever its modalities may be, is inadequate to render the prosodic properties as speech idiosyncrasies; this inadequacy is all the more problematic as the prosody embedded with a strong poetic load. Should we then go so far as to the following extreme statement: there is no poetic discourse except in orality? The writing and objectification of prosodic properties raise serious methodological problems. The approach adopted in this essay is impressionistic; it draws on our intuition as a native speaker. To be rigorous, the analysis should be based on instrumental studies that would allow objective delimitation and schematization using instruments such as the melodic analyzer, the typology of melodic curves in terms of intonation patterns, and confronting these patterns with appropriate semantic units. There is no doubt that the analysis undertaken has probative value as to the status of the problem of the relationship between writing of orality. On another level, the transition from oral cultures to writing, in other words the transition from "the logosphere" to "the graphosphere", is most often internalized as a 'progress' in the process of integration into modernity by taking identity from "primitive irrationality" to "modern rationality".

Essay 12
Intangible Patrimony Transmission

In tribute to
Paul Pascon (1923-1985)

Statement of the Problem

The process of intensive cultural change taking place in Moroccan society is occurring as a result of economic and social transformation; the youth are particularly subject to this process through education and urbanization. The impact of change on young Moroccans has been the subject of several studies, including their attitudes (See Pascon and Bentahar, 1969), their values and strategies (See Bourqia *et al.*, 1995), their political representations (See Bennani-Chraïbi, 1995) and their social integration (See Dachmi and Haddiya, 1996). The purpose of the present study is to grasp the cultural *habitus* of young people through the analysis of their motivations and representations of traditional culture, particularly oral tradition. The objective of this Essay is to provide an assessment of the youth's knowledge and recognition of traditional culture in order to capture the degree of culture change operating in Moroccan society. On the other side, it is important to know whether "youth" as a social segment is detached from the "logosphere" to integrate the other "mediaspheres" and to serve as a locomotive in the process of transition towards "the modernity project".

In his text "La jeunesse n'est qu'un mot" (*Youth is just a word*), Bourdieu (1980) shows how the division into groups in the French society involves a

manipulation of the social field in order to establish an order through which everyone has to stand in his position. In this ordering, the school proceeds to putting youth in a symbolic offside situation and therefore to the manipulation of its aspirations. Among the effects of this manipulation, there is the degree and the nature of the training dispensed, and correlatively the value of the symbolic capital assigned to the delivered title, its valorization or devaluation due to inflation. Thus, in Western societies, where the history of the education system is sufficiently significant to allow its effects to be grasped in the long run, the school institution functions as a source of selective privileges on the basis of the social background of the subjects. The school is in this perspective a major melting pot of social reproduction through the very game of reproducing the distribution structure of the cultural capital (See Bourdieu and Passeron, 1970). In contrast to the predictions of this theory, I would like to try to demonstrate that in peripheral societies, the Moroccan society in this case, the school intervenes as a powerful apparatus ensuring the inculcation of a culture that is displaced from the traditional socio-cultural environment, which nonetheless ensures the production of new elites, at least during the first decades following independence. The culture acquired at school imposes knowledge, values and beliefs different from those of traditional culture. The generational gap intensifies as the majority of adults are illiterate. This conflict is expressed among other modalities by the rejection of oral tradition considered as an obsolete culture, a culture belonging to a bygone past.

Coping with Intergeneration Transmission

Assuming that in this type of society, the school system contributes to offering its graduates opportunities for social distinctiveness through vertical mobility, especially in so-called disadvantaged communities, how do young people behave vis-à-vis oral tradition? How motivated are they to appropriate the intangible cultural heritage? How do they represent the heritage culture?

Working Hypothesis

To answer the preceding questions, we postulate the following general hypothesis: Moroccan youth constitutes active segment acting in the direction of social transformation and the production of a counter-culture which stands as an opposite of traditional culture. We thus presume that young people are inclined to abandon oral tradition, which is supposed to convey outdated values in favor of a culture open to modernity and transmitted by powerful devices, namely school and media. This hypothesis adheres to the positive prejudices that P. Pascon and M. Bentahar have expressed about Moroccan youth:

> *(...) At the intellectual level, youth could be the group carrying the new society and could even be the driving force of the present time society in case its position in the production process ensured the implementation of its ideas. (Idem, 1971, p. 271-272).*

Also, in virtue of this hypothesis, the surveyed young people are supposed to show a limited interest for oral traditions so much as that they would have a low degree of knowledge thereof, adopt a negative attitude towards it, and develop a dysphonic representation thereof.

Population and Sampling

The target population for this study is the young educated people ranging from 11 to 30 years of age. This population was chosen for the following reasons:

- It represents 25% of the overall population according to the latest census results;
- It is more subject than the adult population to cultural change because it is exposed to the cultures of school and media which constitute a serious challenge to traditional culture;
- Finally, it is relatively available and it is therefore more disposed to take the questionnaire than the adult population.

The sample is composed of 294 participants having the following characteristics:

- With respect to age, the sample is segmented into three relatively balanced groups (11-18, 19-24 and 25-30), which gives a representative picture of the different age groups in the young population:

Age	Percentage
From 11 to 18	30.00%
From 19 to 24	38.38%
From 25 to 30	31.11%

- Concerning gender, the proportion of female participants is slightly inferior to that of males:

Sex	Percentage
Males	53.33%
females	46.66%

- As for the place of birth, the number of participants who were born in urban areas is higher than those born in rural areas.

Place of birth	Percentage
urban	54%
rural	36%
No response	10%

The corpus includes about 2/3 of Arabic-speaking participants and 1/3 of Amazigh-speaking ones. This reflects the overall situation as it emerges from the results of the population census. Youth milieu displays a quite developed multilingualism based on mother tongue, viz. Moroccan Arabic/Amazigh, in addition to Standard Arabic and French:

Spoken languages	Percentage
Arab phones	62%
Amazighophones	38%

Multilingualism	Percentage
Moroccan Arabic, Standard Arabic, and French	53.33%
Amazigh, Moroccan Arabic, Standard Arabic, and French	35.55%
No answer	11.12%

- With respect to the participants' social status, we have retained, in an approximate way, the following socio-economic categories:

Social category	Percentage
unstable employees	13.33
Stable employees	37.77
Middle class	42.22
Higher class	06.66

The obtained figures reflect to a great extent the distribution of young people in public education. For the sake of convenience, the two categories "stable employees" and "unstable employees" are grouped into one category named "the popular class"; the latter groups together 51% of the participants who constitute the sample. In view of these figures, we can assert that the sample object of the survey is, to a great extent, representative of the social background of the young schooled population.

The Variables

The analyzed predictor variables are the "motivation" of the participants to know oral tradition and "the mental representations" they have thereof. These intersect with the following independent variables: age, sex, place of birth, spoken languages and social background. The

notions of “motivation” and “representation” are notions borrowed from social psychology and widely used in psycholinguistics, sociology and sociolinguistics (See Gardner and Lambert, 1972; Jodelet, 1993; Racquet-Cyrus, 2009). “Motivation” is defined as the psycho-sociological impetus that is the basis of the decision to adopt adequate behavior for the satisfaction of a desire, a need or an interest. In this case, it is the set of psychological and socio-cultural factors which lead participants to become interested in oral tradition, and to make it an object of knowledge and social skills.

“Motivation” for oral tradition is evaluated here through the memorization of folktales, proverbs and singers as cultural heritage and through the knowledge of research work devoted to oral tradition. Thus, being motivated is ideally to have a vested interest in oral tradition, and to be able to perform it as a heritage and as a scientific subject matter. As for the representations, they refer to the psychosocial- logical arrangements internalized by the participants and which are manifested through their behavior, their judgments and their imagination. Just like attitudes, representations constitute an unscholarly form of knowledge; it is socially shared and contributes to a vision of reality common to socio-cultural groups. Representations and attitudes are generally expressed by stereotypes and clichés; they are used in the study of phenomena such as self-depreciation, prestige, linguistic insecurity and language classification. The two notions are often confused in the literature. However, we will distinguish them by limiting the study of attitudes to the research conducted in the field of social psychology privileging the quantitative method, and the study of the representation to the field of cultural anthropology making use mainly of the qualitative method.

The present Essay will be more about “representation” than about “attitude”, even if there is a lot of emphasis on the quantitative approach. The aim is to capture the representations that young people have of oral tradition based on their more or less objective and scientific appreciation of the value they attach to it, the importance of collecting and archiving it,

the relevance of transmitting it to future generations, and the identification of the potential risks that threaten it.

Research Instrument

The Research instrument used in this study is the questionnaire. Three types of questions are formulated:

(i) Questions 1-5 allow for the identification of the characteristics of the participants according to age, gender, languages and environment;

(ii) Questions 6-13 and 15-16 relate to the participants' representations with respect to the value granted to oral tradition, its preservation, its usefulness, its quality, its transmission and the dangers which threaten it;

(iii) Finally, questions 11-14 relate to knowing oral tradition, especially storytelling, songs, and interest in specialized literature.

This questionnaire has the advantage of including closed questions that require clear and succinct answers and open-ended questions to enable participants to express themselves freely about the subject by qualifying their answers. But the questionnaire was sometimes administered under conditions that are not ideal, as some participants completed the questionnaire in groups, which favors exchange of information, and others filled it out at home, which does not eliminate the eventuality of consulting other parties or checking documents on oral tradition.

Patrimony Social Motivation

Let us consider the results of the questionnaire, especially those concerning the degree of motivation that the participants have for oral tradition and the nature of representations they have thereof.

Degree of Motivation for Oral Tradition

The degree of motivation that young people have for knowing and using oral tradition is evaluated on the basis of the results of the test of mastery of the salient aspects of oral tradition, namely folktales, proverbs and songs. These results are as follows:

Degree of knowledge	Average
Folktales	02.9
Proverbs	03.8
songs	04.5
Overall average	11.2

These figures represent the average (/5) of the answers to questions 11, 12 and 13 of the questionnaire: "list five folktales, five proverbs and five songs in Moroccan Arabic or in Amazigh (Berber)". They indicate, on the one hand, that the participants know the folktale, the proverb and the song relatively well (with a general average of 11.2/15) and, on the other hand, that they know much better about songs than about proverbs and the folktales, following a descending order: song>proverb>folktale. The evaluation of the interest in the academic research devoted to oral tradition is undertaken based on the answers to question 14 formulated as follows: "Provide the title of three studies dedicated to the Moroccan oral tradition". The recorded general average of the participants is very low, it is 0.62/3.

Let us now consider the degree of motivation for oral tradition according to the independent variables selected, namely age, sex, place of birth, spoken languages and social environment:

Age group	Folktales	Proverbs	Songs	Research	Transmission
11-18 years	02.2	02.8	04.2	0.20	09.4
19-24 years	02.9	03.7	04.5	00.7	11.8
25-30 years	03.6	04.9	04.8	00.9	14.2
Average	02.9	0 3.8	04.5	00.6	11.8

Age and Degree of Motivation

The scores registered by the age groups appear in the following table: the participants who feel to know oral tradition best are those who belong to the age group 25-30 years; the younger ones register rather average scores.

Gender and Degree of Motivation

Male and female participants tend to have relatively the same degree of knowledge of oral tradition; in fact, the scores are 12 and 11.78, respectively. This fact contradicts the common assumption that female subjects know oral tradition better than their male counterparts.

Place of Birth and Degree of Motivation

The urban participants are significantly more motivated to know oral tradition than those from rural areas; in fact, the first register a general average of 12.1, while those born in the rural areas register an average of 11.3, which makes a significant difference of 0.8. The following table presents the details according to type:

Genre	Urban	Rural
Folktales	02.7	03.2
Proverbs	03.9	037
Songs	04.7	04.2
Research	00.8	002
Transmission	12.1	11.3

These results refute the idea that oral tradition would be part of rural culture, and that therefore they would know oral tradition better and would be more motivated than urban dwellers to know it and transmit it to their children.

Language and Degree of Motivation

The results on the degree of motivation for oral tradition according to the mother tongue of the participants reveal that Arabic speakers are more familiar with oral tradition than Amazigh speakers because they are apparently more motivated. In fact, the two groups recorded respectively the following averages: 12.6 and 11.2. However, by refining the analysis, we realize that multilingual Amazigh speaking subjects have a higher motivation than multilingual Arabic speakers; their respective average scores are 2.4 and 2.2. These results appear to be in contradiction with the previous ones. They are in fact at odds with the common sense according to which Amazigh-speaking participants are better in command of oral tradition than Arabic-speakers because they are somehow naturally submerged in the logosphere. These results are in themselves intriguing.

Social Environment and Degree of Motivation

The following table exposes the average scores achieved by the participants belonging to each one of the three socio-professional classes selected:

Types	Popular class	Middle class	Upper class
Folktales	04.3	03.8	03.6
Proverbs	04.5	04.2	03.9
Songs	04.8	04.4	04.2
Books	00.2	00.4	01.2
Transmission	13.8	12.8	12.9

We note here, on the one hand, that the participants belonging to the popular class scored the best averages and, on the other hand, that the participants from the upper class scored a general average slightly higher than that of the middle class.

Learning Environment and Degree of Motivation

According to answers to question 16: "Where did you learn oral tradition?" the participants are distributed as follows:

Place of transmission	Percentage
City	43.3
Countryside	35.5
City and countryside	20.0
No response	01.2

Concerning the degree of motivation of each of the three categories, the results show that the participants who acquired oral tradition in rural areas have a better knowledge of it than those who received it in urban areas; the average scores are 12.3 and 11.4, respectively. It should be noted that the average score of the participants who declared to have acquired oral tradition both in the city and in the countryside is 12.6, and it is thus superior to the previous cases. This result seems to convey that oral tradition is transmitted both in rural and urban areas.

Initiator and Degree of Motivation

Regarding the instructing agent to oral tradition that is object of question 16: "Who taught you oral tradition?" The participants provided answers that show that the transmitter is a female par excellence, as it is conveyed in the following figures:

Transmitting agent	Percentage
Paternal grandmother	22.2
Mother	18.8
Maternal grandmother	17.7
Father	10.0
Brother/ sister	00.0

Participants who were introduced to oral tradition by their mothers or grandmothers got the highest score (13/18), while those who declared having acquired the tradition by themselves have the lowest score (5/18); it should also be noted that transmission does not occur between brothers and sisters. These results show that the transmission of oral tradition is performed in a more privileged way by the ascendants of the female members. In addition, the family, as a cultural environment, constitutes a main space of transmission of the orate tradition.

Patrimony Social Representations

The system of representations that the participants have of oral tradition is derived from answers to the questions relating the value assigned to it (Q 6), the utility of its collection (Q 7), the aspects that are appreciated in it (Q 8), its transmission to the youth (Q 9) and finally the threats to which it is exposed (Q 10).

The Value Assigned to Oral Tradition

Question 6 is formulated as follows: "What value do you give to oral tradition?" The relevance of this question consists in that it intends to capture the motivation that participants have for oral tradition. In other words, it is about whether oral tradition is a key value for the participants.

The results obtained on this respect are presented in terms of percentages in the following table:

Value	%	Score
High	33.3	12.1
Average	63.3	11.9
Without	06.6	08.6

The following table provides the average scores achieved by the participants according to their place of birth, gender, social class and age:

Variables		Score
Place of birth	Rural	02.3
	Urban	02.2
Gender	Male	02.2
	Female	02.3
Social class	Popular	02.3
	Middle	02.2
	Upper	02.3
Age	-19 years	02.1
	19-24 years	02.3
	25-30 years	02.3

It thus implies that the participants grant a solid value to oral tradition, which means that they have a positive representation about it. Indeed, by considering the total score recorded by the participants, we realize that the value granted to oral tradition goes proportionally higher in score, so much so that participants who consider oral tradition to be of great value record the highest score and vice versa. This last observation is corroborated by the results of the intersection of the independent variables with the variable "value".

Let us now consider the findings of the qualitative analysis of the participants' representations of oral tradition by highlighting what they think of its collection, the aspects that constitute it, its transmission, and the real or potential risks that threaten it.

Oral Tradition Collection Utility

Question (07) "Do you think that it is useful to collect and record oral tradition?" was massively answered in the affirmative by (80%) of the participants. The relevance of this question is to allow for grasping in qualitative terms the nature of their representation of oral tradition. The analysis of the content of responses provided to this question allows for drawing up an ordered list as delineated below.

Positive Representations

According to the received answers, it is necessary to collect oral tradition for the sake of preserving it, given that it represents: the national cultural identity, the national heritage, the image of culture and thought of the ancestors, the reflection of Moroccan tradition, popular culture, the link between the past and the present, accumulated experiences serving as a guide for youth, the flourishment of the spirit, Moroccan specificity and authenticity, the guarant protector against invasion of Western culture, and finally, a knowledge carrier in that it is a documentary source of a historical value.

Negative Representations

On the opposite side, the participants who are against the recording of oral tradition consider, on the one hand, that it is a useless enterprise as it is the culture of a bygone past, and on the other hand, because it is a culture corrupt by charlatanism and the irrational. Consequently, according to this point of view, the interest that could be granted to oral tradition is a mere waste of time.

Appreciated Aspects in Oral Tradition

Question 8 which reads as follows: "What do you appreciate in oral tradition?" aims to appreciate the valued aspects in oral tradition, including language, style and content. The relevance of this question is that it makes it possible to grasp the nature of sensitivity to tradition: does it have to do with an aesthetic pleasure, an interest in rhetoric, or an interest in scientific knowledge or cultural content? The responses provided by the participants are presented below:

Aspect	Percentage
Language	03.3
Style	08.8
Content	23.3
Language + style	05.5
Language + content	10.0
Style + content	27.7
Language + style +content	16.6
None	04.4

It thus shows that young people represent oral tradition both as a literary object and a medium of knowledge. It should also be noted that they grant only limited interest to oral tradition as a linguistic expression,

which would mean that the Ianguage vehicle, in this case Moroccan Arabic and Amazighe, is not an important element in their system of representations, at least a component of oral tradition.

Oral Tradition Transmission to Youth

Question (Q 9): "Do you think that oral tradition should be passed on to young people?" intends to allow us to know whether young people consider tradition as a central value in the cultural *habitus* and worthy of being transferred to youth; in other words, if oral tradition represents the culture of the past, possibly that of the present, can it be considered that it should constitute a part of the future Moroccan culture? If the answer is yes, are the young generations convinced of the importance of oral tradition to the point of transmitting it to their children to ensure its preservation?

The high proportion of participants who answered "yes" to this question (77.7%) indicates that they are convinced of the necessity to transmit oral tradition to young people. To the sub-question "Why?" they provided relatively accurate and nuanced answers:

- The answers that connote the positive representation of the symbolic function of oral tradition transmission are inventoried as follows: the transmission of oral tradition shapes the mind of young people; grants them with a valuable cultural asset; guarantees the condition of its own durability; ensures the connection with cultural roots; makes young people aware of the past of their community; insures that young people are anchored in the process of opening up to the outside world;
- The participants who declared that they disapprove of the transmission of oral tradition provide the following arguments: oral tradition is futile, it does not appeal to young people because it does not reflect modern culture; therefore, its transition presents no interest.

Threats to Oral Tradition

Oral tradition, as a patrimonial culture, is generally considered as threatened of extinction; it is therefore interesting to know the extent to which this feeling is shared by young people. Question 10 "What are according to you the dangers threatening Moroccan oral tradition?" is an open question that aims to allow the participants to express their point of view about the perils that threaten oral tradition.

The replies provided reflect the participants' cultural imagination, namely their representation of the contact of cultures. The following are the main foreseen threats:

- The invasion of media cultures, namely the American and Asian cultures;
- School as a vehicle of the dominant culture;
- Modern leisure activities such as television, audio cassettes, audio-visual cassettes, video games, etc. ;
- Scientific culture;
- Imitation of Western cultural fashions;
- The general neglect of oral tradition, both by the State and by the older generations as well as by the youth themselves;
- Denaturation of content, language and style following the Arabization of education and public life;
- Diction and defective elocution of the reciters;
- Shortage in the documentation on oral tradition;
- Insufficiency in the scientific research on oral tradition;
- The superficial nature of the content and the poor style of the tradition.

In conclusion, it appears from the presentation of the results of the quantitative and qualitative analyzes that the young people have a favorable attitude towards oral tradition and its transmission; they particularly manifest a significant degree of motivation and positive representations.

Are Youngsters the Weak Link?

In this second part of the analyzes, we will examine the previous findings in the light of the postulated hypothesis, and which is formulated as follows: *because of their particular position in society which makes them primarily a segment that is more sensitive to change than others, a motor group in a way, young people have a little interest in oral tradition and in traditional culture in general*. It is interesting to note that this hypothesis is refuted by the results of the empirical analysis. In this section, we will discuss the five secondary hypotheses which follow from the general hypothesis.

Hypothesis 1. *Young people have a good knowledge of oral tradition*

In contrast with this hypothesis, the young people who make up the surveyed sample have quite a good knowledge of oral tradition, even if they favor songs and proverbs over the folktale, while demonstrating almost a total ignorance of scientific research. These results can be explained by the following indicators:

(i) *Degree of exposure*: young people listen to songs more often than to folktales, especially through powerful media such as television and radio. It is the result of the influence of the "videosphere" culture on youth, at the expense of book reading culture.

(ii) *Nature of leisure*: songs and proverbs have a more marked leisure character than that of tales. The individual is somehow in a state of passive receptivity that requires neither sustained attention nor sustained effort, especially that the lapse of time in which he is exposed to it is sShort;

(iii) Memorization: songs and proverbs are memorized easier than tales, because they appeal to the "instantaneous" involvement of the participant who hums the tune and the refrain and memorizes the assonances of the proverbs.

The fact that only a very small proportion of participants have been able to cite works devoted to oral tradition means that the knowledge they have of them is a kind of informal and ludic knowledge. This also means that the interest for oral tradition as a scientific subject matter is limited since the agent of transmission is essentially an illiterate agent, the grandmother or the mother, and the place of transmission, i.e. the family environment, is an informal place par excellence.

Hypothesis 2: Young people have a positive representation of oral tradition

It also appears from the findings that the majority of participants appreciates oral tradition, wants it to be collected, stored, and passed on to younger generations and regrets that it is threatened of extinction. Young people thus have a favorable attitude towards oral tradition and have a meliorative representation of it, especially when they declare that oral tradition constitutes a foundation of cultural identity, a patrimonial vehicle and a cultural anchorage against alienation to foreign culture, notably the Western culture. What could this attitude mean? Many elements of interpretation can be used:

Influence of traditional culture on youth

This influence is manifested in the conventional sense. Such a fact had already been observed among the rural youth of the 1960s, especially the notion of family, which remains a securing frame, the authority of the father, the position of women and marriage (See Pascon and Bentahar, 1969). It appears that the same values are still prevalent among young people in the 1990s in terms of the perception of family, religion, marriage

and polygamy as well as the perception of the self and of the other (See Bourqia *et al.*, 1995).

Instrumentalization of school culture

Young people have a purely instrumental conception of the culture received at school and at the university, in the sense that this culture is reduced to an instrument allowing acquiring technical skills in order to get a profession (the diploma for employment). The epistemic foundations of this culture are not incorporated in the youth's cultural habitus. In other words, the values that accompany school education are not assimilated to the extent of contribution to change the behavior of young people. Consequently, school culture has little influence on the system of representation of young people in terms of knowledge and social skills; it is reduced to know-how.

Hypothesis 3: *Oral tradition is not a privilege of the rural society*

The analysis findings also revealed that there is no significant difference between rural participants or those of rural origin and urban participants, since the score of the two groups is substantially the same, and the one of the second group is even slightly higher than that of the first group. Can we thus continue to say that oral tradition is par excellence a rural culture? Based on the results of the survey, one can only answer no. How to explain this apparent paradox?

"City life", as a socio-cultural fact, is a relatively marginal phenomenon in Moroccan society, even though the urban population is now greater than the rural population, it represents 61.17% of the total population according to the 2017 estimates of the High Commissioner of Plan. The Moroccan society is culturally marked by rurality because of the impact of the rural exodus, even if it is the culture of the urban groups of Andalusia origin which dominates in the formal field of symbolic production. It can, accordingly, be said that traditional culture is as strong in the city as it is

in the countryside. While still enhancing the paradox, one can say that with the massive rural exodus, we are witnessing a large scale ruralization of urban society.

Despite the decomposition of the rural society following the collapse of its economic and social foundations, rurality as a cultural phenomenon continues to resist decay. It is carried by rural exodus; it adapts to the urban environment, persists in conditioning the migrants' consciousness and minds, and continues to reproduce rural local cultural patterns in urban territory. So, it is not surprising to see rural songs flourish in Casablanca studios, or witness the re-emergence of rural proverbs in the social practices of neo-city dwellers... We, thus, infer that young people are attached to oral tradition.

Hypothesis 4: *Oral tradition is a distinctive feature of women's culture*

The findings of the present survey show that oral tradition is not confined to female participants. In fact, participants of both sexes share as much in terms of the degree of motivation for oral tradition as in terms of the representation they have thereof. This conclusion refutes the hypothesis that girls know and appreciate oral tradition better than boys. It is often claimed that oral tradition belongs to the feminine world and is essentially a feminine culture. It is indeed women who are traditionally custodians and "transmitters" of oral tradition in the context of cultural education of children during family evening parties (See Basset, 1920; Lacoste-Dujardin, 1970). This observation also emerges from the analysis carried out here since the majority of the participants state that it is the grandmothers and mothers who most often transmit oral tradition.

Why is this so?

Let us recall that in traditional societies the education rate is low: child education is essentially women's responsibility, so it is natural that they transmit their culture to their off springs. It stands to reason though that

this culture can only exist in the form of an oral tradition especially that female illiteracy rate is 41.9% according to the 2014 census. Even in the settings where education rate is important, which is apriori the case of the participants who took part in this survey, the privilege of child education mission is ensured by women, in this case the mother and/or the grandmother.

If oral tradition is transmitted mainly by women, the beneficiaries of this culture are as many girls as the boys. For example, when we had worked on the folktale, the informants which served as a source from which I collected my data were exclusively males (See Boukous, 1977). This means that the boy is as attentive to this culture as the girl, and that he appropriates it as much as she does, and that he is in a position to act as its custodian and transmitter.

Youth: What cultural model?

In the conclusion of their survey on the rural youth at the end of the 1960s,. Pasco and Bentham (idem, p.284) wrote:

> *Today, the extraordinary growth of the population over the last decades means that half of it is less than twenty years old: it is the segment which is mostly educated, mostly open to information, the least influenced by the economic or social achievements, the most liberated of beliefs and obscurities, the most free to believe that only ideas create obligations and that all the concert of the laws, rules, economic causalities or anything else are but clutter accumulated throughout history and by retrograde customs. It turns out at the same time that this youth of the new age is the segment of the population that is intellectually best adapted to the technical requirements of the modern world.*

Three decades later, in the conclusion of their study on the values and strategies of Moroccan students, Bourqia *et al.* (Idem, 111) made a striking judgment on the culture of young university students:

> *In sum, what characterizes Moroccan young students is the absence of a student culture and code. The social group known as the students would be a*

> *priori a producer of a subculture that would sometimes function as a counterculture. This latter would distinguish them and would grant them a special position inside society. However, the attitude of Moroccan students regarding values expresses the absence of such a counter-culture and the practice of some tinkering that draws its codes in the different reservoirs of the norms advocated by society.*

We are thus confronted with two opposing assessments of how youth are perceived. On the hand, there is the optimistic perception which views young people as a potential force of progress through their numbers, education, energy and openness to the modern world. Faced with the inertia and retrograde tradition of the greedy and lazy adults, young people represent a social group carrying a new culture, that of change and progress. Pascon and Bentahar (ibid., p. 286-287) get ahead and consider youth as the key to development:

> *It is certain that the solution to underdevelopment is to use the amazing boosts of desire, passion, and hope of young men, who are more and more liberated, to finally build a habitable world free from its old anxieties.*

On the other side, with Borqia *et al.* (*ibid.*), we have a pessimistic view stating that young people have become a reservoir of subculture cultivating tinkering and coping with no other utopian perspective than religious fundamentalism. The image suggested is one where youth are deeply marked by the crisis, disappointed by university, materially and emotionally dependent on parents and anxious to maintain the precepts of religion. It is also the youth who opt majoritarily for the *hijab* and polygamy, defy political parties, privilege religious identity and aspire to emigration.

The present study, which focuses on a particular aspect of the youth culture's habitus, namely the degree of motivation for oral tradition and their representation thereof, in fact contributes to the qualification of the initial hypothesis. Indeed, the obtained results reveal that young people know oral tradition and integrate it into their reference system by placing it in a frame of patrimonial cultural identity rather than appropriating as a

scientific subject matter. This is, in a way, the image of a youth who draw on a cultural patrimonial identity.

Patrimonialism : Decay or Revival?

Based on the observation that youngsters know oral tradition well, adopt a positive attitude and integrate a favorable representation, we can understand then that it can constitute a breeding ground for the influence of traditional if not traditionalist and conservative culture. In fact, the concern of youth people suggests being the quest for identity, the willingness to make anchors in the traditional referents of the past and the heritage. This quest is generally interpreted as an indicator of a favorable attitude to religious fundamentalism. Yet, this ignores the dogmatic rejection of the Salafists as well as *Islamists* of oral tradition and of "Popular culture" in general, both assimilated to charlatanism and *bidâ* or illicit innovations.

This conclusion stands firmly against the hypothesis postulated at the beginning of this study, which presupposes that young people adhere by nature to a process of change that allows them to produce a counter-culture. The weakness of this hypothesis can be explained by several factors, the most important of which are the multi-dimensional crisis that society as general, and the segment of young people in particular, is going through, the rejection of voluntarist utopias represented by the different variants of the revolutionary model, the refusal of the Western model based on wild liberalism, and the attraction to the patrimonialist ideology, and so on.

Invalidation of the initial hypothesis can also be explained by the methodological limitations of the work carried out here, especially the fact that the survey did not sufficiently involve participants from the higher class, and those educated abroad or in the institutions and high institutes which get their candidates from this environment. Given their academic background and the quality of their family environment, it is expected that these subjects would be more inclined than others to give up oral

tradition and adopt modern culture. Can we say that the societal model that seems to go hand in hand with the values generally conveyed by oral tradition is necessarily anchored in the logic of "identity illusion" (See Bayart, 1996) rather than in a new societal paradigm generated by cultural break up? Is it the case that the Moroccan society has developed resistance mechanisms such as the school and the media which failed to inculcate in youth this supposedly universal culture imposed by the unequal exchange of symbolic goods between North and South? The recovery of an equitable exchange inevitably requires the development of peripheral cultural expressions in the context of the creative industries. It is an absolute precondition for sustainable development as a lever for the sustainability of culture itself and the well-being of its producers.

Essay 13
Culture, Development, and Sustainability

In tribute to
Aziz Belal (1932-1982)

Statement of the Problem

Peripheral culture has often been the subject of ambivalent and folkloristic understanding. Some consider the expressions of intangible culture, namely the arts and letters, the arts of oral expression (singing), and oral literature (poetry, storytelling, etc.) as primitive and elementary forms. Others deny any aesthetic value to the production of arts and handicrafts such as the rugs, jewelry, while others place culture on a pedestal which makes it a fetish aureole escaping an objective approach, that of the market. This understanding is challenged today both at the scientific and political level. At the scientific level, cultural anthropology, language and text sciences show that Amazigh literature, for example, is very rich both formally and in terms of content, be they oral or written literary expressions. At the political level, the Amazigh culture is recognized by the Moroccan Constitution (July 1, 2011) as an integral part of the cultural diversity that marks the national culture. It represents even its historical basis.

The revitalization process of Amazigh culture carried by the creativity of its producers and its actors, and legitimized by the constitutional provisions implies a commitment of the State and society to ensure the conditions of its sustainability. Among these conditions, sustainable development occupies a central position. This assumption is now widely established by UNESCO since the Mexico City Summit in 1982, the 2005 Convention, and the Hangzhou International Congress in 2013. As a result

of which, this statement has been implemented in the public policies of the States at the national, regional and local levels. In Morocco, the report of The Ministry of Culture (2014) and the reports of civil society (See *Racines*, November 2014) reflect the interest attributed to culture as a development lever. With respect to the theory of development, it is necessary here to recall the pioneering contribution of A. Belal (1979) who demonstrated the importance of cultural factors in any endogenous development project.

Culture and Development Issues

For the clarity of the analysis that will be developed hereafter, it would be useful to define some of the notions which will be used, namely "culture", "development", the relation between "culture" and "development" and the issues raised by this relationship.

On the Notion of "Culture"

We will adopt here the conception of "culture" conveyed in the definition below by the UNESCO:

> *"In its widest sense, culture may now be said to refer to the whole complex of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features that characterize a society or social group. It includes not*
>
> *only the arts and letters, but also modes of life, the fundamental rights of the human being, value systems, traditions and beliefs"*
>
> Source: Mexico City Declaration on Cultural Policies World on Cultural Policies Mexico City, 26 July - 6 August 1982.

By reformulating this definition, we state that culture is a set of customs, traditions, beliefs, intellectual, spiritual and emotional values, formal and informal norms influencing the way the world is perceived and acted on, characterizing a particular group of people and often related to a geographical area and/or social group. Culture also offers an ethical dimension to human development. According to UNESCO's Convention on

the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2001), cultural diversity is considered a "human heritage". The terms of the Convention stipulate that "Culture creates a rich and a diverse world, which expands the possible choices, nourishes human capacities and values, and is therefore a fundamental element of the sustainable development of communities, peoples and nations." Cultural diversity is therefore a great asset for individuals and societies. The protection, promotion and maintenance of cultural diversity are, moreover, an essential condition of sustainable development for the benefit of present and future generations.

Based on the UNESCO's definition, the Amazigh cultural production will be considered as incorporating both the tangible and the intangible components of culture. Amazigh cultural expressions are of great diversity and richness in their forms and their patterns. Expressions of tangible culture that are mostly known consist mainly in *the Kasbahs, the ksours*, the socio-economic heritage represented by the *Igoudar* in the South-east and South-west Morocco, and the *Agdal* (Aït Hamza, 2012). These include also the handicraft items such as women made pottery from the North and the one made by Men from Southeast, and the jewelers from the Rif, the Middle Atlas, the High Atlas, the Anti-Atlas, the Southeast and the Southwest regions, the wood carving of the High Atlas region, the rugs of Zemmour, Glaoua, and Taznakht (IRCAM, *Amazigh arts and architecture of Morocco,* 2011); the emerging plastic arts (See Azdoud, 2012); men and women clothing of different regions (See Rabaté & Sorber, 2007), nomadic, transhumant and sedentary modes of life (See Skounti, 2012), and the know-how underlying the management techniques of resources, particularly water, land, crops, and cattle, etc. (Asinag, 2012). Modalities of the resource management are formalized through the provisions of customary law (See Al-Milki, 2011).

As for expressions of intangible culture, they are attested in written and oral literary works such as poetry and prose, and speech arts like songs, namely *Aghennnij* in the Rif, *izli* in Central and South-eastern Morocco, *imurig* in the South-west) (Basset, 1920), as well as in body expressions namely dances like *ahidus* in Central and South-eastern

Morocco, *aḫwash* in the Southwest and *bouḍar* in the Northeast). The main values conveyed by the Amazigh culture are listed as follows: solidarity (*tiwizi*) *taḍa* (See Belghazi, 2009), trust (*awal*), respect (*udm*), democracy (*ljmaât*), spirituality (*timzgida*, *zzawit*, *lmusem*), hoarding and saving (*igherm, tasraft*), sanctity of the human life (the customary law ignores the death penalty), socio-economic pragmatism (the customary law favors punishment in the form of material compensation fines, etc.).

It would have been noted here that this is "Amazigh culture" and not "Amazigh identity". The notion of identity is often conceived of as an essentialist, absolute and closed entity to the dynamics of change, whereas culture, as heritage, beliefs, values and social behaviors is affected by change. The approach adopted in this essay avoids the amalgamations and traps of the identity discourse that sometimes magnifies the communitarianism underpinned by a backward-looking and nostalgic vision. Similarly, the prejudice we have here is that of a historicist approach which considers the "Amazigh question" as the product of a certain moment in the history of the Amazigh community. This approach considers the Amazigh culture a fundamentally socio-political issue whose sound management is undertaken within the framework of the constitutional provisions and international conventions in the area of human rights, that is, in the context of a systematic understanding of the impact of the external factors of social determinism and of the endogenous factors related to community sensitization (See Chraïbi, 2013). It is an approach resolutely anchored in modernity and oriented towards the future and common destiny.

On the Concept of "Development"

The Classical conception defines development as the production of material goods in the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors. Countries with a high output of goods are referred to as "developed" and the others as "underdeveloped" or by way of euphemism as "developing". This

conception has shown that economic growth is not synonymous of wellbeing, wealth sharing, meeting of people's needs in terms of consumption goods, cultural goods, education, and public health, etc.

The limitations of the “economist” conception of development have led to questioning its efficiency and to adopting of other conceptions in terms of human development, sustainable development, political development, solidarity economy, and so on. Indeed, as shown by the failure of projects since the 1970s, development is not synonymous with economic growth alone. It is a means of gaining a satisfactory intellectual, emotional, moral and spiritual existence; as such, development is indivisible from culture. Enhancing the role of culture in sustainable development projects is an objective that was initiated by the *World Decade for Cultural Development* (1988-1998). Since then, progress has been made thanks to a global regulatory frameworks and demonstration tolls such as cultural statistics, inventories, national and regional maps of cultural resources. Culture as a means to reduce the impact of poverty and to promote integration and social cohesion, appears at the level of self-centered development, local participation, inclusion and social cohesion, which constitute sources of solidarity, and promotion of gender equality with power primacy granted to women. It is precisely this conception of development that is adopted here.

Finally, we can say, following the Rio Earth Summit held in 1992 under the auspices of the United Nations, that sustainable development is a development that responds to the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet theirs. By adapting the terms of the Hangzhou Declaration (2013), we will add that sustainable development is based on four pillars: economy, ecology, society and culture, all of which establish a development which is economically efficient, socially equitable, ecologically sustainable and culturally viable.

On the Relationship between Culture and Development

It should be pointed out that, since the beginning of the 1990s, a parallel reflection was initiated by the UNESCO on the theme of culture and development, particularly in *the Perez de Cuellar Report*, *Our creative diversity, by the World Commission on Culture and Development* (1996) and *the UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity* (2001). Gradually, the cultural dimension has become a central constituent of the discourse on sustainable development. Mrs. Irina Bokova, Director-General of UNESCO emphasizes, in her speech in the conference on the economic weight of the cultural sector held on December 3, 2015, that culture is "a vector of development" driven by the development in the sector of "cultural and creative industries". With respect to Amazigh culture, the promotion of this latter cannot be sustainable without its adherence to integrated development projects at the national, regional and local levels.

In political discourse, culture would be a powerful factor of creativity, quality of life and innovation that would promote growth and employment. By being placed at the heart of priorities in all the authority decisions, culture can favor the access to knowledge, for upgrading urban and rural spaces, and for social integration. Thus, public policies of sustainable development would accompany the local communities initiatives and they would take into account the ever-increasing expectations of the citizens who, being increasingly better informed and more and more sensitized, consider the contributions of the culture as an integral part of their quality of life, particularly through the integration of culture into a territorial process of sustainable development, as stated in *the Advanced Regionalization Project* (2011).

The challenge for the civil society and for the village communities is to convince local, national and international decision-makers to integrate the principles of cultural diversity and the values of cultural pluralism into all policies, mechanisms and public practices, particularly through public/private partnerships. The aim is to anchor culture in all development policies, including community education, cultural tourism,

communication, health, and the environment, and to support the development of the cultural sector through creative industries (*Raciness*, *idem*, 2014). It is necessary to recall here the conclusions and recommendations of *the Hangzhou International Congress*, pertaining to the theme of "Culture: a key to sustainable development", and which was held in Hangzhou, in the People's Republic of China, from May 15 to 17, 2013. This is the first international congress specifically dedicated to the links between culture and sustainable development organized by UNESCO since *the Stockholm Conference* in 1998. The Congress hosted the first global forum for discussion on the role of culture in sustainable development in the perspective of preparing the "development framework beyond 2015" with the participation of the international community and major international actors.

Culture and Development Dialectics

It is admitted today that culture is an integral part of sustainable development. Better still, culture is the fourth pillar of sustainable development alongside with economic, social and environmental sectors. Experience has demonstrated that the cultural resources of a community can be transformed into economic wealth by promoting the unique character of identity, traditions, cultural products and services of a region in the sense that they generate jobs and wages. Experiences conducted by the civil society in certain regions of Morocco are very promising, especially the cooperatives for the *argan* tree and its derivatives in the Souss and for olive tree in the Sais, the pre-Rif region, the ecological tourism in the South-east and the Atlas, the camel and its products in the Southern provinces, etc. These experiences reveal the capacity of communities to bet on the conservation of cultural goods, to promote cultural activities, traditional knowledge and skills developed by Man through adaptation to the environment. These stand as efficient means to enhance sustainable development and social capital of communities.

The populations of Amazigh-speaking regions are considered among the poorest of the Kingdom, as indicated by the *World Bank's Map of Poverty and Precariousness* relayed by the High Commissioner for Planning (2004). That is the reason why they are investing in the cultural capital, which is an asset in the fight for the alleviation of poverty. In fact, Amazigh-speaking areas are not necessarily the poorest. The subsoil is full of precious minerals but it is the mining companies that benefit from them. The soil produces considerable wealth such as cedar in the Middle Atlas, and the derivative products of *argan*, and Barbary figs are now sold at a price of gold, but it is not the native populations who benefit from them. Similarly, the water resources of the Atlas benefit mainly the plains and the cities. These examples show how the products of material culture are not the object of a solidarity economy, and that, concretely, their marketing does not significantly contribute to the improvement of the well-being of Amazigh-speaking rural populations; it is also almost the case of the different regions of the country.

Taking into account the cultural component makes development possible when projects accept and recognize the local context and the specificities of the place and the community, through the careful use of cultural resources, local knowledge and know-how. Supporting culture, as advocated by the Ministry of Culture and the *Raciness Association*, also means giving an active role to community members in managing their future and overcoming the throes of poverty. Across the poor communities, the observation of the role of relationship between culture and poverty and an examination of their constant interaction make it possible to show that culture remains one of the essential matrices of sustainable human development. The international experts, namely those of UN, UNDP, OECD, UNESCO, and the World Bank, agree on this.

Poverty manifests first and foremost as an expression of a lack and a deprivation, such as the absence or insufficiency of material resources, like food, clothing, shelter, or the money necessary to obtain them. At the same time, it is often also the result of the absence of inadequacy of immaterial resources such as education, social consideration, isolation or

some form of exclusion from society. This phenomenon is widely attested in the communities living in poverty and precariousness around the world. In many countries, women and men become poorer because they no longer identify themselves in their own culture, but worse, they do not know their culture anymore, as shown by a quick examination of two notions: *respect* and *solidarity*. Until a fairly recent time and in many communities, every evening, the head of the family used to gather its members, not to watch a film on television, but to interact, to instruct young people on how to make sense of each word they would have to utter. They were taught both the art of eloquence and argumentation, as well as how to think right and accurate by respecting a hierarchy of speaking turn; and each new lesson learned was put into practice within the group, in a recurrent but organized way and within a coherent vision which would prevent the loss of a lesson based on the respect of the individual, his place and his role within the group. The village communities of the Atlas Mountains, living in isolation and poverty, are in a very similar situation. They watch living examples of the hiatus attested between the evolution of the economic, social and cultural environment, and the social needs and the public offer relative to the welfare, education, health and sustainable development in general.

The project titled "Morocco Culture, the 2020 strategy", designed by the Ministry of Culture in 2014, offers in theory, interesting possibilities for the integration of culture in development, especially if it is included in action plans in the context of regionalization. Investing in a vibrant culture and in creative sectors promotes the revitalization of local economies in areas rich in heritage and in creative industries. In addition to a tourism rich in terms of heritage potential, some regions can host prosperous artistic and cultural institutions such as museums, shows, and cultural festivals using local resources in particular. Thus, cultural and creative industries can offer greater opportunities for marginalized groups to earn a living in areas such as tourism culture, local products, crafts and entertainment performances. The creative and cultural industries are one of the most dynamic and fast growing sectors in the global economy

exhibiting a generalized growth. This is what could be a considerable contribution to the national economy in case all the non-formal and non-commercial activities relating to culture are taken into account.

Regionalisation and Cultural Development

Cultural development can be undertaken within the local, regional and central environment, but it is undeniable that, after the failure of the centralization and concentration of development projects, the most appropriate context is the regional environment which constitutes a human, cultural and economic reality. In this respect, King Mohammed VI appointed in 2010 the *Advisory Commission for Regionalization* (henceforth, *ACR*) and entrusting it with the following mission: "We invite the Commission to endeavor to develop a Morocco-Moroccan model of regionalization emanating from the specificities of our country"; the said commission submitted its report in 2011, the year of the promulgation of the new Constitution. By starting from the fact that the report of the commission is a corpus that naturally lends itself to a discursive analysis, we would like to discuss the content of the project presented by the *ACR*, especially as regards the consideration of the cultural dimension in regional and territorial identity. First of all, we point out that the report contains a number of strong points which denote a definite technicality, and a considerable amount of seriousness and professionalism. We will, first of all, consider the foundations which structure the report. The regionalization project proposed by the *ACR* rests essentially on political considerations in terms of the democratization of governance at the central and local level. It is also based on economic requirements in terms of integrated development and on the balance yet to be established with respect to the regulation of relations between the State and regions. Finally, we emphasize that, on the basis of these general considerations, a regional division which differs from previous ones has been proposed. This division, which obeys certain considerations, is discussed herein for sound reasons.

The foundations that have been retained in the preparation of the Report are foundations which are certainly relevant to territorial organization and management, but they are insufficient bases to account for the social, cultural and heritage reality of the country. We would like to discuss the vision underlying the Report based on the following premises: first, in our view, there is no territorial democracy without taking into account the historical and heritage identity of the territories. By "heritage" we mean both the tangible and the intangible heritage. There can be no economic territorial development without the integration of the cultural dimension of the regions. Similarly, there can be no development project without taking into account the factors of human development. Finally, we cannot pretend to undertake human development without handling the symbolic dimension of Man because the latter, should it be reiterated, is a multidimensional entity which must be considered in its entirety. However, the project proposed by the *ACR* obscures the regional cultural aspects or addresses them from an inappropriate angle. To illustrate this point, we will quote what is stated on page 7, paragraph m: "The advanced regionalization model does not follow from any accommodation with ethnic, cultural or confessional specificities that are more or less exacerbated".

One may rightly wonder what the Commission intended by the "exacerbated specificities". If these refer to the cultural demands of a segment of the civil society, we should not establish a causal link between the expression of a commitment of the citizen to his culture in its specificities, the will to promote cultural diversity, and "the exacerbation of specificities", or else what some people would fearfully call "communitarianism drifts". The Commission does not show signs of being able to distinguish between the call for legitimate language and cultural rights and their promotion in the context of the regionalization program, and the expression of the ethnicity hints and cultural relativism. What is at stake in such necessary distinction is the preservation and promotion of the cultural and linguistic diversity which is the result of the historical

and anthropological development of our country. This is the conviction of the promoters of *the 2005 UNESCO Convention*.

The prejudice of the *ACR* can be explained, in our view, by a misconception of the plural identity of Morocco, historically based on the plurality of its constituent elements. It also denotes the concealment of the contribution of cultural anthropology to the knowledge of the constituency of the Moroccan society. The bias is thus likely to be interpreted as an ideological position which considers any cultural and/or linguistic specificity a source of danger for national unity. This prejudice could be explained by the belief that the ideal universal model is the one of the nation state in the Jacobin way. Finally, the suggested project is deaf to the expectations and social demands in terms of cultural and linguistic democracy expressed by civil society, as if the expression of these expectations could but be "exacerbated ones". Careful attention should have been given to the academic work done in the fields of cultural history and sociology, namely Paul Pascon's work on the Moroccan society composite, cultural anthropology, and human geography. This should also include research on economy as the one conducted by Aziz Belal (1979), who criticized the "developmentist framework", by highlighting particularly its stalemate and the misguided ways of reductive economics. These works have perfectly analyzed the diversity of cultural practices, their richness, and their centrality in the value system of groups and communities.

In the light of these first elements, we consider that the *ACR Report* is characterized by a reductionism which leads it to sacrificing the social and cultural dimension of regionalization. Moreover, the *Report* is likely to be overtaken by the constitutional provisions and by the new perspectives initiated in the speeches of the Head of the State, namely that of March 9, and that of May 17, 2011, speeches in which the Monarch invites us to adopt audacious thinking in the new paradigms of future Morocco. The said *Report* also risks being overtaken by the social movement that aspires to new Morocco as a reaction to the dominance of the classic developmentist vision and to the timorous political behaviors doomed to

failure. To be able to grasp this, we refer to the main points of the *Report* delineated on pages 3 to 5, to the *normative concepts* and to the *guiding principle*s exposed on pages 31 and 34.

The project submitted by the *ACR* is politically inappropriate in the sense that it did not apprehend the constitutional political context and its whys and wherefores. To illustrate the political reference frame of the regionalization project, we would like to recall the vision and the orientations delineated in the Monarch's Speeches related to regionalization:

> *We also perceive in regionalization the advent of a decentralized administration characterized by proximity and managed by regional elites, in addition to the spawning of cultural specificities whose diversity constitutes a source of enrichment for the Moroccan nation. We are convinced that democracy does not consist only of achieving equality in a rights-based and a united Nation-State; but it also requires a cultural substratum that illustrates the respect for the diversity of regional cultural particularities by offering them a nature space to ensure their continuity, creativity and diversity that harmoniously shape the national unity.*
>
> The Throne Day Speech of July 30, 2001

> *Each region enfolds significant potential and natural, urbanistic and cultural assets.*
>
> The Agadir Speech of December 12, 2006.

> *The success of regionalization requires the adoption of an efficient division suitable to promote the emergence of regions which are economically and geographically complementary, and socially and culturally harmonious.*
>
> The Marrakesh Speech of November 6, 2008.

> *Extended regionalization should be the democratic affirmation of Morocco's singularity, rich in the diversity of its cultural tributaries and its environmental assets, all of which merge into a unique and singular national identity.*
>
> The Speech of January 3, 2010.

> *The first foundation of the overall constitutional reform is stated as follows:*
>
> *The constitutional recognition of the plurality of the Moroccan identity, united and rich in the diversity of its tributaries, and at the heart of which there is Amazighity, a common heritage of all Moroccans, all being included.*
>
> The Speech of March 9, 2011.

Pointing out the gap between the royal orientations, which grant full weight to the cultural dimension of the regions, on the one hand, and the apolitical background of the *Report of the Advisory Commission on Regionalization*, on the other, gives rise to the following hypotheses:

- The Commission, which did not benefit from a framework guided by the political line of the State, worked on the basis of the orientations specific to the political context prior to that of the constitution project then ongoing;
- The Commission worked on the basis of a technocratic line of reasoning by providing a project to be later politically reframed by the State;
- The Commission considered that, in the absence of any constitutional provisions regulating the regionalization project, it could not anticipate those provisions which are still under preparation by the State.

Moreover, when it was published, the *ACR Report* was in contradiction with the philosophy of the Constitution promulgated in the same year; this would explain the reason why, among other political, economic and governance reasons, the "advanced regionalization" project is still not being implemented.

In the light of the issues raised above, it is cleat then that there is a major risk that this project will be at odds with the recent developments characterizing the political process in Morocco. Worse than that, there is the risk that the epistemic foundation on which the project is based, namely the assumption that cultural specificities are detrimental to the

unity of the nation and that, consequently, they should be withdrawn from the project of regionalization, stands in contradiction with the new Constitution. The latter recognizes the diversity characterizing the national culture and grants Amazigh with the status of official language. To overcome the model advocated by the *ACR* in the "advanced regionalization" project, alternative principles can be suggested as strategic levers to succeed in reforming regionalization in Morocco:

- Taking into account the historical, cultural and linguistic foundations which shape the plural national identity, whose foundations are delineated in the *Fiftieth Anniversary Report*; correlatively, the exclusion of these fundamentals is likely to engender a deconstruction of the regions by creating irreparable disharmonies;
- Compliance with the human rights, in their universality, complementarity and indivisibility, namely civil, economic, cultural and linguistic rights. In this case, we make reference to the *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,* to the *UNESCO Convention on the Promotion of Cultural Diversity*, *the Barcelona Declaration on Linguistic Rights* and the *Freiburg Declaration on Cultural Rights ;*
- The anchoring of the democratic choices and orientations in which the project of a Morocco "united in its diversity"; and finally,
- The integration of cultural development into economic development and, consequently, the articulation of the economic, social and cultural dimensions in an integrated and regionalizing project.

Within the context of the above-mentioned principles, we are in a paradigm which should considerably enrich the model on which the regionalization project, as conceived by the ACR, is based. It should also be retained that if this project was considered as an advanced regional self-government project, and if it did not integrate the cultural dimension in

its diversity and its scope, it would then be neither attractive nor credible nor viable. What is left is evidently only the competing model, the one of regional autonomy proposed to the Sahrawi populations in the South, which could offer the Amazigh-speaking regions, for example, the conditions for the flourishing of cultural diversity.

The consideration of the preceding principles aims at giving cultural identity to regions in the context of an integrated regionalization project. As a matter of fact, the regional cultural marks can by no means be a disabling factor as to the unity of the nation, to the cohesion of society and to the development of the country; on the contrary, they are additional factors and strategic levers necessary for the success of the advanced regionalization project. It goes without saying that these "cultural marks" are not necessarily synonymous with exclusive ethnic specificities. Needless to state in this respect that the territorial division proposed by the ACR, namely the problematic case raised by the region of Tangier-Tetouan-Al Haciema and that of Beni Mellal-Khenifra, does not meet the constitutional requirements regarding the preservation and promotion of national cultural and linguistic expressions in their natural environment. That is, regions with a historical and cultural personality, those which manage democratically their material and symbolic resources are more congruent with a policy observing unity, cohesion and solidarity of the entities composing national communities.

Culture, Development, and Equity

The World Commission for Culture and Development states that culture is the source of human progress and creativity; to this end, it has to be promoted for the sake of human welfare. The human race knows, instinctively, that maintaining a relationship with the unique character of its historical and natural environment, alongside with language, music, art and literature that accompany it all along its life, is fundamental for its welfare and for making sense of its life. One has to recall that culture assigns an intrinsic value to any community regardless of its position on

the scale of human development. Culture is certainly an essential factor of social inclusion and cohesion and a source of solidarity. Social cohesion creates favorable conditions for development while cultural approaches favor the promotion of inclusion, equity, and diversity by recognizing and protecting cultural values as important resources.

In this general perspective, and through its various expressions, namely local knowledge, know-how and social skills, and also through the social dynamism which embodies its creativity, the Moroccan culture can but benefit from an approach based on respect and promotion of cultural diversity as recognized by the country's Constitution and its implementation in the regionalization program. In addition, this human rights-based approach facilitates inter-cultural dialogue, prevents conflicts and protects the rights of marginalized groups within the national community, thereby creating the optimal conditions for carrying out the objectives of human and sustainable development. Finally, Amazigh cultural expressions considered as sectors of activity - including the tangible and intangible heritage and the related creative industries - are in themselves a powerful vector of development, with considerable social and community, economic and environmental impacts in terms of the valorization of the national cultural and intangible capital. This is possible provided that the transmission of the community knowledge and know-how engages the new generations and integrates the dynamics of creativity and modernization. Overcoming precariousness is thus the guarantor of social cohesion through the solidarity of citizens and the recognition of collective belonging to a modernist social project.

Essay 14
Towards a Humanized Modernity

In tribute to
Abdallah Laroui (1933 -)

Statement of the Problem

The main issue dealt with in the present essay is about the conditions of the raise of "the Moroccan modern project". By "modern project", we generally mean a social model based on the progress of sciences and arts that is supposed to liberate human beings from suffering and alienation. We therefore boost the development of the productive forces so as to attain a domination/exploitation of natural phenomena through science and technology. Modern philosophers and scientists believed that this development in knowledge and technology must necessarily yield improvement in the human, social and political conditions. "The modern project" is therefore at the same time philosophical, scientific and sociopolitical.

The "modernity" syndrome crosses the peripheral societies vertically and horizontally since the frontal collision with the West and the representations that these societies have, namely with respect to weaponry, technology, industry, and the way of life. This is the reason why modernity today represents a major challenge of the historical evolution of communities and societies. But "modernity" as a concept or a notion remains ambiguous. According to Piotte (2001), the clues allowing for understanding cultural differences between modernity and the periods that preceded it are: individual freedom, equality between individuals, reason at the service of passion, honor and prayer, work as a value rather than wisdom, love rather than reproduction, the market rather than the

community, the nation rather than religion, a new form of State or representative democracy, and religion as a private affair. In brief, following Baudrillard (See *Encyclopedia Universalis*), modernity is a characteristic mode of civilization which is opposed to the mode of tradition, that is to say, to all the other anterior or traditional cultures.

The modern individualist and rationalist thought, since Descartes and *Philosophy of the Enlightenment,* are the philosophical and political foundations of modernity. The latter will become a way of life, after being initially an idea related to a constant progress in science and technology and a rational division of industrial labor which introduces a dimension of permanent change to society. With demographic growth, urban concentration and developments in the means of communication and modernity has become a social practice and a way of life articulated around change, innovation, but also around worries, instability, permanent mobilization, unstable subjectivity, tension, and crisis. Modernity will stir up, at all levels, an esthetic of rupture, individual creativity and innovation anywhere marked by the sociological phenomenon of the avant-garde, and by an ever-increasing destruction of traditional forms. Tradition used to live on sustainability and on real transcendence.

Having inaugurated the rupture and the discontinuity, modernity has confined itself into a new cycle; it has lost the ideological impulse of reason and progress and is becoming more and more confused with the formal game of change. Even its myths have turned against it; technology, formerly triumphal, is today a source of threats. The ideals and the human values it once incarnated are being lost: it is more and more characterized by the *abstract transcendence of all powers*. Within it, liberty is a formal entity, the people become *a mass* and culture turns into *a mode*. After having been a catalyst of progress, modernity is slowly becoming "an activism of well-being". Its myth covers the growing abstraction of political and social life, in which it is progressively being reduced to *an everyday life culture*. Faced with these paradoxes, peripheral societies are perplexed and wonder whether modernity, which is objectively out of

reach, is not a trap in the snares of which Western societies are struggling in vain.

Is Modernity, exclusively, a "Western Affair"?

Starting from Citot's assertion (2005), we will see the extent to which it is true that "Modernity", which has historically been an internal event of Western civilization, actually has a universal scope, and that all people, either from the West or from anywhere else, aspire to this "modernity", that needs to be defined. Therefore, one can ask if asserting that "Modernity" is the monopoly of Western civilization has to do with ethnocentrism. Yes and no. Yes, in so far as we believe that the values of "Modernity" as they appeared in Europe in the XVth, XVIth, XVIIth

and XVIIIth centuries are entitled to be "exportable" to any society. No, insofar as it is less of an ethnocentric illusion by projection and generalization of a cultural prejudice than of an assumed thesis. In the Western countries, many scholars have sought to recapture *the spirit of modernity* in a synthetic way, and characterized it, not for nothing, as an individual and social enterprise of liberation from the various tutelages that maintained humanity in a state of mind of heteronomy, namely the spiritual, moral and scientific tutelage of the Church, the political and economic tutelage of the monarchy, the aesthetic tutelage of the ancients, as well as the social and psychological tutelage of the patriarchal family, etc. The spirit of modernity is a spirit of enfranchissment, liberation and empowerment. Modernity thus appears to be *the historical possibility of freedom*. Modern spirit was first the work of a handful of Florentine scholars of the fifteenth century. It gradually gained the whole of Europe, it then extended to all institutions before gaining the minds and mores. Moving from Western Europe, this unique spirit is exported to the new world (which soon after, and quite logically, declared its independence), and recently, with more or less delight and most often still very partially, it has attempted to spread over the surface of the globe. This globalization of the values of Western modernity is a historical fact. Freedom is the true

spirit of modernity, but freedom in general is not peculiar to the modern West. In a sense, the question of freedom has been at issue ever since the beginning of man's existence, if it is true that his humanity is more than a nature from which he inherited only a possibility and a responsibility. Culture appears as a collective liberation of mankind from the imperatives of nature, and the individual singularity in turn tries to liberate itself from this community, whose transcendent norms place it in a position of heteronomy. The affirmation of individualism confronted to the supra-individual standards and requirements would be one of the characteristics of modernity. The individual intends to make use of his thought and his critical thinking; he wants to express his own sensitivity, beyond the dogmas and canons of the society to which he belongs. Individualism understood as such implies no social exclusion or withdrawal into selfishness. Individual autonomy does not attempt to atomize the social tissue, but aims only at a form of socialization compatible with the respect for individual freedom. Modern democracy and modern law are the manifestation of such a compromise. Cultures which subdue the individual do not embody universality. And ultimately, this culture, which elevates the mind and grants the individual with access to universality, elevates the work of singular individuals, a work which society would finally appropriate in the form of a collective culture, and which other individuals would have to appropriate in their turn by participating and enriching it. "It is always in the individual that Humanity finds itself", wrote the philosopher Alain. The role of society is therefore to awaken the individual consciousness of his humanity by transmitting to him a culture which reveals his identity to himself, because as V. Citot put it: "The individual left to himself is a fool, and society that puts the individual at its service rather than putting itself at his service is plain barbarism."

Reason is the means of this liberty and participative autonomy. Modernity, which has not invented this form of liberty, has in fact taken it over and conjugated it into another version; it only reactivated a tradition, by taking the best of it and giving up the rest. Modernity is therefore the affirmation of the individual: the legitimacy of his free disposition of

himself, as well as the possibility of contributing to the universal human race. Men are therefore equal from this point of view; equality is a consequence of what we labeled as the *Universalist freedom*. To benefit from the universal leisure, one should be able to enjoy favorable conditions of existence; it is necessary to first of all become independent, so free in the second sense. This is why in principle, equality of men must, in order to be effective, be coupled with a minimum of material equality. This equality must therefore be recognized and encouraged; it was initially so at the legal level with the fundamental texts of the American and French Declarations at the end of the 18th century. The socialist movements of the nineteenth century have then claimed social efficiency: to move from a formal legal and political equality to a material and social one. The history of the twentieth century, though being so deplorable, has allowed a partial but substantial achievement of this equality within developed countries. We identify a fundamental notion of modernity here, namely the belief in historical progress. The important thing in reality is not to believe in it, but to undertake its project; what defines modernity is not the belief in progress but rather the project of a better future. The idea of progress is born, precisely, from man's reflection on his own historical conditions; this idea had to wait a good century to be elucidated, with the influence of the decisive scientific progress of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Modernity is therefore an invitation for man to take his destiny in charge, that is to say to force the factor of time to work in his favor. As Citot (idem) wrote:

> *Thus, modernity is, overall, man's awareness of his freedom -in the two-fold meaning of universalist and individualist freedom-, and commitment to achieve this freedom in terms of the social existence reality, through the recognition of the equality of men and by the historical project of putting it into practice.*

Scientific modernity is part of the "modern project" in that all the revolutions in the area of knowledge correlate with modernity as being defined: it is indeed about a rationalization of natural phenomena and an enlarged access for man to universal truths. The rigor of the experimental

method in particular marks a decisive turning point in this appropriation by man of the secrets of nature. Thanks to progress, man can become "master and owner of nature". This Descartes' formula expresses faith in science and in the future, it will be the symbol of "modern prometheism", of the idea that humanity, through its knowledge and technology, can only increase indefinitely its power over things. Prometheism is from this point of view a kind of humanism.

Modern thinking is political in its principles and genesis; a political thought is modern when it places man, and no longer the divine will, in the center of political organization. For the modernists, the natural order and the divine order cannot define the political order; the latter is human, a cultural affair. It is up to men to define for themselves the rules of their common life, without being subject to an onto-theological model. But if it is the individuals' agreement which sets up political organization, and if the latter does no longer lie anywhere in nature, or in the sky of eternal truths or in the divine understanding, "it is because it proceeds from free inter-individual regulation"; in other words, the freedom to contract with one's fellow becomes the new political principle. This freedom of arrangement has, logically, to evolve into a freedom to contract in order to guarantee its freedom. In other words, the political contract will become a rational and voluntary way of guaranteeing individual freedom as a natural aspiration of man. Natural freedom is thus guaranteed by a contract resulting from this same freedom; "modernity thus consists in conceiving of the political organization as a fact of culture, emanating from the free consent of individuals". Therefore, there is no longer any natural or pre-determined political hierarchy: everything has to be constructed. Based on the contestation by the moderns of the political organization of their time, it is "natural" for man to freely choose his political regime by virtue of the inherently cultural character of any political regime in general. Individuals adhere to a social pact whose purpose is to guarantee their individual freedom. In other words, any law that would try to deny this essential freedom will be null as such, for being anti-contractual. It is not possible to willingly give up one's liberty, and

the ultimate goal of any political organization is to preserve and extend this freedom. And to be sure that political power does not abuse its power, the separation of powers, "legislative", "executive" and "federative", is introduced. For "the post-modernists" on the contrary, liberty is first and foremost the freedom that citizens can bring forward and use against the State and against its omnipotence and its interference in private affairs. We move from a "holistic" to an "individualist" conception of political organization; the "holistic" consists in thinking of the primacy of the whole over the parts, that is to say, to cut down on the individual freedoms for the common benefit. Conversely, individualism, poses the irreducibility of individual rights and their primacy over any totalitarian value of the central power. In parallel to the social and economic turmoil, and the preceding ones in great part, political revolutions would give a new figure to modernity, which, has so far been confined to the order of ideas and culture. It is the advent of democracy and modern individualist law; the American and then the French citizens endow themselves with a Constitution in the image they have of their freedom, an individual freedom. People are granted "unalienable and sacred" rights. The State can no longer intervene in the private sphere, which falls under the responsibility of the individual over himself, the freedom to think, to believe or not to believe, to move, to express oneself, to enjoy one's private property, etc.

Avatars of "the Modern Project"

Modernity, as a global human project, is questioned as much by philosophers, political specialists, economists as by artists. Formerly defined as a break with tradition, "modernity" proponents have perceived the "postmodern" movement postulate as a decline of the main principles of the modern period, including reason, progress, and the individual. By privileging the cult of the present and narcissistic individualism, "the postmodern label" itself would have "exhausted its capacities to express the world that is coming" (Lipovetsky, 2004). This recurrent call into question since the end of the twentieth century has led certain

intellectuals of the "periphery" to revisit the issue by attempting to conceive of a third path between "tradition" and "modernism", that of "concordism" between the two extreme poles. Some consider that "the modern project" is out of reach for the peripheral societies because the latter lack the epistemic prerequisites, namely, the emergence of individual freedom, the force of reason against tradition, the secularization and the importance of society, adherence to the values of science and technology, and interest in democratic politics. "Modernization" has been established so as to integrate some values of "modernity" in local communities to build "a westernized society"; but, failing to be "a paradigmatic structuring mechanism", it served the local oligarchy with its political and economic wings, an oligarchy that has "recovered" the wealth generated through the state, the company and the bureaucracy. The "social modern and democratic project" has thus been converted to "sustainable development strategies" with uncertain meanders that have failed in their declared objective, namely to build a "modern project" based on the renewal of the mode of division and organization of social work as well as equitable redistribution of the generated wealth.

The fact of raising the problem of the relationship between "tradition" and "modernity" shows that after more than four decades of development and declared conviction, we are no more convinced of the necessity of an evolution from the traditional society to modernity as it has been practiced in Western countries. The researches conducted for several years at the level of the institutions of the United Nations, and particularly by UNESCO, responded to the same concern and aimed to explore different paths which put man and his culture at the center of concerns in a new approach of development. The so-called "modern" development models, which focus on economics, productivism and technicism, have been abandoned in favor of a domestic development that takes into account the real human, social needs and aspirations of the people. In this endogenous development, the developing countries are calling for respect for their cultural identity confronted to ethnocentrism and the evolutionary

culture of Western thought, which necessarily requires a systemic approach to the cultural phenomenon in its symbolic, creative, social and developmental dimensions.

Being conceptualized and performed by individuals belonging to the intellectual elite, the discourse of modernity addresses itself above all to the intellect, even when it has political aims. Its strength lies in the critical analysis of cultural heritage and the option for openness to progress, but its impact is limited and its *perlocutionary force* on weak receivers. In this respect, the intellectualist discourse is deflected with regard to the expectations of the masses that are more sensitive to the resurgence of the discourses they have already heard and experienced, and more predisposed to getting the traditionalist discourse (See Kably, 1989). This is why the discourse of "modernity" grants the intellectual with a privileged position. The latter, in fact, is assigned the role of a master thinker of the society to which he belongs; its major mission is to make the latter access *modern awareness*.

Laroui (1974) levels an acute criticism of the Arab intelligentsia, which he says, generally adopts a traditional frame of thinking or, to a lesser extent, adopts an eclectic approach. That is thus how the Arab intellectual is insensitive to the historical dimension and would find himself alienated both in time and in space. The traditionalist intellectual is alienated by identifying himself with a glorious and unsurpassable past, while the eclectic intellectual remains dependent on the processes carried out by the West. Laroui severely condemns the first type of alienation:

> *For every objective observer, true alienation is this loss of the self in the absolutes of language, culture, and the saga of the past. The Arab intellectual takes part in it joyfully, believing that he proves to the highest level of his freedom and expresses his profound personality. It is there that the internal chains are found, which tie him to a present which he, however, pretends to refuse; only the historical spirit will allow him to get rid of it. He may then be able, for the first time perhaps, to see reality: that these absolutes that he adores are strangers to him, and which he does not internalize no matter what he thinks of them, only through intellectual*

analysis and synthesis, that is to say, by a voluntary effort, and never by subjective assimilation and intuition.

(Idem, p. 193-194)

The crisis of the Arab intellectual results from the fact that he has always had mitigated attitudes towards the foundations of the Arab society, namely language, culture, and tradition, in the light of the stifling of democracy, the dominance of the economist ideology and the oppression of national minorities. So far, the intellectual has been unable to transcend such attitude and compromising behavior; and this is what explains his "unhappy consciousness". *The revolutionary intellectual*, generally coming from the petite bourgeoisie, was then assigned the task of modernizing society by rationalizing its structures. However, the accomplishment of such a mission can only take place if this intellectual complies with certain conditions:

- He can emerge in the Arab countries only if the latter are open to the Western progress;
- He must embrace the nationalist ideology and abandon romanticism and utopia; and
- He can change the balance of power if he manages to mobilize the masses by designing a program that is in the interest of the poor peasants, workers and dominated minorities.

We find basically the same attitude in the thinking of Al-Jābrī (1977), for whom the intellectual can only be *revolutionary*. According to him, the intellectuals constitute a social avant-garde which is able, thanks to its culture, to dissect the social situation of exploitation in which the popular masses and the poor peasants live, to explain to them the causes of this situation, and to denounce the comprador bourgeois and the feudal ones who are responsible for it. The intellectual is considered by the masses as a *symbolic father* and a model image. That is why he bears many responsibilities, firstly a *personal responsibility* which imposes on him an ethical behavior devoid of opportunism, selfishness and deviation in his behavior; secondly, a *social responsibility*, that is to say, he has to live in

society and not outside of it, in order to be able to grasp concretely the conditions in which the masses live. Finally, he is responsible for the future, in the sense that he should be an active agent in the masses and the designer of the objectives to achieve and of the directions to follow. He wrote in this respect:

> *It is up to the intellectual to pave the way of the revolutionary struggle so as to change this reality and establish the foundations of a new order likely to concretize the hopes and goals of the masses (Idem, p.21).*

A more intellectualist conception is expressed in the reflections of Khatibi. The intellectual occupies therein a privileged position as a symbolic actor in total possession of his critical liberty and not as an ideologue subservient to a party. He is the echo of his time and attentive to the profound changes; he calls on his community with as much insight into its weaknesses as into its strengths, and he is subject to an ethical discipline that requires him to be consistent with his ideas in his social behavior. He writes:

> *The intellectual is the receiver and transmitter of the signs of his time. (...) his initial mission is to awaken the spirit and to call on the society and not to manage it. (He) is the bearer of continuous freedom of mind. (Idem, 1993, p. 3-4)*

The intellectual cannot escape his time; he can play the role of the *custodian*, the *renovator* or the *inventor*. "The custodian intellectual" is the guarantor of tradition at the symbolic level; he is the guardian of the heritage, but a heritage which is petrified, mummified and fetishized. "The renovator intellectual" recognizes heritage as both a sign of the past and as a legacy some element of which are his own property and others belong to universality; these latter are likely to be re-read and reinterpreted, reinvigorated and reinserted in the living tissue of the present temporality. Finally, the inventor intellectual is the one who is confronted with unprecedented questions, those related to the technical and structural challenges of modern civilization, and who proposes original

solutions and creates new paradigms in the field of symbolic production (cf. Kuhn, 1970).

An atypical variant of the discourse of modernity is the one represented by Elmandjra (1992). The latter occupies a special position in the field of culture in that he adopts an attitude close to the *reformist theses*, while having an acute awareness of the historical underdevelopment and urgent need for modernity. In fact, he supports the idea that the West cannot be taken as a standard of modernity; he thus leveled a severe criticism:

> *.... the intellectuals who still believe in the model of mimicking the West as if there was only one way to modernity (...). To pretend that we have to take the same pathway as the West in order to achieve "modernity" means that we misunderstand the West, modernity, and above all, we don't know even ourselves.*
>
> (Idem, p. 79).

Alluding to the Japanese model, he asserts that modernization must be distinguished from "Westernization". The West cannot serve as a model because it is impermeable to any culture dialogue; its values are based on egoistic interest and violence. Therefore, it is necessary *to break up with the duality of the West and its ethnocentrism which negates civilizational pluralism*. The postcolonial era is that of "wars of civilizations", the first of which was the Gulf war. This new era is marked by contradictions between the North and the South, which are not only economic, political and strategic, but also cultural and civilizational. Confronted to these conflicts, the West undoubtedly undergoes an ethical crisis resulting from the contradiction between its opulence and the poverty of the peoples of the South. On the other hand, there is a conflict between international law as stated in the *United Nations Charter* and human rights stipulated in the *Universal Declaration of the Human Rights* and the facts as manifested in the violation of these rights in the practices of Western States in general, and more particularly their violation by increasingly larger sectors of the civil society in the northern countries. Contrary to what is said about

Elmandjra, an anti-imperialist ideologist, the latter developed a liberation thought based on openness and dialogue:

> *Cultures are the foundations of peace. No culture is, by definition, born to be aggressive or to fight another culture. And history has taught us that when a culture takes power, it tries to impose its system of values on the others. This is why there is conflict. But if we respect the basic rules of cultural communication and diversity, then I believe that the causes of conflicts will be minimized.*
>
> (Idem, Humiliation à l'ère du méga-impérialisme)

It is easy to see that in the modernist discourse, the intellectual is invested with a social and cultural mission that is disproportionate to his real competence and to the objective position he occupies in society. This is why discourse on the responsibility of the intellectual has taken dramatic tones that appear in the current situation either as an obsolete discourse recalling the romantic conception of the missionary creator in the Western society of the last century, or as a promethean vision of the intellectual bearing the burden of humanity. In both cases, it is a discourse that is naive and displaced in relation to the prevailing reality, a reality marked by the crisis of free thought in a society seeking itself. The transformations undergone by society in two decades have indeed imposed new values based on social pragmatism, which had as a major effect the domestication of the intellectual. This explains also why the discourse on the mission of the intellectual is no more of a value among the intellectuals, including those who initiated this debate. To talk about "revolutionary intellectual" or about "proletarian culture" is likely to sound peculiarly obsolete today. Now, more than ever, the need for free thinking imposes itself.

The trends which claim adherence to tradition interpret the discourse of "modernity" as the cultural and artistic expression of intellectual elite alienated by the Western rationality. They argue that this elite uses the weapons of dialectic and reason in order to destroy the foundations of the Arab-Islamic culture. According to them, the call for "rationalism" and "secularism" failed in the Arab world because, on the one hand, its

instigators are an elite which is mostly Christian, and on the other hand there is no opposition between religion and the State, because Islam is, at the same time, a religion and a State. The separation of religion and State is a European historical fact; it is foreign to the history of the Islamic community. Oumlil refutes the positions of the fundamentalists in the following terms:

> *Those who advocate that politics emanates directly and solely from the Shariâ (the Islamic law) are deluded because there is always intervention of a human mediator in its implementation.The difference is an attested fact because of this same mediation, because the text, in spite of being immutable in itself, is liable to multiple readings because of the plurality of interpretations and the multiplicity of the interests at stake. In this case, differences exist not only between those who postulate the subordination of politics to religion and those who oppose it, but also between those who are for this subordination. Indeed, since when have the "Islamists" - the ancients and the modern ones- among those who support an absolute coincidence between politics and Chair, constituted a unified and a similar tendency?*
>
> (Idem, 1992, p.96).

The contribution of intellectuals in the analysis of the symbolic situation is absolutely important, especially with respect to the criticism of the fundamentalist discourse. Indeed, the claims advanced by this discourse remain deceitful because the intended aim is to make politics an appendix of the *Shariâ* on the basis that the uniqueness of the reference, the Quranic text and the *Sunna*, constitute a guarantee to keep the faithful on the right path and to avoid discord between them. Actually, the proclamation of the subordination of politics to *Shariâ* has long been attested in the land of Islam, still without preventing the emergence of political and doctrinal divergences.

The crisis of intellectuality is evident. It is due to a large extent to the environmental conditions in which the intellectual lives, but one cannot reasonably overlook the intrinsic limitations of the latter. They are of

three types: incompatibility with reality, methodological immaturity and the disrespect of ethics. Indeed:

- The intellectual is dramatically cut off from the real world. These constructs involving a theoretical pretention are compiled from a truncated knowledge of the social and cultural reality of his community. This reality is not the subject of a scientific knowledge based on empirical tools but on his own interpretation according to dysfunctional reading grids. This leads to subjective judgments often in total incompatibility with reality;
- The intellectual is also confronted with a problem of methodology in his work. In fact, everyone works in isolation, cut off from what the others are doing, including those who work in the same domain. Most often, instead of working in a serene collaboration, intellectuals work in hierarchical cenacles on the basis of a structure of relations of master to pupil reproducing the same framework of thought. The debate usually shifts to polemics and verbal aggression; the aim is not to engage in dialogue but to symbolically kill the other. This explains why there is no scientific accumulation, no overtaking and no break up in paradigms. For example, we have vainly waited for an intellectual debate between Laroui, Al-Jâbri and Khatibi. Likewise, it would have been interesting to have a discussion between the latter and Sheikh Yassin, etc. It appears that the expected, desired, and sought gratitude is that of the elsewhere, from the West and/or from the Levant; finally;
- The intellectual also suffers from an ethical inadequacy between what he thinks, writes and says and what he does. Thought shifts to discourse as a strategy to seduce the other by performing simulations, or to denigrate him in the event of resistance. One sometimes would profess contempt for the sake of receiving honors and privileges and by cultivating a certain marginality of pageantry, while displaying an infallible pragmatism in daily life.

Society is less and less deceived about it, and one would sometimes shout at simulacrum. Such a dysfunction of thought and behavior is a symptom of the "peripheral intellectual syndrome" haunted by "modernity", a notion whose nature and function are, by the way, extremely ambivalent.

For a Double Criticism

The discourse of "modernity", in its different modulations, tries to introduce a new cultural paradigm in the field of symbolic production in Morocco. It takes as a starting point the radical criticism leveled to the "tradition" in its different forms, advocating the adoption of the present time rationality to make up for the "historical backwardness" of the society. Confronted with the issue of the Arab-Muslim heritage, the proponents of this paradigm generally consider that taking charge of the "current and positive aspects" of the heritage is a necessity as it strengthens the collective identity vis-à-vis the dominant West. But it is necessary, on the one hand, to conceive of heritage as a living body that is subject to the laws of history and, on the other hand, to firmly subscribe to the new universal culture. Aware of its marginality and the absolute necessity of overcoming such a situation, the modernist elite attributes great importance to the cultural struggle for democracy, a struggle which is defined as "the radical criticism of the cultural foundations of Tradition" (See A. Oumlil, 1992), especially the aspects of the cultural heritage from which it derives its legitimacy to claim a dual appropriation, that of Authority and that of Truth. It is a fight that begins with connecting the cultural to the human and to the universal, because authentic modernity supposes independence and participation, as well as the individual and the universal. Faced with the dilemma of the exclusive and mechanical choice of either route, Tradition *vs.* Modernity, the right path sounds to be that of double criticism based on the systemic understanding of the historical change taking place in societies and the vigilant and efficient implementation of a project bearing the potential of individual and collective intelligence.

Essay 15
Advocating for Citizenship Culture

In tribute to
Driss Chraïbi (1926-2007)

Statement of the Problem

The aim of this epilogue is to contribute to the reflection on the place of values in the debate on "identity", "Moroccanity" and "citizenship" as concepts and as practices, starting from the issue of the relationship of society to the law. This issue can be stated as follows: Morocco displays a reality marked by a diversity of cultures and languages. However, this diversity is not taken for granted as it is dealt with according to exclusive modalities, namely that of "the Islamic identity" based on the religious discourse, the one of the "Arab identity" based on the Arabist ideology, or even that of the "Amazigh identity", according to the Amazigh modality. However, there is a gap between the denial of diversity in everyday life and in discourse on the one hand, and law provisions on the other hand, mainly laws stipulated in the 2011 Constitution. The latter recognizes cultural and linguistic diversity in Morocco and delineates the legal and operational mechanisms in favor of its development and promotion. We are in this case facing a paradox between the inclusive philosophy of law and the exclusive tendency of society.

Examination of this problem, deliberately formulated in "definite" terms for the purposes of analysis, will lead us to defend the following thesis: the constitutional recognition of diversity implies the exercise of

cultural and linguistic rights within the framework of an inclusive public policy underpinned by the effective commitment of the State and society united together by the same vision of national identity and active citizenship. These are the main stages in the development of the debate on the issue of national identity in its connections with "Moroccanity" and "citizenship". Let us consider the common paradox: in these days when immigration is an issue of the day around the globe, "people" speak about "national identity" almost everywhere, but there is no consensus over its definition.

Arguing for an Imagined Identity

As a contribution to the debate on the problem of identity in Morocco, we formulate the following four arguments. These arguments are based on the concept of "imagined community" developed by Anderson (1983). Following the latter a nation is "a socially constructed community imagined" by the people perceiving themselves as part of that group, and believing to have a common heritage and collective responsibility to the nation. Moreover, it is "a flexible and negotiable cultural construct" that can change depending on the political, socio-cultural and socioeconomic circumstances.

Identity as a historical process

"Identity" is the product of a historical process which has brought into contact, competition, and conflict the endogenous cultural base with the various contributions of exogenous cultures which have been "nativized" through intercultural contact throughout the history of the country. Thus, Moroccan identity is a plural historical construct, a cluster of cults and identities, languages and cultures; and the cults are chronologically paganism, Judaism, Christianity and Islam. The components of identity are therefore plural: Amazigh, Sub-Saharan, Jewish, Phoenician, Iberian and Arabic, at a minimum. This plurality is a historical fact that is recognized

and conceptualized only recently, because of the hegemony of the Islamist and/or Arabist discourse produced by the national movement since the 1940s, partly in reaction to the colonialist discourse making the Gallic as the ancestors of the Berbers, and partly because of the emergence of the Amazighist discourse in the 1960s. For decades, the positions of the protagonists have been crystallized, and there has been a dialogue of the deaf between beliefs, excesses and mistakes of one another.

Identity as a Mirror Image Effect

The discourse on identity is a discourse based on the paradox of the mirror image: the representation that I have of my identity and of my culture is the exact inverted reflection of that of the Alterity. Thus, in Western countries and in a line of thinking of self-defense, the Arab/Muslim identity within the Maghrebian diaspora induces behaviors perceived as "deadly identity drifts". This reaction is generally advanced by Western analysts as a negative argument against communitarianism, although the representation of self-identity is euphoric based on a biased Eurocentric value system. The case of France is significant in this respect by its paradoxical and incoherent character. In fact, the advocacy of "cultural exception", as a modality of preserving French cultural identity in front of Anglo-Saxon hegemony, is consistent with the very essence of the idea of legitimate difference claimed by the non-native communities. But the latter demand is negatively perceived in the representation of endogenous communities. In the same line of thinking, in Iraq, for example, the Chiîte religious identity is perceived negatively by the Sunnis, and conversely the Sunnite identity is rejected by the Chiîtes. Similarly, in Israel, the Palestinian identity is stigmatized, and the Jewish identity vilified in the Arab countries. These various crystallizations around "the issue of identity" indicate the difficulty of cohabitation of different identities.

Identity as a Socio-cultural Construction

The configuration of identity is the result of a process in evolution, and under construction. It is neither closed nor absolute, hence, the plurality/diversity of identities and plural cultures. The definition of "identity" then arises. As far as we are concerned, we will admit to define "national identity" as the link which brings together the beings who are attached to it, and which assigns meaning to their collective belonging to a civic community. Is this a notion of common sense? Is it a notion of ontological and essentialist nature or a notion related to passeism? Or is it, on the contrary, a sign of post-modernity? Other untimely Questions are as follows: Are individual and collective identities irreducible or complementary? More particularly, is identity cumulative or subtractive?

On the basis of these questions, let us consider the question of "identity" as being addressed in the Amazigh environment. The observer remarks that at first Amazigh identity had a culturalist meaning with the birth of the Amazigh cultural movement starting with *the Moroccan Association for Research and Cultural Exchange* (the so-called AMREC, Rabat), since the end of the 1960s, followed by *the New Association for Culture and Popular Arts* (the so-called ANCAP, Rabat), and the *Cultural Take Off Association* (the so-called Al-Inṭilāqa aṯ-ṯaqāfiya, Nador). Reference to culture as a horizon for advocacy is outstanding in the name of the association itself; the associations aspire to the recognition of Amazigh culture, its revaluation and its promotion in its intangible dimensions (linguistic, literary and artistic expressions) and tangible ones (art, craftsmanship, and architecture). These same associations and more recent ones have evolved since the 1990s by integrating the component of human rights. The incorporation of linguistic and cultural rights as human rights has not been so obvious to the human rights associations in Morocco. The latter used to adopt a reductive vision of "human rights» under the pretext that cultural and linguistic rights could be "a Trojan horse" to advocate "the Amazigh specificity" with all what it could carry, such as "ethnicism", "tribalism", and "regionalism", etc. The specialists

argue that in the course of implementation of cultural and linguistic rights, a distinction has to be made between "personality rights" and "territoriality rights", between "individual rights" and "collective rights" ... The political use of Amazigh "identity" began to impose itself with the Ajdir speech (2001) within the scope of the State policy for promoting Amazigh, notably with the creation of IRCAM, and later on with the new Constitution (2011) which granted official status to Amazigh alongside with Arabic. The reaction of the political community, in general, has been to follow suit with the will of the State by occasionally adopting a political use of Amazighity, as in the case of the practices taking place during parliamentary elections.

Identity as phantasmagoria

Identity discourse is often considered as a carrier of intolerance, as being closed to others, rejecting the difference, or a vehicle of "mad" identities (cf. Khatibi, 1983) or even of "deadly" identities (See A. Maâlouf, 1998). For example, identity discourses, be they Amazighist, Arabist or Islamist, are sometimes performed as essentialist discourses anchored in the ideology of original purity, as idealistic discourses that magnify identity and cultural values, and convey a phantasmagorical vision of belonging, as a historical perspective of identity that makes of the human being, of its language, and its culture idealized objects and a vision of the spirit. This vision, which anchors "identity" in an unrealistic universe and accordingly escapes to an objectivizing approach, is the only way to be conceived of, worked on, and shaped in social practices to ensure its political sharing in a strategic goal of sustainable development. Considered from this angle, identity and its underlying culture are assets that can enable the community to access universal knowledge and modernity which, in turn, create the conditions for its durability.

For some people, "the question of identity" rises with an obvious acuity, especially for individuals or groups living in a migrant situation. By way of illustration, Muslim communities living in Western Europe

sometimes experience the "identity dilemmas" as an experience which generates anxiety, disturbance, psychological discomfort, existential disharmony, and all the things that can be faced with violent expressions of rejection of the lifestyle and culture of Western society. But should we generalize by postulating that such is the situation of any migrant? Certainly not, because there are many Maghrebian people who live in harmony within their social environment in Europe, where they are recognized and estimated. The host communities gratefully acknowledge the migrants contribution to their cultural diversity. This is the case in Holland, Belgium and France, where the contribution of allogeneic personalities are acknowledged in the areas of politics, culture, sport and business. If we take a historical look at the situation of certain communities with a migration tradition, such as Italian migration, with their disappointments, their successes, their exclusion, then their inclusion and sometimes their assimilation in the environment of the hosting society, it should be noted that the management of the phenomena of inter-community rejection and attraction, repulsion and seduction needs some time to lament the untimely original identities. The migrant should have access to the outcome of the process of integration in order for him to *choose,* consciously and with full knowledge of facts, his identity, which could be bipolar with the establishment of a *modus Vivendi* between Moroccan identity and that of the host country, or else monopolar by opting for either of them.

Moroccan community residing abroad is undergoing a process of evolution, if not a change, that is even more intense than that which is taking place in the Moroccan society. The preservation of Moroccan identity/culture is at stake in this change. Some studies conducted on cultural and linguistic change in migrant communities, namely in France, Belgium and Holland, reveal that migrants' behavior varies according to certain variables: generation, education and social environment (See Boukous, 2012). In general, these studies reveal that the first generation, with little education, is more attached to its original identity and to its native country than the younger generation, which is integrated into the

host culture, and which is eventually comfortable and does not envisage ultimate return to the country. Being aware of the characteristics of the dominant trend of the migratory flow, some people wonder how Moroccans residing abroad, whose profiles have nothing to do with those of the first generation, can claim or assume their Moroccan identity by bringing to their country of origin political support, knowledge, know-how and investments. Starting from this paradoxical situation, how can a Moroccan residing in Europe behave towards his native culture/identity? Is Moroccan identity/culture assumed and advocated? Does it represent an important symbolic need, a central value in the imaginary of migrants? Or is it experienced in unhappy, painful, unhealthy way and in a hostile environment? Or is this identity deliberately and consciously repressed as a stigma that prevents integration within the host society? As far as Amazigh culture is concerned, it is obvious that the contribution of the migrant artists and authors is considerable. We will mention here only the contribution to the renewal of the Amazigh culture of two creators established in Holland, the singer W. Mimoun and the author M. Chacha who contributed, respectively, to the emergence of the song and novel in Amazigh culture. The collaborative work conducted by the institutions concerned, *the Ministry of the Moroccans Residing Abroad*, *the Council of the Moroccan Community Abroad, and the Royal Institute for Amazigh Culture*, in partnership with Amazigh cultural associations in France, Belgium, Spain, Holland and Germany is significant in this synergy between the internal and the external levels, the outside and the inside, as well as the national level and the international level. Beyond the cultural shock, the difficulties of integration and the alias of assimilation and their impact on the preservation or decay of identity and culture, it is undeniable that an empathic and pragmatic approach to the migratory experience can constitute a resulting added value for migrants providing countries not only by their contribution in terms of foreign currency but also and perhaps most importantly by their qualitative contribution in terms of knowledge and know-how, engineering potential and political and diplomatic competence, everything acquired in the host countries.

From Jigsaw Puzzle to Rainbow

Moroccan identity comes across as being rather a jigsaw than a rainbow. It is made up of embedded identities on the basis of confessions (Islam *vs.* Judaism vs. Christianity *vs.* agnosticism) and language/culture (Arabity *vs.* Amazighity *vs.* Judaity). These identities are in a situation of symbolic competition which is more or less exacerbated, more or less managed or assumed. But within this arrangement, if one admits that "being Moroccan" represents the federating parameter of the components of this puzzle, then by elevating it to a focal position, one would ideally move from a confined confessional and ethnic conflicting arrangement to another relationship made of differences within the same Moroccan nation. The following representation illustrates this process:

< [Islamity (Arabity ≠Amazighity)] U [Judaity] U [Christianity] >

< [Moroccanity] ⇒ [Islamity] ∩ [Judaity] ∩ [Christianity] >

Symbols: ≠ different; ⇒implies; ∩ conjunction

It thus follows that what constitutes the unifying ground and the federator of the identity of Moroccans, is "Moroccanity" and not the confession, which implies that what unites them is the link of "being Moroccan" independently of the differences of religion, language and culture. How then to proceed so as to ensure that the supreme interest, the interest of and for the "Moroccanity", can prevail in the thinking and behavior on a contractual and ethical basis embraced by the state, society in general and individual citizens? This is the challenge imposed by the crossed looks of cultures and identities mobilized not for short-term and ephemeral interests but for the construction of a societal project in which Moroccans, whatever their religion, behave as actors exercising their rights as citizens and fulfilling their duties vis-à-vis their country. Therefore, in a world characterized by a great cultural diversity, globalization of exchanges and at the same time attachment to cultural specificities, as well as the manifestation of religion, and religious and spiritual references in communities, it is necessary to reconcile the values of the individual, the community or the national identity and the values shared by humanity. In other words, globalization has to cope with local

cultures, and the latter have to be enriched by human universal values. This is the vision advocated by UNESCO in its Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) program. It is in this line of thought that Sasson wrote: "The universally shared values are those which connect citizens to their community and commit them at the same time to embrace a vision of their future based on solidarity, trust and mutual respect, moral behavior, awareness for the protection of the environment, the responsible exercise of power and the treatment of others as equals. Here, we are at the heart of the close interaction between culture and development in the context of a humanized globalization" (Presentation at the Advisory Council on Human Rights, 2010).

The studies devoted to the recent evolution of Moroccan society (See *50 years of Human Development, 2025 perspectives*, 2005) show that the Moroccan citizen is characterized by "making effort to reconcile between tradition and modernity, that is to evolve in the contemporary world, to face globalization, to profit from it and to limit its shortcomings, while preserving the essence of his traditions, enriching them and putting them to the test of the evolution of mores, society and the world." But, for some decades now, "Moroccanity" has been characterized by some kind of clenching in certain sectors of society over the imposed tradition without critical thinking, over openness and curiosity with regard to what is new and to what is evolving in other sectors. As for the values characterizing Moroccan identity, the experience gained in the field of human rights since 1990, especially in the context of *Equity and Reconciliation Commission*, opinion surveys (the World Survey on Values (2000)) and the national survey conducted in Morocco on values in (2005), and historical analysis and cultural diversity (v. Boukous, 2018), indicate that Moroccans are generally attached to the values of justice, equity and solidarity.

In any case, the Moroccan would not fail to meditate on these words by Renan:

> *When we confine ourselves within a particular culture, considered as national; we limit ourselves, we cloister. We leave the open air that we breathe in the vast field of humanity to shut ourselves inside the conventicles of compatriots. Nothing is worse for the mind; nothing is more*

unfortunate for civilization than that. (...) Before French culture, German culture, Italian culture, there is human culture.

Renan, What is a Nation? (p. 26).

Citizenship Awareness

Awareness of "citizenship culture" is new in Morocco; it emerged with post independence political demands for the instauration of democracy and human rights, and particularly with the Movement of February 20, 2011. Traditionally, Moroccans are considered as "subjects of His Majesty". With the various constitutions promulgated since 1962, rights have been recognized to Moroccans, but it is the constitution of 2011 that clearly stipulates these rights, and at the same time establishes institutions and bodies for the protection of rights and freedoms, namely the National Council for Human Rights, the Mediator, the Council of the Moroccan Community Abroad and Authority in Charge of Parity and Combating all Forms of Discrimination. The Preamble of the Constitution defines the Moroccan State as follows:

> *The Kingdom of Morocco is a sovereign Muslim State that is attached to its national unity and territorial integrity, and committed to preserve the diversity of its unified national identity. This unity is forged by the convergence of its Arab-Islamic, Amazigh, and Saharo-Hassani components, and enriched by its African, Andalusian, Hebraic and Mediterranean influences. The preeminence accorded to the Islamic religion in the national reference is consistent with the commitment of the Moroccan people to the values of openness, moderation, tolerance, dialog, and mutual understanding between all the cultures and civilizations of the world.*

However, the terms "citizen" and "citizenship" are absent from the text of the Constitution. This is why voices are calling for *the Charter for the citizen* which is equitable and adhering to modernity and in line with the project developed by the Consultative Council of Human Rights (2009) stipulating that :

- All citizens are free and equal with regard to their rights and responsibilities;

- All aspects of social life have to be codified. The law must be respected by all and apply to all and without exception. It can only be changed by means which are themselves legal;
- Concerned with dignity and the welfare of all female and male citizens, the Moroccan society rejects social divides within it. Attached and committed to the essential values of solidarity, female and male citizens are mobilized against exclusion, inequality and discrimination of all kinds;
- Community life is based on active citizenship in which citizens, voluntarily, participate in the animation of their daily living space, contribute to the modernization and democratization of Moroccan society, and engage in the action of national development;
- Education is a public service obligation for all citizens. The State must, as soon as possible, make the compulsory character of schooling up to the age of fifteen effective. It must also ensure the quality of teaching at all levels and the promotion of scientific and technical research;
- The teaching staff is responsible for the development of education. It must adopt an ethical and civic behavior, and fulfill its mission of transmitting knowledge with a sense of responsibility, and with a constant desire to improve by self-training efforts;
- The State must provide the teaching staff with quality training and adequate working conditions;
- Parents have the responsibility to contribute to the qualitative education of their children;
- School students, at least from secondary school level, and university students should be treated as partners of the teaching and administrative bodies of schools and universities,

and they should be able to have their own deliberation and "government" bodies in order to initiate them at an early age to their status of citizens, consolidate their knowledge and acquire the motivation necessary for learning;

- The Nation as a whole must be mobilized in order to eradicate illiteracy in the shortest possible time;
- Morocco is a country of cultural plurality. All the languages that are related to Arabic and Amazigh, spoken therein must be recognized and be allowed to develop and to be used at school, in everyday life and in cultural expression;
- Learning in other languages, such as French, Spanish, English and Chinese, should be encouraged;
- Morocco rests upon a plural cultural identity. Female and male citizens have the right to cultivate themselves and to emancipate in their cultural identity and the cultures of their choice;
- The State must guarantee free and easy access to culture;
- The State must deploy the necessary efforts to provide the country with adequate infrastructure and to encourage cultural and sports activities;
- Artistic creation in particular must be promoted and respected regardless of its forms and of public affinities to which it is addressed, given that art is an area of freedom and creativity par excellence ;
- Female and male citizens have the right to live in a healthy environment;
- Citizens have the responsibility to bequeath to the future generations an environment that is at least in the same state as

the one in which they have lived, according to the fundamental principles of sustainable development;

- The State is responsible for the protection of the environment and the dissemination of the culture of sustainable development.

"Living-Together" Principle

Citizenship conceived of as such assumes the appropriation of the culture of "living-together." Everyone can have his own definition, his conception, his vision of this common notion which is not yet a concept but it is nonetheless useful. To define it negatively, it is neither "tolerance" that keeps the difference in fine distance, nor is it superficial and condescending interculturality. It is rather the willingness of individuals and communities to live, to create and to work together in an environment of equality and conviviality. It has noting to do with the national entity divided by horizontal differences (cultural, ethnic, confessional, etc.) and/or vertical disparities (social class, socio-economic categories, etc.). At a global level, "living together" is antithetical to the closing of borders, the erection of walls of separation, to throwing the wretched of the earth in the sea... to symbols of a fearful world that maintains phobias, to a communitarian world, with national and local identities which are mad and deadly, vis-à-vis which the dominant, the West, is strictly uncompromising. Let's take two metaphors here. That is not cohabitation in a collective ownership in a Spanish inn where everyone brings his own bread and his wine; nor is it cohabitation in a house which is "kosherized". It would, ideally, be the common life in a *fondouk*, in a caravanserai where every family has its own room but where the common facilities (the kitchen, the toilets and the living room) are managed collectively. The courtyard is the place of meeting, of dialogue, of consolidating the social bonds, the place of artistic creation and entertainment ... A tacit agreement, a moral and deontological contract, define the rules of cohabitation and of living together.

The “living-together” issue is nowadays a central matter because the more the movement of people, ideas, cultures, languages, and material products becomes important, the more tensions, conflicts and terror become prevalent in all continents and between communities. This being said, it becomes difficult to produce a coherent discourse, one that is projective, a bearer of socio-political efficiency based on notions such as “*dialogue*”, “*tolerance*”, “*cohabitation*” and *“living-together*” without falling into naivety, idealism or *jargonaphasia*. Yet, it should be done, because what may appear today as verbiage with no significant consequences, may prove to be advantageous and promising in the medium or long term. It is a project for the future.

In the context of globalization underpinned by the circulation of ideas, culture, languages, and market products through the new communication and information systems, the integration of peoples and countries takes place in a system that is fundamentally devoid of equity and morality and plagued by conflicts. The most serious problems are manifested by the hindrances to the free movement of “the populations from the south”; the perpetuation of illegal exchanges in terms of value between the products of the North and those of the South; the conflicts and wars between the westerners and the rest of the world; the religious conflicts between the Muslim countries and within these countries; and the degradation of the ecological environment and climatic deregulation due to overexploitation of natural resources. This description of the current state of the world may look to be caricatural, pessimistic or macabre, but it does not deviate much from today's reality. The main causes of this situation are profit, greed, monopolization of wealth, and the quest for power to control the world and its resources through international finance and multinational companies. Its means are force, violence, and terror through resort to military industries with devastating effects. Nevertheless the principle of “living-together” is the only viable option for humanity because it is a matter of survival for the human race in as much as the issues it involves are serious and vital. It is also undeniable that such an environment generates exchange, dialogue and cohabitation; so much so that progress

in the fields of science, technology, education, health, culture, housing, working conditions, and so on, has raised the standard of living, and increased longevity; the means of communication have facilitated the lives of the people through building roads, railways, shipping and air transport. Of course, this does not mean to engage into blissful optimism. Not everyone and not all social categories profit equitably from these advantages; certain social groups here and elsewhere continue to live in conditions of precariousness.

In such a context, how can all ideal conditions for "dialogue", "cohabitation" and "living-together" be met? It can be argued that it is the responsibility of the government and its institutions to redouble their efforts to integrate the disadvantaged people by providing employment, wages and education, and improving health care conditions. It is certainly the case, but we all know the complex problems which States are facing, the management of political and macroeconomic balances, and the management of the scarcity of financial resources, etc. It may be beneficial that the citizen gives a hand too; the era of the welfare State is over. The rich citizen, who has the means to do so, has the duty to pitch in his hand into the dough or more precisely into his pocket. It is necessary to claim one's rights but it is also necessary to act as an active and honest citizen, by cultivating citizenship-based practices: doing one's job properly, paying one's taxes, guaranteeing the rights to one's employees, etc. In short, to create the conditions of "living together" requires changing the culture paradigms; and that starts with oneself, with a personal commitment, with a thorough work on oneself, through the assimilation of the values of sharing, and of "pleasing sobriety" (See Rabin, 2010) ... Everyone can achieve this in his own way. In other words, the approach consisting of being too demanding vis-à-vis the other, of being exempt from custom duties, of wanting to ask everything to others, to the government, to the commune, to the company, to the institution, to Europe, to the West, and so on, is an approach which leads to an irresponsible, dishonest, and hypocritical attitude and behavior. This presupposes, assuredly, civic

governance which is virtuous and concerned about the public interest, in a word governance that is fully democratic.

To return to a level where each of us is emotionally and rationally challenged, and for giving the debated question its humanistic dimension, let's read. Cheng (p.1, 2017) on simplicity, modesty and depth of thought:

> *My personal experience ends up convincing me that man's destiny is to be "the interlocutor". Man can exist only through dialogue with his fellow men, with living environment and with transcendence. In dialogue, one never risks to lose one's soul. By discovering the best of the other, one discovers his own best part. The best part that calls for the best part, the human spirit expands, ascends and accesses another dimension of being. The truth about life can only be revealed through this voice / way of openness....*

Identity as a Mystic Feeling

Moroccan cultural identity has no chance for durability unless it gets rid of the demons which sweep it to the alienations of the past and the present. Identity is chosen and constructed based on freedom, innovation and knowledge. "Being Moroccan", which itself is not necessarily a monolithic fact, is made up of cultures and identities expressed in their unity and diversity. Diversity represents the foundation of the human condition, the invigorating soil of its environment; it is the receptacle of the root sap which energizes the branches of the tree of life; it is the vector of universal values that project us into the future. In the concert of world identities, "being Moroccan" (*tamghribiyt*) is built on citizenship, respect for the fundamental values of human rights and duties. It cannot blossom in a factitious entity emanating from traditional tribalism of ancient Morocco, or in neo-tribalism based on mercantile or political allegiances. It can, on the other hand, flourish in a Morocco of inclusion, open to the spirit of modernity made of liberty, and of universalism, a Morocco which also guarantees both individual liberties and collective rights, as Alain (*Propos,* 1911), in the same line of thought, stated: "It is always in the individual that humanity finds itself".

Ultimately, “being Moroccan” is this mystical feeling that makes Chraïbi, who had nonetheless chosen exile, say: “I love my country. As far as I can go all over the world, I only have to close eyes to see, hear, smell and feel it.” Should it be recalled that the great author managed to attain this degree of serenity thanks to being able to appropriate the values of a humanized modernity that he has been advocating for since his first novel *Le passé simple* (1954).

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يتمحوَر هذا الكتابُ حول مركزيّة الثقافة بمغرب اليوم كإشكالية رئيسَة، وما يحتّم تدبير رهاناتها على نحوٍ "عولمحلّي" يوفّق بين عناصر "العولمة" و"المحلية". وتهُمّ المظاهرُ التي تتناولها التحاليلُ المقترَحةُ المخاطرَ الرمزية للتنوّع الثقافي في سياق العوْلَمَة وكذا ما يتضمّنه الحقلُ الثقافي من العروض النموذَجيّة، خاصّةً منها ما يتصل بالطوباوية "البيْثقافيّة"، وبمفارقات الخطابات التُراثية، وتعاظل العلاقة بين "التقليد" و"الحَداثَة"، وكذا تناذر أعْراض "السّعْي الهوياتي". وتُبرز خاتمةُ الكتاب معالمَ السيرورة نحو بناء "المُواطَنَة المغربيّة". وقد تم التوسّلُ في هذه الدراسة بمقاربةٍ تَعتمدُ السوسيولوجيا النقديّة للهيمَنة الرمزيّة إطاراً نظريّاً.

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ⵄⵇ ⵙⵇⵄⵓⵄⵍ ⵖⴰⵏⵙⵇ ⵄⴰ ⵅⵃ ⵜⵛⵖⵅⵙⵇⵜ ⵏ ⵜⵏⵏⵖⵛⵇⵄ ⵏ ⵜⴰⵏⵇⵄ ⵣ ⵉⵛⵢⵇⵙⵇ ⵏ ⵓⵄⵇⵇ ⵄⴰ. ⵙⵣⵣⵄⵍ ⴰ ⵄⴰ ⵙ++ⵓⵄⵇⵣⵄ ⵖⵇⵓⵖⴰⴰⵖ ⵏ ⵙⵛⵇⵄⵄⵇⵇ ⵏⵇ ⵅⵃ ⵇⵍⵄ ⵜⵢⵄⵓⵙⵇⵙⵏ : « ⵜⵄⵇⵛⵄⵄⵇⵍⵜ » ⴰ «ⵜⴰⵢⵄⵇⵄⵍⵜ». ⵄⵇ ⵇⵄⵓⵄⵍ ⵙⵇⵃⵇⵙⵜⵏ ⵏ ⵖⴰⵏⵙⵇ ⵄⴰ ⵅⵃ ⵙⵛⵙⵅⵙⵜⵏ ⵙⵏⵙⵅⵍ ⵏ ⵖⵛⵎⵍⵄⵍ ⵄⴰⵍⵇⵄⵍ ⵣ ⵎⵍ ⵖⵏⵍⵄⵇ ⵏ ⵜⵇⵛⵄⵄⵇⵍⵜ, ⴰ ⵎⵃⵇⵄⵇⵍ ⵎⵍⵍⵍ ⵣ ⵎⵎⵣⵇ ⵄⴰⵍⵇⵄⵍ, ⵇⵍⵄⵓⵍ ⵄⵘⵘ ⵄⵎⵍⵍⵎ ⵎⵅⵍⵎⵏ ⵇ ⵜⵃⵎⵍⵄⵓⵓⵍⵜ « ⵜⵄⵍⵅⵇⴰⵍⵇⵄⵍⵜ », ⴰ ⵜⵛⵅⵄⵍ ⵎⵍⵍⵍ ⵣ ⵎⵍⵇⵓⵍ ⴰ ⵎⵇⵇⵄⵍ ⵇⵅ ⵓⵄⵎⴰⵄ, ⴰ ⵖⵛⵛⵖⵘ ⵏ ⵖⵛⵎⵇⵄⵇⵇⵄ ⵏⵅⵇ « ⵜⵄⵅⵍⵇⵄ », ⴰ « ⵜⵛⵜⵇⵄⵇⵇⵜ », ⴰ ⵎⵏⵅⵄⵃⵏ ⵏ « ⵖⵇⵎⵅⵅⵍ ⵇ ⵜⵛⵄⵅⵎⵜ ». ⵄⵇ ⵜⵛⵛⵄⵍ ⵜⵛⵇⵅⵄⵍ ⵏ ⵖⴰⵏⵙⵇ ⵄⴰ ⵜⵄⵖⵇⵎⴰⵜ ⵢⵇ ⵜⵖⵇⵘⵅ ⵏ « ⵜⵛⵖⵇⵎ ⵜⵄⵛⵢⵇⵄⵖⵎⵜ ». ⵏⵄⵃⵄⵇ ⵣ ⵜⵢⵖⵇⵎ ⵄⴰ ⵎⵄ ⵜⵛⵎⵄⵍⵄⵇⵜ ⵎⵇⵍⵍⵏ ⵅⵃ ⵜⵇⵖⵇⵎⵎⵍⵎⵖⵎⵜ ⵏ ⵖⵅⵢⵄⵍ ⵏ ⵜⵘⵎⵅⵙⵜ ⵏ ⵎⵍⵍⵍⵍ.

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This book attemps to address the main issues underlying the arduous process of cultural identity construction in present day Morocco. The analysis of these issues is conducted within the framework of symbolic domination in critical sociology. It focuses on the centrality of culture and the necessity for a "glocalized" management of its challenges. It also relates these aspects to the vagaries of cultural diversity in the context of globalization and to cultural discourses competition, mainly the interculturalist utopia, the patrimonial paradoxes, the binomial Tradition-Modernity avatars, and the identity quest syndrome.

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Le présent ouvrage est focalisé sur la problématique de la centralité de la culture dans le Maroc d'aujourd'hui et la nécessaire gestion « glocalisée » de ses enjeux. Les aspects sur lesquels sont polarisées les analyses proposées se rapportent aux aléas de la diversité culturelle dans le contexte de la globalisation et à l'éventail de l'offre paradigmatique dans le champ culturel, notamment l'utopie "interculturaliste", les paradoxes du discours "patrimonialiste", les avatars de la relation entre « la tradition » et « la modernité », et « le syndrome de la quête identitaire ».
L'épilogue met en exergue le laborieux cheminement de la construction de « la citoyenneté marocaine ». L'approche adoptée se ressource dans la sociologie critique de la domination symbolique.

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